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Can a right, as an abstract yet powerful symbol of a legitimate claim, influence individual
political behavior independent of the underlying entitlement the right represents? Or are rights
merely rhetorical proxies for distributional struggles? This dissertation examines whether the for-
mal recognition of a right—in particular, a formal property right to land—can empower political
engagement. I construct a theoretical framework for how legal property rights influence political
behavior around two central claims. First, I argue that legal rights have an impact that goes be-
yond expectations of economic value or tenure security. Legal rights are powerful symbols that
also legitimize claim-making and empower rights-bearers to engage in politics. In this sense, legal
rights not only provide the rights-bearer with a material entitlement (i.e. an increase in economic
value or material endowment), but also a political entitlement in the form of a greater legitimacy
in demands for protection and benefits from the state. This increased sense of legitimacy, in turn,
can spill over to influence political behavior more generally by incentivizing political participation
and claim-making. I refer to this mechanism as the “symbolic effect” of rights.
My second claim is that this empowering, symbolic effect is strongest where property pro-
tections are weakest and underlying rights most vulnerable. Specifically, this occurs when the
state is either unable to provide adequate guarantees or unwilling to enforce rights as a matter of
course. Under such conditions, rights help define just claim-making and legitimate grievances, thus
incentivizing greater political engagement.
I construct my theory and provide an initial test of derived hypotheses by relying on expe-
riences with rural titling programs benefiting small-holder peasant farmers in Peru and Colombia.
Land titling differs from traditional land reform policies, in that it attempts merely to formalize the
existing tenure regime, and hence does not otherwise impact the distribution of landholding. This
provides a unique moment to examine the effect of a change in legal rights that is distinct from
changes in underlying assets or benefits. In essence, we can focus specifically on what impact the
“right” itself has, while keeping the actual distribution of property relatively constant. In addition to
recognizing important rights to land for thousands of peasant farmers, these programs also provided
a significant moment of interaction with central state authorities. As a result, titling provides not
only a new material connection to the state—in the form of a full, legal title—but also a symbolic
connection through the rights and privileges promised in those documents.
I draw on three sources of data to provide empirical support for my theory. First, I provide a
historical summary of access to rural land and legal property rights in Peru and Colombia over the
20th and early 21st Centuries, highlighting the importance of legal property rights for shaping rural
conflict and claim-making by peasants. The second source of data is from a series of semi-structured
interviews with peasant, smallholding farmers in rural areas of Peru and Colombia. Through these
interviews, I attempt to understand the meaning peasants place on legal titles, experiences with
land titling, and local practices for regulating private land and participating in rural village politics.
Third, I use original, panel data of titling through the now-defunct Colombian Institute of Rural
Development (INCODER, Instituto Colombiano de Desarrollo Rural) from 2000-2015, and in Peru
through the first two waves of massive land titling in the Rural Land Titling and Registration
Project (Proyecto de Titulacio´n y Registro de Tierras Rurales, PTRT) from 1996-2007.
I find evidence that changes in legal rights are associated with increases in voter turnout,
use of courts, and willingness to engage in politics, but only in areas with weak state institutions.
Conversely, in areas with strong state institutions where titling likely increases tenure security, for-
malized property rights either produce no change or are associated with a reduction in engagement.
These findings support my theory that legal rights exert a “symbolic effect” on behavior, which
can lead to counter-intuitive results as formal rights promote engagement most where rights are
otherwise weak or ineffectively protected.
This evidence highlights the non-material effects of legal rights—an impact that is often over-
looked by most political economy scholars who typically understand property rights as synonymous
with property tenure (i.e. the expectation of extracting value from property). Instead, I focus on
the “right” itself as a moral claim to protection and special consideration by the state. This shift
in perspective can broaden our understanding of property rights by explaining how legal rights can
influence behavior and convey meaning even when they do not otherwise change material benefits.
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“You can’t trust the politicians in the municipal government, they’re all corrupt!” I was siting
with Don Jose´, an elderly farmer in a small rural village in the Andean highlands of A´ncash, Peru.1
We were discussing his views on farming, local village politics, and—most interesting to me—his
experience with a massive land titling project that came through nearly two decades before. Don
Jose´ was a peasant farmer with just under a hectare of land divided between a couple parcels he
had purchased over time. All of these land sales were finalized “by word” (i.e. a verbal contract) or
a simple letter of sale from the prior owner, the later of which did not amount to a full legal title
under Peruvian law.
Don Jose´’s thoughts on the government and state institutions were fairly typical of other
smallholding, peasant farmers I encountered in my fieldwork in A´ncash. Do you trust the national
government? “No, no, they don’t listen to the people in the countryside.” Do you trust in the
elections? “No, not at all.” Do the courts in Peru guarantee a fair trail? “Only for the rich!” Don
Jose´’s reactions were understandable. His village had few basic services and the closest police station
or Justice of the Peace was a couple hour’s walk down the river and across a footbridge which, until
recently, had been uncrossable after it had been washed out several years ago in a flood. In years
past, property theft and common crime in the village were so high that villagers had organized a
volunteer night watch group to help scare off thieves.
While not uncommon, Don Jose´’s views of the government and politicians were not shared by
all the smallholding farmers with whom I spoke. Several had relatively positive views of the national
government at the time or the local courts. However, nearly all had a similar and curious reaction
to the next question: Is the formalization and titling of lands important for your community? “Yes,
absolutely! Titling is very important, without a title, you don’t have anything!” Almost all of the
peasant farmers I met with in both Peru and Colombia shared this sentiment and thought very
strongly of the importance of having a full, legal title. Many, such as Don Jose´, still safely guarded
the large, colouful titles that were distributed during the first titling campaign in the late 1990s (see
photograph below).
1All respondent names are pseudonyms to protect the confidentiality of respondents.
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Figure 1.1.: Beneficiary of land titling during the first wave of massive titling (1996-2000) in A´ncash,
Peru.
The contrast between the faith in legal titles and the serious distrust in state institutions
seemed inherently contradictory to me. Why was a legal title so important if the organs of the
state charged with defending that title were at best distant and inaccessible and at worst corrupt?
The titling programs, while effective at distributing legal certificates of title, did not seem to offer
much material benefit to the smallholding peasants in the countryside. Many former titling officials
doubted the ultimate capacity of land titling to spark development or increase access to credit as
had been promised. This pessimistic view aligns with existing studies on the program which showed
little effect on economic outcomes such as access to credit (Fort, 2007; Zegarra, Escobal, and Aldana,
2008). Rural smallholders also seemed perfectly willing to transact in property and resolve local
disputes using informal documents such as letters of sale and hand-written testaments. Why would
a formal property right be so universally significant to peasant farmers if the material benefits are
relatively few?
The heart of this study is an effort to understand why legal titles to property—essentially
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little scraps of paper—seem to signify so much for small landholders in the countryside of Colombia
and Peru. Are these scraps of paper valuable because they actually help peasants prove material
entitlements or secure economic value from land? Or do they also represent a deeper connection
between the landholder and the state—a symbolic connection between the rights-bearing citizen
and the duty-holding state?
In addressing this question, I develop a theoretical framework around two central claims.
First, I argue that legal rights can have an impact that goes beyond expectations of economic value or
tenure security. Legal rights are powerful symbols that legitimize claim-making and empower rights-
bearers to engage in politics. In this sense, legal rights provide two types of entitlements for the
rights-bearer. The first type is material. Material entitlements increase the expected economic value
that an individual can extract by increasing the resale value of land or by stabilizing a landholder’s
expectations of maintaining their property over time, free from threats of encroachment by the state
or other individuals. The second type of entitlement is political. Political entitlements increase the
legitimacy of an owner’s demands for protection and benefits from the state. This increased sense
of legitimacy, in turn, can spill over to influence political behavior more generally by incentivizing
political engagement and claim-making. I refer to this mechanism as the “symbolic effect” of rights.
My second claim is that this empowering, “symbolic effect” is strongest where property pro-
tections are weakest and underlying rights most vulnerable. Specifically, this occurs when the
state is either unable to provide adequate guarantees or unwilling to enforce rights as a matter
of course. Under such conditions, rights help define just claim-making and legitimate grievances,
thus incentivizing greater political engagement. From a certain perspective, this second claim may
seem obvious. If legal rights are symbols of legitimate claims, then they should naturally lead to
greater claim-making and demands for protection whenever they are under threat. However, from
the perspective of much political economy theory on legal property rights, this assertion is counter-
intuitive. Under this perspective, a legal right is only valuable if the state commitment backing
the right is credible (North, 1990; Firmin-Sellers, 1995). Stated differently, why would a legal title
incentivize claim-making if everyone knows the state is unable or unwilling to back that claim?
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My response, which I develop theoretically and defend empirically throughout this work, is that
rights are symbols that do not only regulate economic choices, but also political decisions about
what forms of claim-making and political participation are just and fair. In this sense, Don Jose´’s
insistence on the importance of titling was not because he could better defend his property interest
in court or before the state, but rather because of the greater, symbolic legitimacy he could claim
as a legal land owner.
I base my empirical analysis on legal property rights to rural land for peasant farmers in
Peru and Colombia, and, in particular, on major land titling programs in each country.2 Rural
land titling is a politically popular policy that has been promoted by governments and international
development organizations in developing countries all over the world. Land titling typically involves
a massive effort by the state to formalize and register the current, actual possession of land. During
such efforts, state officials often arrive in a given area and attempt to delineate existing land holdings,
record these in a national registry, and provide landowners with formal titles that legally guarantee
their rights. The overall objective of land titling is to spark rural development by promoting
investment, improving access to credit, and facilitating land transactions (De Soto, 2000; De Janvry,
Sadoulet, and Wolford, 2001).
Although sharing the same fundamental objective with prior agrarian reform policies (i.e.
rural development), land titling differs from earlier land reforms, in that it attempts merely to for-
malize the existing tenure regime, and not to redistribute or otherwise impact physical landholdings.
This then provides a unique moment for researchers to examine the effect of a change in legal rights
that is distinct from changes in underlying assets or benefits. In essence, we can focus specifically
on what impact the “right” itself has, while keeping the actual distribution of property relatively
constant. In addition to recognizing important rights to land for thousands of peasant farmers,
these programs also provided a significant moment of interaction with central state authorities. As
a result, titling provides not only a new material connection to the state—in the form of a full, legal
2Throughout this study I use the terms “peasant” and “smallholding farmer“ interchangeably to refer to a socioe-
conomic class of rural farmers in Latin America known as campesinos. These individuals are typically from poor
backgrounds, own or possess relatively small plots of land, depend at least in part on subsistence agriculture, and
share a common cultural identity (see Thiesenhusen, 1995; Vendryes, 2014).
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title—but also a symbolic connection through the rights and privileges promised in those documents.
In the chapters of this study, I provide evidence of changes in political behavior as a result
of these titling programs. I compare not only political behavior in regions before and after titling,
but also between areas with weak and strong enforcement of property rights. As I explain further in
Chapter 2, these comparisons help isolate the symbolic effect of rights via political entitlement from
changes in the material entitlement that a right can provide. This evidence demonstrates how legal
rights are more than just representations of material entitlements, they are also political entitlements
that can shape the ways in which individuals engage with the state and in politics. Legal titles have
the potential to strengthen property tenure, increase land values, and increase the expectation of
future material benefits. But they also increase the legitimacy of making claims toward the state,
reinforce the political identity of landholders as citizens with just and fair entitlements, and focus
attention on the state’s corollary duty to respect and protect those rights.
In turn, a deeper understanding of the importance and meaning behind rural property rights
can also give us insight into how one of the most important political concepts of modern time, the
legal right, and how it connects individuals and the state. While my discussion and evidence centers
on rural property rights, the theoretical implications of this study go beyond the effect of land titles.
The theory I develop on the symbolic effect of legal rights can be applied more generally to other
significant civil and political rights. Indeed, any fundamental legal right is a symbol that legitimizes
claim-making and justifies political participation on behalf of the rights-bearer.
1.1. The Symbolic Effect of Rights
The essence of my theory of the symbolic effect of legal rights is that property rights and rights
regimes do not just shape expectations of economic benefits. That is, rights do more than simply
determine who has a claim to a particular area of land and how likely an individual can enforce that
claim through the use of state institutions. Rights also give rise to politically legitimate actions
that do not exist in their absence. Rights shape our understanding of who are legitimate political
actors, what type of claims are permitted, and who is the appropriate authority for realizing those
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claims. While the struggle for control over property and resources may be one of the main goals of
politics (if not the ultimate goal), to understand the full importance of property rights for politics
we must also understand how the rights framework provides a foundation for defining appropriate
claims and legitimate claim-makers. In other words, when analyzing the political implications of
property rights, we must not only explore the impact of “property” (or tenure security, the ability
to capture a stream of revenue (Barzel, 1997)), but also the behavioral and attitudinal impact of
the “right” itself.
To understand the relationship between formal, legal rights and political participation, I
begin from the perspective that a legal right is a political statement that an individual’s claim to
an entitlement is legitimate. A right, and in particular a fundamental right, is an assertion that
an interest is imperative and superior to other economic and practical considerations (Dworkin,
1977). The formal recognition of a right by the state, either through legislation, the judiciary,
or an administrative action, will thus increase subjective perceptions that a right-bearer’s claim
ought to be respected by third parties and state institutions. Rights are also key for defining
citizenship (Turner, 1997) and the distribution of entitlements within a state (Holston, 2008). Thus
a right provides a moral justification for making public claims to defend an underlying entitlement
(Scheingold, 2010). In essence, to have a right is to have a legitimate claim to an entitlement and
for state protection of that entitlement. Receiving a right will therefore affect an individual’s sense
of self-efficacy and identity as a political agent empowered to make claims toward the state, and to
participate in politics in general. This impact underlies the “symbolic effect” of rights on political
behavior.
Key to my theory on the symbolic effect of rights is that this effect can exist even when a
right produces no change in material possessions or benefits. That is, even if a newly recognized
right does not actually change an individual’s rational expectation of extracting value from property
or receiving state protection, the right should still strengthen the perceived legitimacy of exerting
a claim. This will then increase the incentives for making a public claim when interests are under
threat, even if that claim ultimately fails because the state is unable or unwilling to back it. This
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perspective makes Don Jose´’s faith in legal titles, despite his complete lack of trust for state insti-
tutions more reasonable—it is not based on the state’s credible commitment to back the right, but
the symbolic power of the right itself.
In fact, under my theory, the symbolic effect will be even stronger in areas of weak enforce-
ment where rights are at risk and of questionable economic value. Under such circumstances, the
symbolic effect will change a legitimate claim into a legitimate grievance (Gurr, 1970). Scholars of
human rights movements have noted that rights seem to play the most important role in framing
understandings of justice and mobilizing support when rights are most vulnerable or ineffective in
practice (Donnelly, 2013) or for populations that historically have been excluded from the state
(Holston, 2008). Particularly for theory on international human rights law, the mobilizing effect of
a “rights-gap” between enumerated rights and state policy is one of the key mechanisms through
which human rights are made effective (Simmons, 2009; Goodman and Jinks, 2008).
I rely on three sources of data to provide empirical support for my theory. First, I provide a
historical summary of access to rural land and legal property rights in Peru and Colombia over the
20th and early 21st Centuries. Each country had different experiences with rural land tenure and
agrarian reform. Where Colombia had abundant state land to distribute through home steading
programs, the limited agricultural land in Peru was mostly locked in large estates that were broken
up and redistributed through major agrarian reform in the 1960s and 1970s. In both countries,
reform efforts then gradually moved toward their present configuration. Now agrarian policy at-
tempts to spark rural development not through the alteration of physical, de facto land holdings.
Instead, it alters the distribution of de jure property rights only.
However, despite differences in prior experience with land redistribution, both countries show
similarity in the importance of legal property rights for shaping rural conflict and claim-making
by peasants. Specifically, in both countries, conflict over land between peasants and landed elites
coincides with areas in which peasants have either formally recognized property rights or where they
have a strong expectation of rights due to new legislation. These histories of land reform also show
similarities in the centrality of the state in granting legal property rights in much of the countryside,
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even in remote agricultural frontiers where the reach of state power is greatly circumscribed.
The second source of data is from a series of semi-structured interviews with peasant, small-
holding farmers in rural areas of Peru and Colombia. Through these interviews, I attempt to
understand peasant farmers’ use of legal titles, experiences with land titling, and common practices
for regulating private land and participating in rural village politics. I find remarkable similarity in
the importance of titling and legal property rights for peasants across both fieldwork sites. Peasant
farmers highly valued formal titles and viewed them as a way to not only increase tenure security
and access to credit, but also to strengthen their identity as land owners and increase access to the
state in general. I also found no qualitative difference in the importance or use of titles between
areas with strong or weak state presence. Even in villages with limited access to state institutions
charged with protecting property rights, peasants relied on titles to resolve disputes and would travel
great distances to seek aid from courts or the police if necessary. Conversely, those in areas with
strong state presence still relied on informal documents to prove ownership and preferred informal
mechanisms for resolving land disputes. The only exception was in a peasant community in the
Peruvian highlands with a collective title. There, the state played no role in regulating individual
property rights, and the importance of titling and state-recognized titles were qualitatively different
as compared to other villages visited.
Third, I use original, panel data of titling in both countries to test hypotheses derived from
my theory. Specifically, I test the impact of rural land titling programs on political participation
in Colombia, through the now-defunct Colombian Institute of Rural Development (INCODER,
Instituto Colombiano de Desarrollo Rural) from 2000-2015, and in Peru through the first two waves
of massive land titling in the Rural Land Titling and Registration Project (Proyecto de Titulacio´n
y Registro de Tierras Rurales, PTRT) from 1996-2007. As mentioned above, formalization policies
are ideal for studying the “symbolic” effect of a change in legal rights and distinguishing it from
any impact due to the economic distribution of land or assets in itself. This is because, unlike in
traditional agrarian reform policies, land formalization does not alter land tenancy directly, but
rather formalizes the existing distribution of de facto property rights.
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I find evidence that titling increases political participation and claim-making toward the
state, and that it does so in a manner consistent with my predictions about the symbolic effect of
rights. This effect is strongest in areas where state institutions for protecting property rights are
weakest—precisely the same areas where I predict that legal rights will turn newly legitimized claims
into legitimate grievances. The estimated effect is not trivial. Moreover, it is consistent across both
countries and for a number of different measures of political participation. For a district among
those with the weakest institutions, titling can increase electoral turnout from 0.94 to 3.21 percentage
points on average. It can also increase claim-making before courts as well. I find titling can lead to
an increase demand for judicial protection in areas with weak state institutions by as much as 33.26
percent. Conversely, similar titling efforts in areas with the strongest institutions have little effect
and may lead to a decrease in political engagement. While these observational results cannot show
causality without additional assumptions, they are consistent across several alternative measures of
political engagement and robust to a variety of tests for parallel trends assumptions and alternative
model specifications. They thereby provide promising initial support for my theory on the symbolic
effect of rights-recognition.
1.2. Rights, Property, and Political Engagement
The central contribution of this study is the assertion that the idea of a legal right—as a guide
for appropriate and just political behavior—can have an impact on political behavior independent
of any material benefits derived from the right. This claim draws from a long line of theory on
the political significance of fundamental rights and rights-based framing in social movements. It
also has the potential to contribute to our understanding of a broad array of political phenomenon,
including political participation, social movements, and the role of political institutions in shaping
individual behavior.
A substantial body of political theory identifies the protection of property rights as a funda-
mental force motivating political behavior. Under the contract theory of the state, the protection
of individual property and liberty is the basis of the legitimate exercise of state authority (Locke,
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2014). Additional work has developed this justification into a more robust argument for the pro-
tection of fundamental rights as the theoretical source of state legitimacy (Dworkin, 1977; Rawls,
1999). Still, the basic rights-duty relationship between the state and the citizen has remained a
powerful idea. Legal rights also form one of the defining elements of citizenship (Turner, 1997), and
from one perspective, to be a citizen is to be a subject of rights. Express requirements for property
ownership as a barrier to political participation have been replaced by universal suffrage rights in
nearly all democracies (Keyssar, 2009). Nonetheless, access to property still plays an important role
in considerations of citizenship, insofar as movements to gain property rights are frequently under-
stood as struggles for recognizing citizenship and political agency (Holston, 2008). Finally, work on
social movements has consistently show that rights-based claims are important conceptual frames
around which political movements coalesce (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001; Scheingold, 2010),
from the civil rights movement in the United States (McAdam, 1996; Tushnet, 1987), constitutional
rights movements in Latin America (Eckstein and Wickham-Crowley, 2003; Gotkowitz, 2008) and
the human rights movement globally (Simmons, 2009). This literature shares a central tenant: that
fundamental rights are powerful symbols that justify the use of political power and can incentivize
claim-making and political mobilization.
The protection of property is also a motivation that underlies much political economy theory
on political development and conflict. However, unlike the literature referenced above, this work
has focused primarily on control over property and the distribution of resources, and not on the
recognition of rights. Property rights protections have a strong connection with the development and
emergence of the state itself, allowing rulers to extract more resources over time (Olson, 1993) and
therefore grow in power relative to would-be rivals (Tilly, 1985). Property rights also help to explain
the development of state institutions. For example, in their historical analysis of 17th Century
England, North and Weingast (1989) show how the crown’s commitments to limit expropriation
of the emerging merchant class’ property, bolstered by institutional developments that permitted
greater political participation and voice such as the creation of parliament, allowed the continued
growth of the state’s external power as well as its legitimacy among citizens.
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Property rights are likewise central to theories on political change and conflict. Under the
conflict model of democratization theory (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005; Boix, 2003), the likelihood
of transitioning to a political regime with broader participation (democracy) is tied to the likelihood
that the lower classes will expropriate the property of elites. Moreover, theories explaining when
peasants will join in social revolutions or contentious mobilization often directly highlight the degree
of threat that these groups perceive to their property rights, and the likelihood that the existing
political order will guarantee those rights (Skocpol, 1979; Luebbert, 1987). At the extreme, those
completely unprotected by the existing property regime, in particular the landless and sharecroppers,
are even more likely to engage in political mobilizations against the existing regime or the status
quo (Paige, 1978). Finally, both cross-country and sub-national studies have uncovered evidence
supporting the contention that rural unrest is correlated with weak protections of property rights
(Hidalgo et al., 2010; Lawson-Remer, 2013; Albertus and Kaplan, 2013).
While the above works represent major contributions to our understanding of how property
influences the development of politics and political institutions, they all share a similar focus on
studying the effects of the distribution of property itself, and not on rights. That is, they primarily
examine the control and struggle over the material benefits of property. While this is indeed an
important driver of political behavior, it ignores the fact that property ownership is also a legal
construct that is imbued with a moral basis for rights and duties vis-a-vis the state and other
individuals. Understanding and exploring this later effect is the work which concerns this present
study.
This is not to say, however, that prior literature has ignored the impact of legal property
rights on behavior in general. A significant body of work has attempted to understand how legal
property rights, and specifically land titling, can affect economic behavior by increasing incentives
to invest and access to credit (Besley, 1995; Feder and Feeny, 1991). However, the evidence of actual
changes in behavior has been mixed (Deininger and Feder, 2009; Bromley, 2009). In Peru, there
exists some evidence showing modest increases in investment for beneficiaries of urban (Field, 2005)
and rural land titling programs (Fort, 2007; Zegarra, Escobal, and Aldana, 2008). These findings
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have been corroborated in a systematic review (Lawry et al., 2017) and in recent experimental work
(Goldstein et al., 2015). However, these same studies have shown little support for an increase in
access to credit, the principal benefit many governments hope to draw from titling (De Soto, 2000).
There are far fewer studies that test the impact of legal property rights on political behavior,
and those that do exist have produced conflicting results. Studies on homeownership have tested
whether homeowners, as compared to renters, participate more in politics by measuring electoral
turnout and interactions with politicians (e.g. DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1999). Theoretically, these
studies predict that homeowners are more politically active and responsible citizens as their as-
sets are more tied to the community. However, more recent studies employing quasi-experimental
methodologies have since placed the robustness of these findings into question, showing no connec-
tion between property ownership and political behavior in advanced democracies (Engelhardt et al.,
2010; Blonigen, 2011).
Another, more limited line of inquiry has examined the impact of land formalization on po-
litical preferences. Di Tella, Galiani, and Schargrodsky (2007) use a natural experiment in squatter
settlements in the outskirts of Buenos Aires in which parts of the settlement were titled, and others
were not. They found that receiving a legal title made landholders more economically conservative
over time, a result similar to that found in observational studies on homeowners (e.g. Scheve and
Slaughter, 2001). Using evidence from the same squatter settlement in Buenos Aires, Van Gelder
(2013) shows evidence that changes in perception as a result of titling might be related to subjective,
affective responses. The study finds that changes in a homeowners’ sense of tenure security is more
likely an affective, and not a rational response in practice, and that this emotional effect is stronger
than the simple rational calculus that the state will recognize their property rights.
De Janvry, Gonzalez-Navarro, and Sadoulet (2014), using a time-series analysis, similarly
find a shift in voting preferences for the conservative PAN party in Mexico after the break-up
of collective ejido lands. However, the effects of land titling in Mexico might also be related to
the dissolution of the PRI parties clientelistic structure, which was closely connected with the
ejidos (Magaloni, 2006; Albertus et al., 2012), and not due to the impact of formal property rights
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themselves. This alternative explanation is supported in later work showing that change in voting
preferences concentrated in areas of former PRI enclaves (Dower and Pfutze, 2015), and that urban
titling increased support for leftist parties and reduced clientelistic ties to voters (Larreguy, Marshall,
and Trucco, 2015).
Several studies have also asked whether land titling in women’s names can politically empower
women by giving them more control over household assets (Deere and De Leal, 2001). There is
some evidence that efforts during Peruvian titling campaigns to jointly title family property in men
and women’s names has led to an increase in women’s participation in household decision-making
(Glavin, Stokke, and Wiig, 2013; Wiig, 2013). However, subsequent experimental evidence in Africa
has suggested that this effect may not be as robust as previously thought (Ali et al., 2014).
Finally, there is some evidence that land titling programs may actually depress political
engagement in poor communities. Many have noticed that individuals in squatter settlements
(De Soto, 1989) or frontier zones (Alston, Harris, and Mueller, 2012) compensate for weak property
rights specifically through higher levels of community engagement and organization. Once these
rights are secured through a titling program, community organizations subsequently disperse. Dosh
(2010) in a careful study of urban squatter movements in Lima and Quito noted this tendency to
demobilize after gaining full title. Once the state formalized property rights for squatters through a
legal title, associations and civil society groups in these neighborhoods tended to disperse, despite
still facing many needs such as access to basic services including electricity and water (see also
Stokes, 1991).
The above literature, although incipient, has produced conflicting results, variably show-
ing increases in participation or null effects, and some tendency for shifts in preferences toward
more economically conservative policies or leftist candidates. This mixed evidence reveals the need
for deeper theorizing on the nature of property rights and why legal rights-holders may behave
differently from those with informal rights.
What could be the missing piece that these studies have yet to uncover? I argue that
these studies all start from a similar theoretical assumption—that legal rights affect expectations
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of material benefits. They predict that formal titles or homeownership increases economic ties
to a given community (DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1999), economic capital (Di Tella, Galiani, and
Schargrodsky, 2007; De Janvry, Gonzalez-Navarro, and Sadoulet, 2014), or control over resources
(Larreguy, Marshall, and Trucco, 2015; Deere and De Leal, 2001). While far from wrong, I argue
that this perspective is incomplete, as it fails to adequately explain the varied ways that legal
rights can affect political behavior. This is because rights are also important symbols that define
legitimate political behavior and claims toward the state. In this sense, rights can inform behavior
not only because they can lead to more successful claims, but also because they prescribe what are
proper and legitimate claims. They dictate not only which claims “can” be made but also which
ones “ought” to be made.
The perspective I adopt follows other scholars that have also posited that property rights
regimes can have broader effects on the political order, claim-making over land, and land conflict
(Boone, 2014; Verdery, 2003). The work that most closely resembles my theoretical perspective
is that of Saffon Sanin (2015), who examines demand for agrarian reform and land redistribution
in Mexico and Colombia. Building off of prior scholarship on early 20th century land conflict in
Colombia (LeGrand, 1986), Saffon Sanin shows how land titles granted in colonial times or by
previous governments explain the emergence of later conflict over rural land and demand for land
redistribution. The common perspective shared by these authors and the present study is that
property rights are more than just expectations of controlling resources; they are also symbols that
provide meaning to appropriate forms of political behavior.
In addition to advocating for a new perspective on the study of property rights, this study
also offers important contributions to other areas of political research. First, the results of this
study can help understand the determinants of political participation. Standard socioeconomic
status models that have explained voter turnout in the United States or Europe (e.g. Brady, Verba,
and Schlozman, 1995) have proven to have limited explanatory power in regions like Latin America
(Fornos, Power, and Garand, 2004; Blais, 2006). I find evidence that legal rights can also be a
factor driving political engagement, either by legitimizing grievances or reinforcing identities as
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citizens. This result is supportive of expressive theories of political participation (Fiorina, 1976)
and those which tie participation with perceptions of state legitimacy and procedural fairness (Tyler,
2006; Levi, Sacks, and Tyler, 2009). They also support literature that notes how participation in
Latin America is increasingly articulated around shared perceived claims to rights and identities
(e.g., Eckstein and Wickham-Crowley, 2003; Gotkowitz, 2008). My findings are also significant
considering that titling, a program that provides a legitimate claim but arguably little immediate
economic benefits (particularly in areas of weak enforcement), can mobilize voter turnout as much
as targeted welfare programs (Zucco, 2013; De La O, 2015). In turn, this has important implications
for research on democratic consolidation, which typically involves the expansion of rights protection
to vulnerable groups, sparking both engagement and disenchantment with democracy (see Dahl,
1973).
This study also contributes to a broad body of literature on the impact of rights-based frames
and social movements. Shared perceptions of grievances are central motivators for contentious pol-
itics (Gurr, 1970), and grievances over rural land tenure in particular have long been highlighted
as a cause of contentious mobilization (e.g., Paige, 1978; Skocpol, 1979). Nonetheless, literature
on contentious politics has shied away from studying the effect of grievances, assuming that their
existence is not enough to explain variation in the emergence of conflicts (e.g., Collier and Hoef-
fler, 2004). While not ignoring the multiple factors that explain episodes of political mobilization
(McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001), I closely follow the guidance of Simmons (2014: 515) in assert-
ing that grievances are claims that are both “materially and ideationally constituted,” and therefore
to fully explain political behavior, we must understand why certain ideas or frames mobilize actors
at different places and times (see also, Snow et al., 1986). Understanding the ideational effects of
rights in particular can have important implications for debates on the effect of a rights-framing on
political mobilization (Rosenberg, 2008; Scheingold, 2010), demand for political change (O’brien,
1996; Perry, 2008), and the enforceability of international human rights (Goodman and Jinks, 2004;
Simmons, 2009).
In addition, this study adds to a growing area of research on the impact of formal institutions
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under conditions of weak enforcement (Holland, 2017; Amengual, 2016; Levitsky and Murillo, 2009).
I provide theoretical justifications and initial empirical evidence for a counter-intuitive result: that
rights can empower engagement most where they are weakly enforced. This contradicts expecta-
tions of much political economy scholarship that understands that formal rights, and in particular
property rights, are worthless when not supported by prior, credible state commitments for pro-
tection (Feder and Feeny, 1991; Firmin-Sellers, 1995). I follow a growing number of authors who
show that formal institutions can influence decision-making even when the immediate prospects for
enforcement are weak or dependent on political discretion (e.g. Ginsburg and Moustafa, 2008; Frye,
2004; Haber, Maurer, and Razo, 2003). For example, Frye (2017) finds that even though firms in
Russia perceive political connections to heavily influence court outcomes, they also believe the law
and the facts of a case matter as well (126). Similarly, Gans-Morse (2017) shows that demand for
court services in Russia has increased even though the “supply” of quality legal institution (in the
form of impartial and effective adjudication) has been relatively constant.
Understanding how formal rights influence behavior in such conditions is important for two
reasons. First, numerous rural communities in Latin America and other developing regions still
suffer from limited access to central state authorities and institutions for protecting property rights.
As states continue to expand access to these areas, often policies granting formal recognition of
rights or access to programs, such as land titling, will precede actual constructed capacity to serve
those communities. The resulting disconnect between recognized rights and state capacity to deliver
can potentially lead to heightened periods of contentious politics or political mobilization. Several
studies have already uncovered evidence that political mobilizations are accentuated in areas with
weak state capacity (Arce, 2014; Lawson-Remer, 2013; Hidalgo et al., 2010)
Second, and as a corollary, a considerable number of rural and urban landholders currently
exist in a legally ambiguous state in which they enjoy uncontested control over property, but still
lack formal legal rights. Often, the choices of such individuals are heavily influenced by the possi-
bility of securing a formal right. In both Peru and Colombia, new settlements frequently appear
in undeveloped peri-urban areas, motivated by access to affordable land for housing (Dosh, 2010;
17
Introduction
Gilbert, 2002). These communities continue to flourish despite the precariousness of tenure, expo-
sure to possible mass evictions (Holland, 2017), and the vagaries of continued policies supporting
squatter rights (Stokes, 1991). As these communities gradually benefit more from titling and legal
recognition, understanding how these rights change political behavior will be an increasingly central
concern.
My research also contributes to the study of political institutions by going beyond a tradi-
tional political economy analysis of how institutions affect the rational calculus of interests (North,
1990; Barzel, 1997). Rather, I consider how institutions construct meaning and political identities
(Hall and Taylor, 1996). I adopt Simmons’s (2016) “meaning-laden approach” to studying political
behavior and apply it to the analysis of institutions. She examines how the construction of meaning
behind grievances is central for understanding the origins of political protests against neoliberal
reforms in Mexico and Bolivia. I similarly show how institutions do not just influence material in-
centives, but also construct meaning for appropriate behavior and political identities. This approach
also follows other authors researching how the structure of property regimes and legal rights can
shape property claims (Boone, 2014; Verdery, 2003) and identities of citizenship (Holston, 2008).
Finally, this study contributes to policy debates about the impact of rural land titling pro-
grams. Policy experts and analysts specializing on rural development have hotly debated the im-
portance of legal titles for economic development (e.g., De Soto, 1989; De Janvry, Sadoulet, and
Wolford, 2001; Bromley, 2009), and access to formal property rights is still a central concern for
policy-makers today.3 Peru and Colombia are also presently each pursuing renewed plans to expand
former titling programs—Peru through a third round of titling in the PTRT program, and Colombia
in a massive titling campaign sponsored by the new National Land Agency and modeled off the
Peruvian experience. Understanding the impact and importance of legal property rights and how
they are used in practice by beneficiaries of land titling is valuable for understanding the conditions
under which formalization could fulfill its lofty goals.
In addition, while the immediate aims of formalization and land titling campaigns are eco-
3For example, the 2018 World Bank Conference on Land and Poverty featured over 120 panels on titling and
formalization programs, securing land tenure, and land rights.
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nomic in nature, titling is also concerned with state building and increasing the access to, and the
reach of, formal state institutions in poor and marginalized rural communities. In Peru, state-
building was an explicit goal of Hernando De Soto, one the main proponents of the theoretical
benefits of land titling in Peru and internationally. This reasoning was patent in the very title of his
influential book on the subject, “The Other Path,” which was a direct allusion to the Shining Path
rebel group active in Peru at the time. For De Soto, providing access to formal rights was not only
a way to spark economic development, but also to increase the legitimacy and acquiescence toward
the state. He argued that titling could help win over support of poor communities from the Sendero
Luminoso rebel group, and that “if [the] government does not protect the assets of the poor, it
surrenders this function to the terrorists, who then can use it to win the allegiance of the excluded”
(De Soto, 1989: xxiv). Similarly, the rebuilding of the state, inclusion of marginalized communi-
ties, and strengthening state legitimacy are all goals of land formalization in Colombia through the
ambitious land restitution process under the 2011 Victims Law (URT, 2015; Uprimny-Yepes and
Sa´nchez, 2010).
This state-building aspect highlights two further implications of this study. First, although
land titling has the potential to bring economic benefits to many remote rural areas, it also implies
an important source of distributive justice. This justice is not only in regards to the distribution
of resources (i.e. land) per se, but also of privileged claims toward the state and access to the
state itself. This, in turn, is crucial to building legitimacy and trust within the state (Tyler, 2006;
Hough, Jackson, and Bradford, 2013). Second, increasing access to privileged claims also implies the
potential to overload the state with grievances to which it does not have the capacity to respond.
This could compound governance problems in areas in which state services are already limited.
Therefore, this study provides further support for arguments in favor of comprehensive agrarian
policies that do not just distribute titles, but also seek to simultaneously construct capacity and
improve service provision (Deininger and Feder, 2009; Bromley, 2009; Restrepo and Morales, 2014).
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1.3. Case Selection: Peru and Colombia
Peru and Colombia provide ideal case studies for the development and initial empirical val-
idation of a theory on the symbolic impact of legal property rights. First, both countries have
recently undergone efforts to promote rural titling programs as a major agrarian policy. There also
exist reliable, geo-referenced data on titling programs over time, which is often not available in
countries that have undergone massive titling campaigns (Conroy et al., 2014). Peru and Colom-
bia have large populations of smallholding peasant farmers living in remote, rural areas that are
the principle beneficiaries of land titling. For both these populations, land is a principal means
of economic production and land ownership is a significant factor in the construction of peasant
identity (Thiesenhusen, 1995). The rural poor in each country have also suffered from a historical
lack of access to central state institutions and formal recognition of legal rights, both of which are
important conditions for rights-recognition to influence political behavior (see Chapter 2).
A comparison between the experiences of Peru and Colombia is particularly helpful for de-
veloping my theory on the symbolic effect of rights. I use these countries as parallel cases to test
the robustness of my findings and whether evidence I find on the meanings attached to legal rights,
experiences with titling, and statistical trends are the result of random chance or the idiosyncrasies
of a particular context. The selection of analytically parallel cases is helpful for a comparative
analysis of complex political dynamics (Locke and Thelen, 1995: 344). It allows for the selection
of similar mechanisms or processes without “problematic assumptions about what the theoretically
relevant variation that needs to be controlled is or whether the same empirical phenomena work in
the same ways across contexts” (Simmons, 2016: 31).
Peru and Colombia share several important historical and contextual factors that make them
apt for a parallel case comparison. Both countries are in the Andean region of South America and
share broad cultural and historical precedents. In addition, both countries have had prior experience
in the mid-20th century with land reform efforts (more extensively in Peru), as well as periods of




The two countries also differ in many respects. For purposes of this study, there are two key
differences that make the replication of results in both cases theoretically relevant. First, although
both countries attempted land reforms during the mid 20th century (and eventually abandoned
these efforts in favor of land titling), the extent of the reforms differed. Whereas Peru engaged in
extensive redistribution of rural land under the Velasco military government in the 1970s (Harding,
1975; Lowenthal, 1983), Colombia had very limited land redistribution policies which only recognized
a few prior peasant invasions. Rather, Colombia’s land reform efforts centered on the distribution
of state frontier lands to peasants under homesteading policies (LeGrand, 2003; Arango Restrepo,
2014). A comparison across both cases can reveal whether the symbolic effect and significance
of legal titles in rural areas is dependent upon prior experiences with land reform and access to
agriculturally productive land.
Second, the titling procedures used in each case are distinct. Titling in Peru involved a
massive sweep strategy that covered a relatively broad geographic area. This reflects a more top-
down, state-driven approach to land titling that does not necessarily map onto local demand for
land formalization. In contrast, the Colombia titling program was “targeted” in the sense that
it responded directly to the accumulation of local demand, did not affect all land-holders in an
intervention area, and requires some degree of prior mobilization among local residents.
These differences in titling methodologies also reflect the two main strategies for land formal-
ization undertaken by most developing countries. Systematic, broad-sweep methods such as those
employed in Peru are more common and typically favored in large projects with development bank
funding from the World Bank or Inter-American Development Bank (Conroy et al., 2014). These in-
clude efforts in the Latin American region such as Brazil (1981, 2005), Bolivia (1996-2014), Ecuador
(2001-2009), and Panama (since 2007), and also efforts in other regions including Indonesia (since
1996), Thailand (since 1980s), and Vietnam (1993-2000). Colombia’s more targeted, on-demand
approach, while less common in systematic titling projects, is the default form of land titling in
many regions, and has been employed in diverse settings including Armenia (1998-2004), Ecuador
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(before 2001), Malawi (2003-2012), Nicaragua (since 2018), and the Philippines (2005-2014). There-
fore, a comparison across these two principal forms of land titling can offer important insight into
the external validity of my theory in other contexts.
While I do not expect these differences to alter my theoretical predictions, they do suggest
that Peru might be a more “difficult” case for my theory relative to Colombia. This is because the
requirement for prior organizing to petition titling in Colombia could potentially prime beneficiaries
on the benefits of engaging with the state, and specifically over issues involving property rights. It
may also select for individuals who highly value formal titles. This difference mirrors experience with
mobilization around rural issues between the two countries. An extensive agrarian reform under
the Velasco administration in Peru largely dampened rural mobilizations by satisfying demand for
access to land among peasants (McClintock, 1989). However, in Colombia the limited land reform
efforts, which were soon redirected toward land titling, left greater unmet demand which, in turn,
sparked a higher degree of peasant mobilization in the countryside (Zamosc, 1989). Due to these
differences, I expect that evidence and effects sizes should be larger in Colombia, while Peru should
offer a hard test case in which positive results will be strong, initial evidence for my theory.
1.4. Overview of the Dissertation
The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, I summarize
my theoretical model on the symbolic effect of legal rights. There, I outline and defend the two
principal arguments of this study: (1) that legal rights are important political symbols that can
have a symbolic effect on behavior; and (2) that this effect is strongest where rights are weakly
enforced. I then describe how this effect applies to the specific case of legal property rights and
rural land titling programs for smallholding farmers. I also derive my main empirical hypotheses
and outline the empirical methodology I will employ in this study.
The next two chapters provide empirical support for the assumptions underlying my theory
and an examination of agrarian reform and land titling in Peru and Colombia. Chapter 3 provides
the historical context of rural land tenure in both countries and compares their experiences with
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land reform policies and land conflict throughout the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st.
I discuss how land reform took different directions in each case—massive redistribution of large
haciendas in Peru, and distribution of state frontier land in Colombia. However, in both cases legal
property rights played a central role in property claims made by peasant farmers and the state was
the principal source of access to land, and more importantly, legal rights.
Chapter 4 then asks what meaning, if any, legal property rights have for peasant farmers in
remote area of the rural countryside. I rely on a series of semi-structured interviews with peasant
farmers to show the significance for legal titles, how they are utilized in regulating land in small
villages, and how peasants participate in village political life. I also contrast the experience of
typical peasants with those living in a collectively-titled, peasant community in Peru, where the
state does not play a role in allocating or recognizing individual property claims.
I then perform a statistical analysis in Chapter 5 as an initial verification of my theory on
the symbolic effect of rights. Using original panel data on land titling in each country, I examine
the impact of changes in legal property rights that do not directly affect landholding patterns. I
also examine variation in local capacity to enforce property rights to distinguish the symbolic effect
from any impact of material benefits or changes in tenure security due to titling.
I conclude this study with a brief discussion of the significance of my theory for different
areas of political science literature, with an emphasis on how my theory applies to transitional
justice. As a brief case study, I discuss Colombia’s land restitution process, a specialized form of
rights-recognition through the ambitious 2011 Victims’ Law. This policy aims to provide legal titles
and special benefits to victims of displacement and armed conflict, and presents a special case in
which the symbolic value of rights is especially salient. I finally discuss the further implication of
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2.1. Introduction
This study offers an explanation for how legal rights—and in particular fundamental rights—
influence political behavior. I focus on the specific case of property rights, and whether formal
property owners are more politically engaged. While the claim that control over land or property is
a key motivation in politics is neither novel nor controverted, I make a different argument. Rather
than examining the distribution of resources, I look at a more abstract yet equally as important
concept: the distribution of formal, legal rights. The distribution of resources and rights are closely
connected, but distinct in a significant way that I elucidate in this chapter. Resources provide
important economic benefits, while rights define the relationship between the individual and the
state. In doing so, rights identify who is a legitimate political actor and when and under what
conditions claims should be made on the state.
Control over land and property tenure have obvious implications for political behavior, as
these key motivations have sparked numerous wars and revolutions. But what about formal rights
themselves? Can such an abstract and ephemeral concept as a right motivate individual behavior
independent of the material benefits it provides? I make two central arguments in this chapter.
First, I contend that rights have a “symbolic effect” on individual behavior that goes beyond the
economic value of entitlements. In this discussion, I focus in on the moment when a new right
is granted or recognized as key for producing a symbolic effect. Rights-recognition is, in essence,
a transference of authority from the state (or other authoritative body) to an individual. This
recognition not only affects perceptions of security regarding an entitlement, but also legitimizes
claims to that entitlement in the eyes of the recipient and the broader community. Recognition of
particularly important rights also strengthens the bond of citizenship between the individual and
the nation-state, legitimizing claim-making and participation in political affairs more broadly. This
symbolic conveyance of authority and legitimacy is the nucleus of my argument in this chapter
and motivates the entire study. In essence, it is what gives rights their unique discursive power in
modern, liberal states.
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I term this mechanism the “symbolic effect” of rights-recognition. I distinguish this impact
from the“material effect”of a legal right, which I define as a change in behavior that results from the
enjoyment of the material goods or economic benefit underlying the right, as is similar to the common
perception of property rights in most political economy scholarship. This would include any change
in expected assets, value, or access to that entitlement. This also includes changes in the ability to
access state institutions for protecting a right (e.g. increased tenure security), or in the strength
of the state’s commitment to refrain from encroaching on an entitlement (e.g. protection from
expropriation). For property rights, this material effect would directly impact future expectations
of capturing the property’s benefit stream (Barzel, 1997). Instead, the symbolic effect encompasses
changes in attitudes concerning the justice, propriety, or fairness in making a claim. The symbolic
effect informs perceptions of who are legitimate claimants, when they can make justifiable claims,
and the appropriate venues for airing grievances. In turn, it also influences perceptions of political
agency and the identity of the rights-bearer as an individual justified in making public actions on
behalf of her interests. Key to motivating this symbolic impact are concepts of just or legitimate
claims, rather than expectation of successfully accessing state resources or state protections per se.
My second argument is that the symbolic effect of rights is strongest where rights guaran-
tees are weakest. This argument is counter-intuitive from the perspective of the vast majority of
political economy theory on legal institutions, which understands that where enforcement is weak,
formal, legal rights are not credible commitments and therefore should not alter expectations of
economic behavior (North, 1990; Feder and Feeny, 1991; Firmin-Sellers, 1995). However, if recog-
nizing important new rights can empower individuals by legitimizing their claims and themselves
as political actors, then the lack of enforcement can actually catalyze political behavior. Under
circumstances where expectations of the state’s willingness or capacity to defend rights are low, the
act of formal rights-recognition will generate perceived grievances. These grievances will then spark
greater political mobilization and claim-making towards the state, as individuals perceive their new
rights to be in a state of jeopardy. This argument builds on theory and evidence from literature
on rights-based movements (Scheingold, 2010; Simmons, 2009), which argues that legal rights are
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important conceptual frames for political mobilization and most effective in contexts where right s
are vulnerable.
In this chapter, I flesh out the theoretical foundations for the symbolic effect of rights and
the conditions under which they are most effective at promoting political engagement. I begin
with a clarification of basic definitions of property rights and political participation. I then justify
my argument for why rights-recognition leads to greater legitimacy as a claimant and political
agent. This increase in legitimacy, I argue, produces clear predictions for the symbolic effect of
rights under conditions of strong or weak enforcement, which can either be due to lack of state
capacity or willingness to enforce rights. I then derive hypotheses on how to distinguish the symbolic
and material effects of rights-recognition in the specific contexts of land titling and formalization
policies that are the focus of this study. While these two effects are not mutually exclusive and
could coterminously impact behavior, the conditional impact of strong/weak enforcement gives us
analytical leverage to distinguish them empirically. This chapter then concludes with an outline
of my empirical research design and a discussion of the scope conditions under which I expect my
theory to apply.
2.2. Rights, Citizenship, and Political Engagement
2.2.1. Property Rights as Civil Rights
Before launching into the explanation of the symbolic effect of rights, it is necessary to
establish clear definitions for two central concepts: property rights and political engagement. While
this chapter puts forth a general theory about the symbolic effect of fundamental rights, I focus
specifically on the case of property rights, a concept which is sometimes muddled in political economy
literature and requires clarification. When I refer to property rights here and rights in general, I use
the concept to represent a formally recognized right to property, and in particular, land. Although
bearing the same name, this is not the common understanding of a property right in most economic
and political economy literature. This can be the source of some confusion, as there are two related,
yet conceptually distinct versions of property rights that scholars on the subject commonly employ.
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Barzel (1997) clarifies these two competing concepts of property rights. On the one hand are
what he refers to as “economic property rights” (3), which consist of an individual’s expectation to
access and enjoy the benefit stream derived from property. This concept is more closely related to
property tenure, as it specifically incorporates the expectations of extracting some kind of economic
value from property, regardless of formal relations or legal rules regulating ownership or use. This
notion also incorporates the idea of credible commitments by leaders and states to respect established
relations of property tenure and to not interfere with a property’s economic value (North, 1990). In
essence, this concept of a property right focuses more on the “property” and its material benefits.
In contrast, I wish to examine the “rights” side of property rights. I ask what the impact of
the formal, legal institution in itself is—what Barzel refers to as “legal property rights.” Under this
perspective, my focus is not on the property per se, but on the political and social relationships
that are established when the state concedes and recognizes a civil right to property (Verdery,
2003). These relationships are defined in part by a legal construct which attempts to regulate these
relationships, and privilege certain claims over others. In Hohfeldian terms, a right is an established
relationship between the individual and the state, in which the individual has a potential claim for
protection of an interest (whether through expropriation or encroachment by third parties), and the
state has a correlative duty to provide that protection (Hohfeld, 1913: 30-31). Despite its centrality
to normative theory and the common understanding of rights, this definition is missing from most
discussions on property rights in political economy literature. Rather, authors have traditionally
concerned themselves with the impact of the distribution of resources or changes in property tenure
on political considerations (e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005; Engerman et al., 2002; Coatsworth,
2008; Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Albertus, 2015). This perspective, unfortunately, implies that
formal legal rights are superfluous or ancillary to discussions about the impact of property rights
on political processes. Here, my interest is not on the distribution of resources per se, but instead
on the political assignment of rights and duties and how these give meaning to ideas about political
legitimacy and citizenship.1
1While throughout this study I examine the specific case of formal property rights, I expect the symbolic effect of
rights to also extend to other fundamental legal or constitutional rights. I address specific examples of other rights
28
Theory: Legal Rights, Just Claims, and Citizenship
2.2.2. Political Engagement
A second term which I discus frequently in this study is the concept of political engagement
or political participation, both of which I use interchangeably. I understand political engagement
as a public action directed toward the state with the intention of furthering an interest, expressing
preferences, or making claims to an entitlement. Such actions are typically before state institutions
designed to channel political voice. This can be through the common exercise of suffrage or voter
turnout. However, it can also refer to claims made toward other state institutions, including de-
mands for protections or services through courts, police, administrative agencies, or local municipal
government. Although the above examples are directed toward formal institutions, engagement
could also include contentious behavior directed outside formal institutions and against the state
(McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001). Indeed, popular protest and political mobilization are common
in situations where property rights are insecure (Lawson-Remer, 2013; Hidalgo et al., 2010; Albertus
and Kaplan, 2013).
As the role of the state is central to my theory on the symbolic impact of rights, I limit my
discussion to forms of political participation directed specifically toward or against the state. This
includes claims against interference by the state or for state protection against third-party encroach-
ment. In both cases, it places primary responsibility for the effective enjoyment of the right on the
state and the state’s apparatus (Cummings, 2013). This definition therefore excludes non-state
political activities that could otherwise be understood as forms of political participation, including
membership in non-state organizations and traditional institutions for protecting interests. While
these are also forms of political engagement, they are not directly implicated in the relationship
embodied in a formal property right, which specifically involves the rights-bearer and the state, and
therefore I exclude them from my discussion.
in the concluding chapter of the study.
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2.3. The Symbolic Effect of Rights
2.3.1. The Symbolic and Material Effects of Rights
What I define as the symbolic effect of rights-recognition is the impact that a legal right has
on perceptions of legitimacy in making claims. I understand legitimacy in this sense as “the belief
that authorities, institutions, and social arrangements are appropriate, proper, and just” (Tyler,
2006: p. 376). Thus, a legitimate claim would be one that has a privileged interpretation as being
morally appropriate and just. Perhaps the best way to define the symbolic effect and describe its
theoretical basis is to start with an explanation of what this effect is not. By symbolic I do not mean
to imply that this effect is nominal or “merely” symbolic. Rather, I use this term to conceptually
distinguish the material benefits of the right from the immaterial ones.2 For clarity, I refer to any
impact on behavior from the former as“material effects,” and those relating to the later as“symbolic
effects.”
The material effect results from any change in behavior due the material benefits or economic
value a right produces. In effect, these are the material entitlements that a rights-bearer enjoys as
a result of the right, and thus more akin to the concept of property tenure or “economic property
rights” described above. The material effect emerges from two underlying expectations. The first
would be the expectation of enjoying the material benefits of the property itself. This would be
the simple calculation of whether a rights-bearer can capture the benefit stream derived from the
right. The second consists of the expectation that the state will engage its resources to effectively
guarantee the right. This includes the expectation that the state will refraining from expropriating
or unfairly limiting a right, or that state institutions will effectively prevent encroachment from
third parties. Examples of this second expectation could include the likelihood of accessing judicial
or police protection in the case of third party invasion of property.
In contrast, the symbolic effect of rights-recognition is related to the subjective feeling of
propriety or fairness in making a claim of protection toward the state. These beliefs arise from the
2I also do not imply that the immaterial benefits lack “value.” Rather, they I argue they confer a kind of symbolic
value that is different from the economic value of material benefits.
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privileged relationships that the right represents as a legal construct. In contrast to the material
effect, these are the political entitlements that the right grants the rights-bearer. These can be
understood as a form of moral license to make claims for respect or protection of interests vis-
a-vis the state and other individuals. These political entitlements influence perceptions of rights-
bearers as legitimate political actors and their identity as citizens more broadly. For property rights,
receiving a formal right alters perceptions of legitimacy as a “true” property owner and buttresses
the sense of self-efficacy as a political agent. The formal property owner thus has a stronger feeling
of justness and fairness in their claim to land or other property, and a greater affective attachment
to that property. It could also influence perceptions that an individual as a property owner is now
entitled to participate more in politics or as a full member of a local community or the national
polity.
2.3.2. Rights, Citizenship, and Political Legitimacy
The symbolic effect emerges from the role that rights play in contemporary, liberal political
systems. This role is two-fold. First, rights are legal constructs that regulate legitimate forms
of claim-making and political engagement. Thus rights attempt to define what interests deserve
special consideration. Secondly, rights serve as important symbols of citizenship and thus identify
legitimate political actors. In this sense, rights also define whose interests ought to receive special
consideration. I examine each of these roles in turn.
Regarding the first role, it is important to note that my argument does not apply to all cases
of legal rights, but rather to the specific case of important, fundamental rights. These are rights
that fall under Dworkin’s (1977) “strong sense” of moral claims. Specifically, they are claims to
protection or against state interference even when such claims are not the “right” thing to do from a
strictly utilitarian perspective. In this sense, a fundamental right “must be a right to do something
even when the majority thinks it would be wrong to do it, and even when the majority would be
worse off for having done it” (Dworkin, 1977: 194). Thus, my argument applies to property rights
understood as fundamental civil rights.
31
Theory: Legal Rights, Just Claims, and Citizenship
These rights are such strong moral claims that they deserve special consideration in policy
making. Property rights in particular form the basis of the legitimate exercise of power in liberal
states, and therefore carry the implicit assertion that they can challenge even state authority. As
Locke (2014) notes, governments cannot legitimately encroach on these rights as “the preservation
of property being the end of government, and that for which men enter into society, it necessarily
supposes and requires that the people should have property...” (para. 138). This moral claim is
powerful enough to have a discursive effect that can justify limitations on the use of political power.
Liberal theorists have posited that by merely enumerating a list of rights within a constitutional
document, they generate the power to shape the political actions of rulers: “The political truths
declared in that solemn manner acquire by degrees the character of fundamental maxims of free
Government, and as they become incorporated with the national sentiment, counteract the impulses
of interest and passion” (Stagg, 2010: p. 298).
Holding and exercising these rights, rights-bearers will feel more empowered and morally
justified in making a claim. They will expect other members of society to view protected interests
as legitimate and superior to other bases of morally appropriate claim-making, such as personal
need, expediency, or other justifications. Scheingold’s (2010) analysis of civil rights movements in
the United States highlights the potential for rights-based claims to empower actors to voice claims
for entitlements or protections:
There is dignity in asserting a right. Moreover, in asserting your right you imply a
reciprocal relationship with others in the society. Your right is no longer personal but
part of a more general set of societal rights and obligations, independent of and predating
your particular need. To claim a right is thus to invoke symbols of legitimacy that
transcend your personal problems. (58)
Literature on the human rights movement similarly ascribes a discursive power to rights claims that
can legitimize political actions and movements for reform. Simmons (2009) argues that international
treaties that enumerate rights produce such an effect. Through the mere naming of a right, they
“empower individuals, groups, or parts of the state with different rights preferences that were not
empowered to the same extent in the absence of the treaties” (125). Conversely, for entitlements
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not conceptualized as strong rights claims, mobilization around such claims can be difficult as they
are viewed as matters of individual choice or problems with market allocation. Such is the case
with access to health care and insurance in the United States, which are understood as problems of
personal finance and not the responsibility of the state (Levitsky, 2008).
Property rights regimes in particular not only influence when mobilizations or contentious
claim-making will occur, but also the form that claim-making will take regarding property rights.
In her extensive analysis of rural property conflict in Sub-Saharan African states, Boone (2014)
emphasizes the importance of land regimes in shaping not only how land conflicts play out, but also
key outcomes such as to which authority claims for property rights are made and the form that these
claims take. She noted that in several countries, the decision to make property claims before local,
customary authorities or state authorities often were connected to the perceived legitimacy of the
property holder and the political authority. Property claims in post-Soviet transitional countries
were also shaped in-part by pre-Soviet property regimes. Verdery (2003), in her analysis of rural
property rights in transitional Romania, notes that the form that post-transition land reform took
depended heavily on pre-Soviet property rights. Where land was held privately in an area before
collectivization, the restitution of individual property claims was favored over simple redistribution
of collective farms.
The second role that fundamental rights play is in defining citizenship and whose claims
deserve special political consideration. Citizenship is often understood as consisting of three parts:
rights, duties, and loyalties (Turner, 1997). Rights are central to the definition of citizenship as
they provide the fundamental benefit of political membership in a nation-state and therefore the
basis for why individuals should acquiesce to central authority. Citizenship itself can be understood
as constructed at least partly through rights, and that to be a citizen is to be a subject of rights
(Kymlicka and Norman, 1994). Therefore, rights, and in particular fundamental rights, have a
strong impact on the way individuals perceive themselves and others as citizens. In turn, this
can have an empowering effect as new rights-bearers feel more self-efficacious and legitimated to
participate in politics in general now that their interests deserve special consideration. This is a
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central argument for how rights-framing empowers and mobilizes interest groups to make strong
claims against the state (Scheingold, 2010). In the specific case of marginalized communities or
those who previously had limited access to certain rights, this sense of increased legitimacy and
political self-efficacy can be particularly strong. Van Gelder (2013) noted such an impact among
urban squatters in the outskirts of Buenos Aires:
During talks I had with dwellers it was clear that residents simply wanted to be legal and
not be regarded as informal slum dwellers by society at large. Discrimination against
people living in informal neighborhoods is rife in Argentina (see Auyero, 2005) and
legalization of tenure implies not just a change in legal category but also in social status.
For residents, having a property title, realistically or not, implies inclusion in a society
that has systematically denied them entry.
In Holston’s (2008) masterful study on the historical roots of differentiated citizenship in the urban
peripheries of Brazil, he effectively illustrates the key link between rights, citizenship, and the le-
gitimation of political participation. In his study he defines two dimensions of citizenship, the first
is incorporation or membership in a national identity, and the second is the formal distribution of
rights and duties. He argues that the historical lack of access to formal, legal property for Brazil’s
poor communities also served to exclude them from the benefits of this second part of citizenship.
As he notes, the landless poor were denied “the civil standing that legitimate property ownership
is conventionally understood to create. By that, I refer to the relation between property and per-
sonality, as political philosophy has called it, in which property ownership is the means to establish
such fundamental qualifications for citizenship as independence, respect, and responsibility” (113).
In essence, the lack of access to formal property rights limited the extent of their citizenship and
truncated their ability to participate in political affairs. He later examines informal communities
in urban peripheries that demand formal rights and land titling as an effective means of reclaiming
and redefining citizenship. The idea that these residents were justified property owners sparked
a form of rights consciousness, that “they not only have a right to legal rights but also that their
problems can be redressed in terms of the rights and dignity of democratic citizenship rather than by
other means, such as patronage, favor, or revolution.” (230) This, in turn, fostered further political
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mobilization to demand additional services and benefits on the basis of legal property ownership.
Finally, it is important to note that the symbolic effect of rights is not simply a rational
calculus of how likely others will view one’s claims as legitimate, but rather provides “filters for
interpretation, of both the situation and oneself, out of which a course of action is constructed”
(Hall and Taylor, 1996: 939). In this sense, rights claims also have constructive and psychological
components related to perceptions of fairness and an individual’s self-efficacy in engaging in political
realms. For fundamental rights in particular, this effect can rise to the level of moral convictions
which “are especially tied to people’s motivations to become politically engaged to either proactively
stand up for what they believe is right, or reactively fight against what they believe to be fundamen-
tally wrong”(Skitka, 2010: 267). In their work on the impact of rights claims on public participation
in China, O’Brien and Li (2006) have argued that claims against the state, although not sparking
contentious mobilization, could still engender a new understanding of citizenship which “involves
adjustments in psychological orientation: in particular, changes in one’s awareness of politics, sense
of efficacy, and feelings toward the government” (120). In regard to property rights in particular,
Van Gelder (2013) found an affective component of tenure security in beneficiaries of land titling in
squatter settlements. This affective component also had a greater impact than rational calculations
of probabilities of eviction from one’s home when making judgements on tenure security.
2.3.3. State Recognition of Rights
This study focuses in on a key moment—the recognition of a formal property right—which
produces a change in legal status and therefore induces a shift in the perceptions of an individual
as a political actor and her relationship with the state. Throughout this discussion, I use the term
rights-recognition to refer to this moment. However this theory can apply equally to situations
in which the state directly grants a new right, or cases in which a preexisting legitimate claim is
subsequently granted legal status as a right through state recognition. Special attention to the
moment of when rights are recognized or granted provides two benefits for this study. The first is
analytic convenience, as it identifies a concrete point in time when legal status changes. Second, it
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focuses our attention on the relationship between the state and individual that is central to informing
political identity and decisions to engage in politics. The key here is that rights-recognition not
only enables access to state institutions, but also represents a symbolic marker that an individual’s
interests deserve special consideration—specifically that this interest is legitimate even if it conflicts
with the immediate interests of the state, as explained above.3
While rights-recognition should be a public act of conveyance from a body with some legiti-
mate claim to authority, the exact form that this conveyance takes can vary. Perhaps the strongest
form of rights-recognition, particularly in the case of fundamental rights, is the specific enumeration
of rights in a constitutional document. Enumeration and entrenchment in a constitutional text are
strong signals that the rights enshrined within the document are elevated above typical political
discourse and deserving of special consideration (Dworkin, 1977).
However, other political institutions can also recognize fundamental rights. Particularly
in the case of Supreme or Constitutional Courts that are invested with powers of constitutional
review, the recognition of a new right ex officio or the interpretation of a constitutional text to
provide an expansive reach of an existing right can also be important moments of rights-recognition.
Legislative acts of congress, although not entrenched as constitutional texts, are similarly sources of
rights-recognition. This is the case for particularly important pieces of legislation, which although
not entrenched per se, have a constitution-like significance, such as the 1977 Canadian Human
Rights Act or the 1998 Human Rights Act in the United Kingdom (Jackson and Tushnet, 2014: ch.
5). Key piece of legislation that make effective or broaden protections for previously enumerated
constitutional rights can also present important moments of rights-recognition, such as in the case
of the Civil Rights or Voting Rights Acts in the United States (McAdam, 1996; Tushnet, 1987).
3My focus on the moment of recognition excludes certain other changes in legal status that will likely not produce
a symbolic effect. Among these are voluntary transfers of rights between one individual to another, such as in the
sale of a property right. These interactions do not incorporate a role of state recognition, but are rather exchanges
between private individuals. Also excluded would be temporary acts of waiving or refraining from exercising rights
that do not imply a change in relationship with the state. Such acts would include voluntarily withholding property
claims that would otherwise be available to the person. A voluntary waiver may activate a change in legal status or
effects, and could potentially alter material benefits. However, such transferences would not affect the underlying
relationship with the state as the symbolic recognition and transference of authority is not present as it is when a
state directly conveys a new right.
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Finally, administrative acts can be an important source of rights-recognition. This is particularly
salient in cases where an agency has the authority to review applications for recognizing new rights-
bearers, such as during land formalization and titling programs, which are the focus of the present
study.
Regardless of the specific form that rights-recognition takes, for the symbolic effect to man-
ifest itself, the corollary duty for protecting property must be patently vested in the state. This
would be the case for negative rights claims against state expropriation and also claims against
third-parties, but which require state action to be effective. For either the role of guarantor or duty-
bearer, the state must be a central player for the right to affect attitudes regarding the relationship
between the state and the individual.4
What this excludes are informal institutions or practices that could affect property tenure,
but do not amount to a formal recognition of legal rights. These could include first-person strategies
for using personal effort or technology to secure property tenure (e.g. Field, 2005; Hornbeck, 2010),
or informal community institutions that rely on second-person enforcement to regulate property
and protect land from outside encroachment (e.g. Alston, Harris, and Mueller, 2012; Boone, 2014;
Wily, 2008; Toulmin, 2009). While these institutions also have important implications for tenure
security, they are not directly implicated in the construction of meaning regarding citizenship and
legitimacy of the state, and will therefore not activate the symbolic effect of rights.
2.4. Rights and Legitimate Grievances
The preceding discussion demonstrates how rights are symbols of political legitimacy that
serve to justify claim-making and mark boundaries of citizenship. In this section, I argue that
rights engender political engagement by legitimizing grievances and rights-bearers as political actors.
4Many normative theorists have criticized the state-centric vision of rights, in particular for being a limited concept
in regards to the protection of human or universal rights (e.g. Beitz, 2011). However, the focus on the state as
the primary authority charged with defending rights is convenient for my theory for two reasons. First, under
common political discourse and in most legal systems, the state is seen as the primary, and in many instances the
only, legitimate authority charged with the ultimate responsibility of respecting and guaranteeing rights claims.
Second, the power of rights to inform identities of citizenship and define the relationship between the state and
the individual is the central assumption in my theory. Therefore, I focus on this interaction, without necessarily
denying the potential for rights-claims backed by other, non-state institutions to cause similar effects.
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When an individual has a heightened sense of justness or fairness over an entitlement, she will be
more likely to perceive a legitimate grievance when that entitlement is threatened. Similarly when
a rights-bearer has a greater feeling of political self-efficacy, she is more willing to demand that her
interests receive special consideration from others. This is because, as explained above, rights not
only influence understandings of the legitimacy of actors (as rights-bearers) to make claims, but also
ideas of when and how just claims emerge (when the right is vulnerable). In this sense, a right will
define when an individual perceives a grievance or injustice, particularly one that can be remedied
through engagement with the state.
Much literature on political mobilization and contentious politics has highlighted the central
role that perceptions of injustice, rather than inequality or economic losses in themselves, play in
creating grievances and building political support. Gurr (1970) in his much debated work on political
revolutions argued that grievances result from “relative deprivation,” or the change in expectations
versus capacity in providing for personal welfare and security. Dahl (1973) also noted that objective
inequality itself does not mobilize resistance among marginalized or disadvantaged groups unless
they perceive that situation as an injustice. Similarly, in social movements in Latin America many
have noted that grievances are not rooted in inequality per se, but rather perceived injustices in
access to land or unfair pricing mechanisms (Eckstein, 1989).
The literature on contentious politics has proposed that conceptual frames, such as rights-
based claims, are important for defining grievances and perceptions of injustice. Frames are systems
of understanding that assign meaning to events and conditions, allowing them to be readily inter-
preted to build support or mobilize membership in social movements (Snow et al., 1986; McAdam,
1996). McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001) argue that among the most important effects of such
frames are the “attribution of new threats and opportunities by one or more parties to an emerging
conflict and the reimagining of the legitimate purposes attached to established social sites and/or
identities.” (48) Frames as bundles of meaning which help define threats and opportunities are cen-
tral to engendering perceptions of injustice or grievances that can then motivate political activity.
Although closely tied to the potential for material benefits underlying claimed entitlements, these
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frames are subjective evaluations of fairness and thus can affect behavior independently from the
expected economic value of the right.
The symbolic effect of rights on behavior follows such a framing mechanism. Rights inform
ideas on legitimate interests and means for defending entitlements. A threat to that right will
activate feelings of injustice and grievances, particulalry when the appropriate avenues for protecting
rights are either blocked or unavailable. This conceptual framework is what gives rights-based
movements and rights discourse their attributed power to build movements and mobilize support
(Epp, 1998; Scheingold, 2010; Simmons, 2009). However, a right also informs judgements on the
appropriate forum for redress (the state), and thereby canalizes these grievances. In this sense, the
right both defines when and how injustices occur, and also the procedures and venues for redressing
those grievances, which are directed at the state.
Multiple scholars have noted that prior recognition of rights can often define perceptions
of injustices and direct political activity toward the state. Boone (2014) in her multi-country
study on how property regimes shape conflict over land reveals how granting rights over rural
land can incentivizes mobilization around those claims. Tilly and Tarrow (2007) in their work on
contentious mobilization also rely on an example of protests erupting in Caracas’s La Hoyada market
to demonstrate the power of conceptual frames. The authors note specifically how the protests were
motivated by street vendors who were granted formal property rights which were later revoked by
another administration (45-47). This effect has also been identified in collectively held rights, such
as in the case of colonial titles for indigenous communities (Saffon Sanin, 2015). In her study, Safon
Sanin argues that previously granted land titles informed perceptions of “fraud” during moments
of land expropriation, and that these communities then presented greater demands for subsequent
land reform. In all of these examples, the granting of a right provided the frame for attributing
injustice to an economic deprivation and later facilitated mobilization and claim-making toward the
state.
While the preceding discussion focuses on examples of contentious mobilization, rights can
motivate other forms of political engagement as well. These include engaging with formal institutions
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to make claims, such as courts and administrative agencies, or by participating more in voting and
other sanctioned forms of political participation. Although a right is an influential frame for defining
injustices, these perceived grievances are not always directed against the state. Rather, they are
canalized toward the state as the appropriate forum for resolution. Therefore claim-making may not
be contentious vis-a-vis the state, but instead manifest itself before officially sanctioned institutions.
O’Brien and Li’s (2006) study on “rightful” claim-making toward the state in China found that
rights-like guarantees frequently increased claim-making through official state institutions. Similarly,
Saffon Sanin (2015) found that many rural Mexican communities made claims based on colonial
land titles before official channels and courts.
Several scholars on voting behavior have also noted that entrenched entitlements, often per-
ceived as rights themselves, can shape future mobilization by creating organized interests groups
around them. These groups can then defend entitlements and limit policy-making options of politi-
cians by mobilizing votes and increasing turnout around these issues. Pierson (1996) noted that
organized interest groups and new stakeholders forming around state entitlements have influenced
the subsequent development of state benefits in advanced welfare states. In the United States, enti-
tlement programs perceived as a form of“right,” such as social security, have experienced an increase
in voter turnout among beneficiaries, even those from demographics which normally have depressed
turnout rates (Campbell, 2002), whereas other benefits not understood as such (e.g. healthcare)
fail to mobilize votes (Levitsky, 2008). In Latin America and Eastern Europe, Haggard and Kauf-
man (2008) have argued that mobilizing around entitlements also presented obstacles to neo-liberal
reformers to later initiate policy changes.
Although I focus specifically on formally recognized rights, there are many other methods
through which an individual could claim a legal right or mobilize behind a just entitlement in the
absence of state recognition. The most common is through careful framing by movement leaders
to shape grievances into the form of rights claims or through a process of “rights-consciousness,”
(O’Brien and Li, 2006; Scheingold, 2010) where individuals form the belief that they have a legitimate
claim to legal rights (a ”right to rights,” (Holston, 2008)). For international human rights move-
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ments, these rights are enumerated and stated through international legislation and often reflected
in national constitutions (Simmons, 2009). However, even where these rights are not specifically
recognized, movements often wield the discursive power of the symbolic effect in attempting to
mobilize support. While I do not test the effect of unenumerated or un-recognized rights in this
study, theoretically I view these effects to be very similar. This is because they draw from the same
concepts of just claim-making and the legitimizing role of rights in defining citizenship (Holston,
2008). The principal difference between mobilization with and without formal rights is that in the
later case, social movement leaders must engage in active framing and education to construct a
rights consciousness and convince members that they are legitimate bearers of rights. Conversely,
the state recognition of a formal right has a powerful framing effect on its own that does not require
additional mobilization or conscious raising.
2.4.1. Expectations of Enforcement
From the above discussion it should be clear that for rights to translate into grievances and
political engagement, an additional factor is necessary—a perceived threat to that right. This, I
argue, leads to a counter-intuitive prediction that rights provoke engagement most where they are
weak and vulnerable. Threats to a right can come from any number of sources, from state encroach-
ment to actions of third parties, and the exact type of threat will depend on the circumstance of an
individual right. However, I argue that the most important factor is the rights-bearer’s generalized
expectation that a right will be enforced. Where expectations of enforcement are low, rights-bearers
are more likely to perceive a threat to their legitimate interest. Conversely, where expectations of
enforcement are high, rights-bearers may actually have reduced incentives to engage in “costly”
political behavior to protect their interests.
The exact factors which contribute to expectations of enforcement will vary depending on the
specific right and the immediate political context. They include expectations on the capacity of the
state to guarantee rights, including the strength or presence of courts, police, or state bureaucracies.
Expectations could also depend on the willingness of the state to protect rights, for example in the
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case of discriminated minority groups. The key would be an individual’s subjective belief that the
state will guarantee rights for similarly situated persons. Therefore, even if state institutions are
functioning well and are widely present, individuals belonging to marginalized groups, or who have
experienced political persecution in the past, will likely have low expectations that their rights will
be enforced.
The theoretical basis for this conditional effect comes from important contributions in the
social movement and human rights literature. Scholars of human rights movements have noted that
rights seem to play the most important role in framing understandings of justice and mobilizing
support under situations when rights are most vulnerable or ineffective in practice. Donnelly (2013)
refers to this situation as the “possession paradox,” in that rights are the most important where an
individual does not enjoy the material benefit of a right. Conversely, where rights are universally
respected, they would be “rarely asserted, and almost never enforced” (9). Under circumstances
where an individual possesses a right, but does not enjoy its benefits, the recognition of a right
can be a powerful driver for an individual to perceive an injustice and canalize that grievance into
political action.
Scholars on human rights have also specifically highlighted this potential for rights to foster
political action and change. Simmons (2009) argues that human rights treaties can have an im-
portant impact on mobilizing domestic groups around the protection of enshrined rights. This can
catalyze political mobilization when individuals perceive what Simmons terms as a “rights-gap,” or
the distance between new values reflected in human rights treaties and the actual policy or behavior
of states in respecting and guaranteeing those same rights (137). Goodman and Jinks (2008) assert
that the disconnect between state behavior and human rights norms is actually a powerful driver
for acculturating states to keep human rights commitments. They term this effect the “civilizing
force of hypocrisy,” through which the gap between emerging values around human rights standards
and actual human rights practice can motivate changes in state policy. Therefore, outcomes “might
improve over time even if the gap between world-cultural expectations and actual state practice
never closes” (Goodman and Jinks, 2008: 727).
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However, in areas of strong rights enforcement, rights-recognition will not automatically lead
to increased political participation and may actually dampen incentives to engage in politics. If
perceptions of the legitimacy of claims are also correlated with the perceived security of a right (i.e.
the material effect, see below), then new rights-bearers have a disincentive to engage in politics.
After all, why engage in costly acts of political participation when the current political status quo
adequately protects fundamental interests? This will increase the willingness of the rights-bearer
to exercise a claim, but will also reduce the need for participation, effectively making the tendency
for political participation an unrealized, latent potential. This prediction has both theoretical and
empirical support in existing scholarship. First, the reduction in incentives to engage in political
mobilization is one of the principal arguments in favor of entrenching important rights protection
in constitutional documents. By elevating such considerations above the normal political process,
citizens do not have to concern themselves with the quotidian operations of government or politics,
and can reserve engagement in politics for highly significant “constitutional moments” (Ackerman,
1991) when these questions are open for debate (see also Hirschman, 1970). Thus, offering greater
rights protections can increase regime stability (Ordeshook, 1993; Ansell and Samuels, 2010) by
limiting political engagement of citizens to moments when there is a strong signal of a change in
the fundamental contract with the state (see Weingast, 1997).
There is also some empirical evidence suggesting that increased tenure security leads to po-
litical demobilization. In urban squatter developments, many have noted that when communities
finally gain formal property rights, they tend to go through a period of political demobilization.
Community associations that sprouted and flourished through organized efforts to legalize land
occupations suddenly dissolve and turn dormant after residents gain legal title (De Soto, 1989).
Dosh (2010) in his examination of squatter organizations in Ecuador and Peru labeled this trend
in demobilization as the “security trap.” He notes that after receiving formal rights, groups lose
organizational capacity even when their communities still lack basic services such as water or sani-
tation (29). Studies of homeownership in the Untied States have also shown that stronger property
rights can lead to lower probability of voter turnout or engagement with political representatives
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Expectations Symbolic Effect of Rights Recognition
of enforcement Rights Claim Security Participation
Strong Enforcement (+) Legitimate Claim (+) Tenure Security No Change or (–) Engagement
Weak Enforcement (+) Legitimate Claim No Change (+) Engagement, Claim-making
Table 2.1.: Principal hypotheses for the “Symbolic Effect” of rights-recognition. The rows for Strong
Enforcement and Weak Enforcement show the predictions for the conditional effect of
rights recognition under different institutional contexts.
(Engelhardt et al., 2010). More secure property rights in rural areas are also associated with reduced
threat of contentious political mobilization. Qualitative analysis of rural protest in Latin America
and other regions have shown that peasants tend not to join revolutionary movements when they
are buttressed by secure property regimes (Paige, 1978; Eckstein, 1989; Albertus, 2015: 74).
Table 2.1 outlines the different predictions for the symbolic impact of rights conditional on
an individual’s subjective evaluation of the state’s commitment to guarantee that right. For ease
of exposition, I separate these two categories into expectations of strong and weak enforcement.
Where an individual expects that rights will be adequately enforced, the symbolic effect of rights
will increase the perceived legitimacy of a claim, but increases in expected tenure will dampen
participation producing a net zero or slightly negative effect on participation. Conversely, where
expectations of enforcement are low, new rights will be vulnerable. These rights will then frame un-
derstandings of injustices, producing grievances toward the state and incentivizing political actions
to defend those rights.
While my theory conceptually distinguishes the legitimacy of a claim from expectations of
enforcement, in practice it will often be difficult to disentangle these two subjective perceptions
in the new rights-bearer. This is because the formal recognition of a right can also increase state
legitimacy.5 Therefore, receiving a right could directly affect an individual’s expectation that the
right will be effectively enforced. This could be from a belief that the new right is a credible signal
of a greater willingness on the part of the state to protect rights. It could also result from a change
5For a broader discussion of this claim, see Chapter 5.
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in perception that the state is now operating at an increased capacity.
While these perceptions will ultimately depend on an individual’s subjective experience and
perspective, I argue that this is less of a concern if expectations of enforcement are based on the
perceived capacity of the state to guarantee rights. Such would be the case if the rights-bearer
is in an area with weak state presence or institutional capacity. Under such conditions, while
rights-recognition may cause an individual to update her priors on enforcement, other sources of
information about the (in)effectiveness of state institutions will remain constant. Therefore, the new
rights-bearer will quickly grow concerned that her new rights will not accompany a strengthening
of state capacity.
If however, the expectation of enforcement is based on perceived willingness to enforce rights,
as in the case of the selective exclusion of a marginalized group, then the recognition of the right
itself could be a credible signal that the state is now willing to extend protections to that group.
In these cases, the potential for bias due to endogenous expectations is greater. However, assuming
no actual change in the state’s willingness to enforce rights, new rights-bearers will continuously
update their beliefs on enforcement. Therefore, they should return to their previously held belief
of low enforcement (as they see that overall state willingness has not actually changed), while the
perceived legitimacy of their rights claims will remain high. Therefore, in either case the predicted
effect on behavior will be the same as described in Table 2.1 above.
2.5. The Material Effect of Rights
Alternatively, a formal right could affect behavior and attitudes only through a material
effect, that is, by increasing the expected future value or endowment a right represents. In the case
of property rights, this would occur if receiving a formal title increases tenure security or the ability
of the owner to extract value from the land due to increasing a claim’s clarity or guarantee of state
protection (Feder and Feeny, 1991). A change in assets could then influence political attitudes and
behavior by either increasing the marginal benefit of investing in local public goods and community
engagement (DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1999) or by creating an “investor class” of property owners
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(De Janvry, Gonzalez-Navarro, and Sadoulet, 2014). Either of these effects could be a result of the
material effect of a legal property right.
Under contexts with relatively robust institutions for protecting rights, the basic prediction
for the material effect is similar to that of the symbolic effect: rights-recognition will tend to in-
crease the willingness to publicly make claims. This is because of a change in the probability that
claims for protection will be successful, which would also increase the expected future value of the
underlying benefit.6 However, given that a strengthening of tenure security will reduce the overall
threat to a right, I argue that this leads to no change in overall engagement or possibly even lower
rates of participation. The reasoning is similar as in the case of the symbolic effect above. Although
some scholars have claimed that stronger property tenure will also increase attachment to an indi-
vidual’s community, and therefore incentives to engage in politics (DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1999),
others have found convincing evidence that stronger property rights depress political participation
(Engelhardt et al., 2010; Dosh, 2010). My predictions support the conclusions of these later studies,
as more secure tenure will also reduce the perceived level of threat to a right.
While the symbolic and material effects give similar predictions under strong expectations of
enforcement, these two mechanisms give very different predictions when rights guarantees are weak—
while the symbolic effect could spark grievances, the material effect should produce no change in
behavior. As discussed previously, the material effect is directly related to changes in expectations
of accessing state resource, such as state enforcement, brought about by rights-recognition. Thus,
any changes in attitudes or behavior produced by the material effect will also be heavily influenced
by the institutional or political context. In contexts of weak enforcement—where institutions are
absent or state commitments are weak—the formal recognition of a right should have little impact on
the security of a right. Consequently, the right should not change an individual’s future expectation
of enjoying the material benefits or chances of making a successful claim for protection. In essence,
if the impact that rights have is dependent on whether an individual actually enjoys the material
benefits of the right, in contexts of weak enforcement the right is worth less than the parchment
6In contrast, the symbolic effect would only increase the perception of legitimacy and justness in making a claim,
which could be independent of the expectation that the claim will ultimately be successful.
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Mechanism Strong Enforcement Weak Enforcement
Symbolic Effect No Effect or (–) Participation (+) Participation
Material Effect (only) No Effect or (–) Participation No Effect
Table 2.2.: Diagram comparing the hypotheses for the symbolic and material effects of rights when
interacted with different institutional contexts (strong vs. weak enforcement). Predic-
tions for the material effect assume that only the material effect is operating on indi-
vidual behavior. Both theoretical mechanisms produce similar predictions under strong
institutional settings, but differ where rights guarantees are weak.
it is written on. Therefore, when prior expectations of enforcement are low, the material effect of
formal rights-recognition should be minimal.
The differential impact of rights-recognition under situations of strong or weak enforcement
offers a convenient method for empirically distinguishing the symbolic effect from the material effect.
Table 2.2 outlines how the principal predictions of the symbolic effect and an alternative hypothesis
where only the material effect exists.7
It is important to note that I do not argue that the symbolic effect and these alternate
explanations are mutually exclusive. Rights recognition could alter political behavior through a
combination of different mechanisms that act simultaneously on the new rights-bearer. This is the
basis for my predictions of the symbolic effect in contexts of strong enforcement, where the positive
effect on participation is effectively canceled out by the negative effect due to increases in tenure
security (resulting from the material effect). Therefore, the above predictions for the material effect
should be understood as the hypothesis in which only the material effect exists.
7In addition to these main hypotheses, I also derive additional hypotheses to test alternative explanations to how
land titling can affect specific types of political engagement in Chapter 5.
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2.6. Research Design
2.6.1. Land Titling as Rights-Recognition
In the remainder of this chapter, I outline the research design I employed to (1) construct the
above explanation as an empirically grounded theory on the symbolic effect of rights and (2) provide
an initial verification of the hypotheses I derive above. I then conclude with a brief discussion of
the scope conditions of my theory.
This study examines the symbolic effect of rights in the specific case of individual property
rights over rural land—rights that are significant for many theories on the development of institutions
and political change. I understand a formal property right as one that is both defined and enforced
by the state as a third-party guarantor of rights, and for which the landholder has a document
(usually a title) that provides a reasonable expectation that the right will be recorded in a state
registry and recognized by a court of law. Land formalization policies, which both deliver legal titles
and create new registries, have proliferated in the last two decades in response to the high degree
of informality in land tenure in many countries (Deininger and Feder, 2009; Conroy et al., 2014).
These policies grant legal title to landholders who previously have incomplete or informal land
rights, either due to long term possession of state lands or informal sales or transfers. As I show in
Chapters 3 and 4, access to these formal rights are highly significant for peasant farmers not only as
a means to secure capital in land, but also as a symbolic marker of their legitimacy as landowners.
Therefore, I study formalization policies not only as efforts to boost economic development, but
also as massive programs that recognize significant fundamental rights to large numbers of rural
smallholders—a population that has historically suffered limited access to central state institutions
or to the benefits of citizenship.
Land titling provides a convenient place to study the potential for legal rights to have a
symbolic effect on behavior for two reasons. The first pertains to the theoretical importance of
property rights as fundamental civil rights, as noted above. They are also relatively concrete rights
with a tangible corollary in the real-world through physical goods or land and with a symbolic
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representation in the form of a title. Rural property rights in particular are an interesting case,
as land is highly significant for peasant identity, economic livelihood, and political movements
(Thiesenhusen, 1995). In addition, rural land tenure has played a key role in contentious politics
historically (e.g. Skocpol, 1979; Luebbert, 1987), the emergence of rural conflict (e.g. LeGrand, 1986;
Hidalgo et al., 2010; Albertus, Brambor, and Ceneviva, 2016) and continues to figure prominently
in debates over transitional justice in Colombia (e.g. Restrepo and Morales, 2014; Uprimny-Yepes
and Sa´nchez, 2010).
The second reason is methodological. The empirical study of the power of a legal right—
essentially an abstract idea—to influence political behavior is notoriously intractable. The distribu-
tion and recognition of rights in society, much like the distribution of land and property rights, are
largely endogenous to other social and contextual variables that influence preferences and political
behavior (Firmin-Sellers, 1995; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001; Besley and Ghatak, 2010).8
In addition, legal rights coterminously alter both material and symbolic value for the rights-bearer,
and empirically distinguishing these effects is difficult. Similarly for the social movement literature,
rights-framing and decisions to mobilize around rights are highly endogenous to the political and
contextual variables that also influence whether individuals participate in politics, the potential for
material gains, prevailing political attitudes, as well as the potential for rights to influence broader
public opinion (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001).
Formalization, however, largely seeks to recognize existing possession and tenure regimes,
rather than reallocating land to new owners. Therefore, land formalization provides a precise
moment when the state recognizes a formal, de jure right for an individual who already has some
de facto control over land. I argue that this creates an opportunity to observe changes in the legal
status of property rights that do not alter the underlying distribution of land itself. While there
are likely residual changes in material benefits from titling (Feder and Feeny, 1991; Besley, 1995),
as I explained above and further in Chapter 5, a comparison between areas of weak and strong
enforcement of property rights can help control from this remaining source of material value. In
8For a discussion about the empirical challenges in measuring property rights in general, see (Frye, 2017: 30-33)
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addition, titling of property also provides a clear document that indicates who is the property owner
and marks the precise moment when that right changes. This is convenient as it provides a single
moment when both the beneficiary and the researcher can note a change in legal status. Conversely,
for other moments of rights-recognition, such as the declaration of a new right by a constitutional
or supreme court, the exact moment in which any particular individual becomes cognizant of that
legal change would likely vary and be difficult to determine.
2.7. Multi-method design
I employ a multi-method research design with the goal of inductively building a grounded
theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Glaser, 1978) on the impact of legal rights-recognition on political
behavior. I draw upon qualitative interviews from several fieldwork visits to Peru and Colombia
between 2014-2017 to build a descriptive case study of the experience with tiling programs and
formal property rights in small rural villages in the countryside. These cases then form the basis
of my theoretical construction and an initial verification of my theory on the symbolic effect of
property rights. I then test the hypotheses I derive from my theory above using original data sets
on the principal land titling efforts in each country. My goal with this multi-method approach is to
triangulate multiple sources of data that can form a consistent explanation of how legal property
rights influence individual political behavior.
Following the suggestion of Glaser (1978), I draw data from as many sources as possible,
including my personal experience of working in multiple countries in Latin America for over nine
years. Much of this time I spent working directly with peasant farmers in Colombia and Peru,
including time spent as a lawyer assisting rural communities with land claims and direct experience
with displaced individuals in areas of Colombia’s ongoing conflict.
One aspect of my work that always puzzled me was the faith which many peasant farm-
ers placed in formal, legal titles. This was especially poignant among formerly displaced victims of
Colombia’s armed conflict in rural areas in the Northwest of Choco´. Even when legal paperwork had
failed completely to secure property rights against concurrent attacks by both guerrilla and paramil-
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itary groups, and after only reclaiming their former homesteads through political organization and
enduring hardships, many would still reify the notarized documents that they once possessed. This
experience, and my own interactions with peasant families making property right claims toward the
state, both inspired and informed the present work.
The qualitative analysis in this study provides a descriptive explanation of the meaning of
legal property rights for smallholding peasant farmers in Peru and Colombia, and the role formal
rights play in regulating land and local political participation. This analysis is divided into two
parts. The first is a historical examination of rural property tenure and agrarian reform policies
in each country. I draw data for this discussion from secondary sources, which I then supplement
with official data on land tenure and interviews with former and current government officials. This
analysis also provides important contextual information for understanding how respondents in both
countries construe meaning underlying formal property rights (see Simmons, 2016: 14), which I
analyze in the subsequent section.
This second part is based on a series of 70 semi-structured interviews with smallholding
peasant farmers in two comparable regions: A´ncash, Peru and Narin˜o, Colombia. These interviews
come from 6 different villages in each department, which I selected based on theoretically important
variables for my analysis (Warren, 2011; Holstein and Gubrium, 1995), specifically, experience with
titling and variation in enforcement of property rights. These descriptions form the basis of my
theoretical construction as well as a source of initial verification of the assumptions underlying my
theory.
I then test hypotheses drawn from my theory using a difference-in-differences design which
estimates the impact of variation in titling over time on political participation. In order to capture
the potential for formal rights to influence different forms of political engagement, I triangulate my
tests using data on electoral outcomes, the use of courts, and existing surveys. While this method-
ology cannot show causality, I conduct additional tests of parallel trends assumptions (Angrist and
Pischke, 2008) and combine multiple outcome measures to provide a broad empirical basis for an
initial test of my theory.
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2.8. Scope Conditions
My research design attempts to triangulate information across a broad set of measures of
political engagement and by replicating results in two different contexts. Further research and
refinement of the theoretical ideas I present here can then demonstrate the full potential reach of
my theory and the conditions under which legal rights affect political behavior. However, there are
three scope conditions that are implicit in my theoretical framework, and therefore may limit the
application of my theory.
First, the symbolic impact of legal rights requires a particular relationship between the
individual and the state, which implies certain duties on the part of the state to respect and
protect rights of citizens. Importantly, it also imparts legitimacy to public claims made on behalf of
legal rights. However, this ideational power can only affect behavior in settings where liberal rights
are an institution so pervasive that they are naturalized, nearly universally accepted, and taken
for granted (see Wendt, 1992; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). Therefore, an initial scope limitation
would be that my theory applies primarily to modern liberal regimes where the respect for civil
and political rights are an important marker of citizenship. This can be understood as a form of
rights-consciousness that is presupposed in my theory, and would not necessarily apply to illiberal
regimes where the basis of citizenship is not centered on a set fundamental citizenship rights (see
Perry, 2009).
A second scope condition is that the symbolic effect of rights is likely to produce a discernible
change in behavior only for populations that previously suffered exclusion from or limited access
to the state, formal institutions, or the legal rights and benefits of citizenship. This is because my
theory supposes that for a new right to change behavior, it must represent, or create, a change
in the prior relationship between the individual and the state. Those who had previously enjoyed
high-levels of access to the state and benefits of citizenship will not likely notice any change as
new rights are added. For these privileged individuals, their sense of political agency as a citizen
is already well-consolidated. Conversely, for groups that have previously been marginalized or had
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limited access to the state, the recognition of a new-fundamental right may be experienced as a
significant change in political status that can incentivize greater political engagement. As titling
programs typically benefit smallholding peasants in remote rural areas, my theory will therefore
apply to the majority of rural areas in which new property rights are granted. It should also apply
to many cases of major rights expansions in transitional societies, as these are commonly granted
to poor or marginalize groups upon the adoption on new constitutions.
Finally, my theory will be most relevant in political contexts such as unconsolidated democra-
cies and competitive authoritarian regimes. This is because such regimes have the greatest potential
to recognize new rights, for example through the expansion of suffrage or the passage of a new con-
stitutional bills of rights. However, these countries also present the conditions under which state
capacity to enforce rights is still limited, thus creating the ideal environment for new rights to de-
velop into legitimized grievance (see Simmons, 2009: 125). Stable democratic regimes will likely
not undergo major expansions of fundamental rights (although my theory could be relevant for
exploring historical expansions), and closed, non-liberal authoritarian regimes will not have suitable
conditions for public participation nor will they tend to formally recognize new rights.
2.9. Conclusion
This chapter lays out theoretical justifications for the two central arguments in this study.
The first is that fundamental rights exert a strong, symbolic effect on political behavior. When a
state recognizes a fundamental right, it provides a symbol of legitimacy that shapes our understand-
ing of just and fair claims. In doing so, it defines what kinds of claims are legitimate and the proper
procedures for asserting state protection. Rights also define who can make legitimate claims, and
they are therefore important markers of citizenship. These effects are inherent in the symbolism of
the right itself and go beyond the impact of material benefits a right may confer.
My second argument is that rights are most likely to promote engagement and increased
participation where they are least protected. Under these settings, rights legitimate grievances and
create perceptions of injustice. This prediction in particular is counter-intuitive from a traditional
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economic perspective of rights as institutions. If rights only influence behavior when they provide
a credible commitment of protection for an underlying entitlement, then they should be worthless
when enforcement is weak. This is because the new right would not change rational expectations
of enjoying future benefit streams derived from the right, as they would not alter the probability
of successfully asserting a claim. However, under such circumstances the symbolic effect would still
increase subjective perceptions of legitimacy, fairness, and attachment to the claim.
The next chapter examines the historical background of land tenure in the rural countryside
of Peru and Colombia. In both cases, I outline attempts at land reform (widespread in Peru, more
limited in Colombia), problems with access to land and the formal legal system for peasant farmers,
and the background and procedures for large titling campaigns that are the focus of my study. I
then present qualitative evidence from fieldwork in districts benefited by land titling in Peru and
Colombia, which I use to demonstrate the symbolic importance of land and land titles in the lives of
small-holding peasant farmers. I combine evidence from over 70 interviews with peasant farmers in
both countries and 74 additional interviews with government officials and policy experts to construct
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3.1. Introduction
This chapter lays out the background of rural land titling policies in Peru and Colombia by
examining their respective histories of land tenure and land reform. Similar to many developing
countries with significant sectors of the economy devoted to agricultural production, successive
governments in both countries undertook major efforts to spark rural development through agrarian
reform over the past century, Some of these efforts were successful at redistributed land, such as
the 1969 land reform under the Velasco military regime, which broke up large estates in Peru’s
central highlands and coastal regions. Others, such as the less extensive reforms in Colombia and
earlier land redistributions efforts in Peru, were limited to recognizing existing possession of state
frontier lands or prior invasions of a small number of private haciendas. Although none of these
policies were ultimately successful in invigorating rural development as their promoters hoped, they
all contributed to cementing the dominant role of the state in allocating and legally recognizing
property rights in the countryside, particularly for smallholding peasant farmers.
My primary aim in reviewing these histories is to highlight how efforts to reform the coun-
tryside were not solely aimed at the distribution or control of rural land. They also affected the
legal recognition of property rights and the privileges associated with those. As land reform policies
evolved toward the close of the 20th century, the question of legal recognition and access to formal
institutions would become central to debates on agrarian reform. Now, the governments in both
Peru and Colombia are focused on the titling and formalization of property rights for smallholding
farmers—a trend common in many other developing nations. These programs shifted from policy
prescriptions that favored intervention in the de facto property rights regime to ones that focused
primarily on de jure rights, leaving the underlying distributional concerns alone, at least in terms
of the distribution of capital and the means of production.
I draw two principal conclusions from my analysis in this chapter. First, I argue that formal,
legal rights to property have played a central role in driving movements and claim-making by peasant
groups historically in both countries. While these struggles focused on control over land and securing
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land tenure, they often appear where peasants have a formally recognized claim to land or a strong
expectation that the state will recognize possessions as a matter of right. Thus, conflict over land in
the countryside in Peru and Colombia have been driven not only by economic incentives to control
the means of agricultural production, but also by a struggle for legal recognition and access to the
state.1
For this point, the comparison between the recent histories of Peru and Colombia is particu-
larly informative. Each country has taken a different historical path in terms of peasant mobilizing
around access to rural property rights and state sponsored agrarian reform. In Colombia, policies
aimed at developing abundant state land on several frontiers that devolved into conflicts between
peasant colonizers and large estate owners. Failed attempts to resolve these competing claims to
frontier land or redistribute property rights contributed to outbreaks of violence which eventually
spawned a 50-year internal armed conflict. In contrast, Peru’s arid landscape has provided more
limited areas for agricultural expansion, particularly in regions where collective peasant communities
have historical claims to grazing lands. There, conflict between community claims and expanding
haciendas pushed successive governments to prioritize land redistribution, eventually leading to the
dissolution of many large estates and a massive land transfer to collective cooperatives. However,
despite differences in the patterns of de facto land tenure over time in each country, previously
recognized property rights have been a principal driver of peasant claims for access to land and land
redistribution.
The second argument I make is that the state is central for the allocation and recognition
of land rights in the countryside of both Peru and Colombia. Historically in the past century
and today, most peasant farmers acquire legal property rights by petitioning the state. These
can be through titling programs which grant property rights by formally transferring state lands
to peasants. They can also be from distributional programs that allocate property that has been
purchased or expropriated from private owners. In either case, the main role of the state in the rural
property regime is not merely that of a registry of private transactions, as it is in many mature land
1In the case of Colombia, this argument has been advanced by other authors whose work I rely on for this chapter
(LeGrand, 1986; Arango Restrepo, 2014; Saffon Sanin, 2015).
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markets. Rather, the state is directly involved in the creation and recognition of newly formalized
rights, and thus plays an important role as a gatekeeper to formal property rights institutions.
Both of these conclusions form the historical context and support for my theory on the
symbolic effect of legal property rights. They demonstrate how legal rights are not solely about
economic expectations or property tenure, but also about providing meaning and legitimacy to
claim-making and motivating political participation. Struggles over land in both countries are also
struggles over legal rights and the symbolic and moral justification that these rights imply.
While I focus on the role of legal property rights in the history of land reform in Peru and
Colombia, I do not contend that economic property rights (Barzel, 1997) or the control of the
means of agricultural production are unimportant factors. Obviously, land is a principal source
of economic revenue and subsistence for peasant farmers, and land’s economic value provides the
primary motivation for the struggle over its control (Demsetz, 1967; North and Thomas, 1973).
However, the material entitlements derived from land rights can only partially explain struggles
over property rights. Understanding the political entitlements—access to privileged and morally just
claims—that formal property rights provide is also necessary to fully explain how and where claims
over land emerge. However, I do not mean to imply that legal claims and economic motivations
are independent factors. Both are interwoven in the meaning and practice of land rights. They can
also be mutually constitutive; just as legal rights help secure property tenure, de facto property
tenure maintained over time can lead to legal recognition. Rather, my intention is to highlight the
contribution of legal rights in motivating behavior and claims regarding rural land.
I draw historical information in this chapter from secondary sources, which I supplement
with official data and interviews with experts and former government officials working in land
reform and agrarian policy. Where possible, I compare first hand accounts from expert interviews
with official government documentation and legislation to understand both the design of policies
and their implementation in practice.
This chapter is organized as follows. First, I review the 20th-century history of land reform
and land tenure in the countryside of Peru and Colombia. For each case I summarize the land
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conflicts leading up to major agrarian reforms and the ultimate consequences of these policies
on land tenure and the emergence of subsequent conflicts. I also review how land reform efforts
eventually evolved into their present form, which favors the formalization and recognition of property
rights, rather than their redistribution. I then provide an analysis of how conflicts over rural land
are not only shaped by distributional struggles, but also by the legal property rights regime and
prior state-recognition of formal property rights.
3.2. Land Tenure and Land Reform in Peru
In many regards, the history of rural land in Peru in the 20th and early 21st centuries is
typical of Latin America and many developing countries with agrarian economies. Rural tenure
patterns have been dominated by the accumulation of arable lands into a relatively small number of
large estates, while the majority of land holders are subsistence farmers on marginal lands that are
scarcely enough to provide for their immediate needs. This tendency has marked the rural economy
of Peru, and the attempt to alter this situation have driven agricultural policy.
However, the Peruvian case is also a notable exception in some regards. Many rural villages,
particularly in the South and Central Andean highlands, possess large areas of collective lands often
with titles recognized since colonial times. In addition, Peru is one of the handful of Latin American
countries that have successfully undertaken major land redistribution during its agrarian reform in
the late 1960s and early 1970s. Despite having broken the domination of arable lands by large
estates, these reform still did not prevent the later emergence of armed conflict in the southern
highlands during the 1980s.
The geography of Peru is typically divided into three major regions—the coast, the sierra,
and the jungle, each of which has a distinct pattern of land tenure and agricultural practices. The
coastal plains on the western edge of Peru are largely arid and infertile, with the exception of the
52 river basins flowing from the Andes where the majority of the country’s agricultural production
takes place. At the beginning of the 20th century, there was an expansion in export agriculture led
by large sugar plantations in these coastal river valleys (Watters, 1994; Harding, 1975). These large
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plantations relied primarily on migratory wage labor from the sierra and coastal region, rather than
sharecropping or semi-feudal tenant-landlord relationships that were common in other countries at
the time (Deere, 1990).
Peru’s sierra region consists of the Andes mountain range which extends the entire length of
the country. Similar to the coast, arable land is quite scarce in the highlands and the majority of
land is suitable only for grazing livestock. For the first half of the 20th Century, most rural peasants
in the sierra lived and worked on land that was under one of two property arrangements. The first
was a semi-feudal system in which peasants held small parcels of land with usufruct rights within
a larger hacienda shell that was formally titled to a landlord (Huber, 1995; Watters, 1994). Many
of these families would only have access to one or two small parcels for cultivation, but would often
have grazing rights over larger areas of the hacienda lands (Watters, 1994: 8). The second land
tenancy arrangement was in the form of collective lands held by a peasant community (comunidad
campesina). These communal lands frequently had colonial titles from the Spanish viceroys (Burneo,
2013) and were granted constitutional recognition since 1920 (Watters, 1994).
Despite the dominance of large haciendas and collective lands in the Andean highlands, most
peasant families still farmed land individually in small, privately-controlled parcels even before land
reform began in earnest in the 1960s (Watters, 1994). Within peasant communities, most families
managed land essentially as private property, with the limitation that land could not be transferred
to someone from outside the village (Burneo, 2013). In addition, toward the mid-20th century,
many peasants living on hacienda land received transfers of small family plots as large hacienda
owners sought to reduce liability from unproductive lands under the threat of imminent agrarian
reform (Harding, 1975).
The exception to this patter was in the northern sierra, which was less dominated by large
haciendas and had a higher prevalence of small landownership than in the central and southern
highlands. This was due mostly to the lack of large expanses of land or easy access to major urban
markets that facilitated hacienda-style production in other areas (Huber, 1995). In addition, the
northern sierra region had a longer history of private smallholding outside of collective lands. Unlike
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the rest of the sierra region, the north had relatively few peasant communities, and those that exist
today were mostly created during the agrarian reform period (Huber, 1995; Burneo, 2013).
The third region is the jungle lowlands that consist of the area to the east of the Andes
mountains. This region has a steadily expanding agricultural frontier, although its isolation and
distance from the coast have prevented reliable access to export markets. This situation has left
the region to be less of a priority for agricultural policy-making until recently.
During the first half of the 20th century, pressure for agrarian reform gradually increased in
tandem with growing conflict in the countryside. The exact nature of this unrest is related to the
pre-existing land tenure patterns and the agricultural economy of each region. In the coastal region,
conflict typically centered around issues of wages and labor contracts in the large sugar haciendas.
With the emergence of rural unions around the time of World War I, more rural laborers began to
make demands against the large hacienda owners (Harding, 1975). However, the majority of these
demands revolved around improved wages and working conditions, and not access to land (Watters,
1994; Huber, 1995), as most rural laborers depended primarily on wages for income or were migrants
from other regions were they possessed family parcels.
In the central and souther highlands, however, rural unrest was more directly related to land
rights. The majority of the conflict was between peasant communities and expanding haciendas
which were steadily encroaching on collective lands. These land conflicts centered around access
to grazing rights over land which previously were held by peasant communities. Many peasant
federations and unions urged for “reclamations” of collective lands from the haciendas, sparking
repeated hacienda invasions (Watters, 1994; Bourque and Palmer, 1975).
Several governments made tepid attempts at agrarian reform during the period from the
1920s until the 1940s, but these mostly addressed working conditions and labor contracts for migrant
workers in the coast (Harding, 1975). However land invasions, mostly in the central and southern
highlands, began intensifying in the 1950s and early 1960s, prompting increased calls for agrarian
reform to resolve the growing conflict in the countryside (Eckstein, 1983: 361). The first serious
attempt at land reform was not undertaken until the first Belau´nde administration in 1964 (Bourque
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and Palmer, 1975). By that time, an estimated 300,000 peasants had participated in land invasions
in the sierra (Watters, 1994: 76). These included several major invasions in Pasco and Junin in
the central highlands. However, the first major invasion in the coast, involving as many as 10,000
peasants in Piura, marked the beginning of the Belau´nde government and placed extra pressure to
reach a solution to the growing crisis (Bourque and Palmer, 1975: 195).
Most commentators consider the agrarian reform under the Belau´nde administration as rel-
atively limited, particularly in comparison with the later 1969 reform. Belau´nde’s reform legalized
some previous invasions and was centered on the sierra region where most of those invasions occurred
(Bourque and Palmer, 1975; Harding, 1975). An exception for economically efficient haciendas in
the reform law allowed for the exclusion of the vast majority of large landholdings on the coast
(Watters, 1994; Harding, 1975), which prevented the reforms from benefiting much of the migrant
labor working in that region (McClintock, 1989: 63). Nonetheless, the reforms did reach over 70,000
beneficiaries, including over 28,000 peasants benefiting in the departments of Pasco and Cuzco alone
(Bourque and Palmer, 1975: 197). In addition, between 1963-1968 the government formed over 700
new peasant cooperatives and peasant communities.
Land reform began in earnest, however, with the inauguration of the Velasco military gov-
ernment in 1968. In his 1969 speech to promote agrarian reform, Velasco promised that the land
reform would be “radical, massive and rapid,” and to peasant farmers he specifically asserted that
“the master will no longer feed off your poverty” (Watters, 1994: 166). Unlike previous land re-
distribution efforts in Latin America (e.g. Mexico, Cuba, and Bolivia), the Peruvian reform was
largely directed by central policy makers and had only limited involvement by peasant federation
leaders (Eckstein, 1983). The driving goals of the land reform were to break up the landed oligarchy
and to use collective agricultural production to finance industrial growth. To do this, the reform
sector sought to establish agricultural collectives with newly redistributed land and then link these
cooperatives to the central government (Watters, 1994; Bourque and Palmer, 1975).
Despite expectations of many peasants to the contrary, the main goal of the reform was
not individual redistribution, but the establishment of collectively held agricultural cooperatives
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(Watters, 1994: 219). These cooperatives took two forms: the Agrarian Production Cooperatives
(CAP, Cooperative de Produccio´n Agraria), mostly in charge of the large coastal estates, and the
Agrarian Societies of Social Interest (SAIS, Sociedad Agraria de Intere´s Social) which were intended
to manage ex-hacienda lands together with peasant communities. However, the cooperatives were
unsuccessful in sustaining large scale agricultural production. Many were poorly managed or run as
a series of independent farms that ultimately competed with each other (Lowenthal, 1983; Deere,
1990). In addition, cooperatives were often severely undercapitalized, due to the previous owners
having sold off capital before expropriation (Harding, 1975) or because they were laden with debt
to finance the purchase of estates (Deere, 1990).
Even more problematic was the fact that many cooperatives came in direct conflict with
the preexisting peasant communities which they were intended to serve. This was often due to the
forced transfer of peasant community lands into the newly formed cooperatives, which in practice
excluded many families from accessing traditional grazing lands (Harding, 1975; Deere, 1990). This
perceived expropriation of collectively held territory by cooperatives, combined with management
failures, led to the continuation of land invasions in many parts of the sierra region—now with
peasants invading cooperative lands rather than those or large landlords. By the 1980s, only a
small fraction of the cooperatives in the sierras were still in operation, the rest having been invaded
and divided up among peasant families or otherwise recovered by peasant communities (Watters,
1994: 298).
Although successful in breaking up large haciendas and establishing cooperatives, the re-
forms were never able to successfully coordinate the operations of the cooperatives to spark further
industrialization or economic growth (Bourque and Palmer, 1975). Nonetheless, the impact of the
reforms in the patterns of land tenure in the countryside where considerable. By 1978 when the
reforms ended, the government had exceeded its original goals by benefiting over 400,000 peasant
families by some estimates (Watters, 1994: 171), and transferring nearly half of all agricultural land
(Lowenthal, 1983). The new reforms lifted the efficiency exclusion of the previous policy, allowing
for the expropriation of even large haciendas in the coast. As a result, the majority of beneficiaries
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where either on the coasts or in the wealthier central highland area such as Pasco or Junin (Bourque
and Palmer, 1975).
However, the reforms did little to address the parallel problem of minifundismo, or the
excessive fragmentation of land ownership into small, micro parcels that can only provide for the
immediate subsistence needs of a family. This failure was likely due to two primary factors. First,
many large estates, seeing the proverbial writing on the wall, preempted reforms by selling off
unproductive areas and transferring ownership of small parcels to former tenants (Harding, 1975;
Deere, 1990). Second, most tenants only had control over very small parcels on hacienda lands to
begin with, and the general scarcity of arable land in the coast and highlands would ultimately limit
the ability of any redistribution effort to increase the farm size of all peasants. By one estimate,
a total redistribution of all large estates among the peasantry would still have only resulted in an
average increase of 1/5ha of tillable land per peasant family—there simply was not enough land to
benefit all families (Harding, 1975: 169).
The distribution of rural land over time shows a trend toward higher equality following
reforms, but which has reversed course in the past two decades. Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1 summarize
data on rural land tenure from a series of four agricultural censuses between 1961 and 2012. The
charts show the land area and the total number of farms divided between four categories according
to total landholding size.2
2The census uses a unit of analysis known as the “Agricultural Unit” which corresponds to the land under a exploita-
tion by a technical unit managed by a single person or by multiple people working together. This measure could
include several smaller plots of individual land that are managed together as one farm.
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Figure 3.1.: Visual display of the distribution of rural land tenure in Peru over time according to
agricultural censuses. Plot shows proportion of area (hectares, right) and agricultural


































1961 1972 1994 2012
Number Area Number Area Number Area Number Area
Total 843,478 18,322,044 1,390,288 23,545,147 1,745,773 35,381,809 2,213,649 38,844,268
Micro (< 5ha) 699,427 1,036,188 1,083,775 1,560,448 1,228,367 2,072,119 1,754,479 2,268,824
Small (5-20ha) 107,853 887,574.1 231,840 2,036,421 381,843 3,410,248 336,845 2,940,460
Med. (20-200ha) 28,922 1,495,265 66,626 3,090,454 121,496 5,642,297 109,137 5,035,399
Large (200+ha) 7,276 14,903,018 8,047 16,857,824 14,067 24,257,145 13,188 28,599,585
Proportion
Micro pr. 0.8292 0.0566 0.7795 0.0663 0.7036 0.0586 0.7926 0.0584
Small pr. 0.1279 0.0484 0.1668 0.0865 0.2187 0.0964 0.1522 0.0757
Med. pr. 0.0343 0.0816 0.0479 0.1313 0.0696 0.1595 0.0493 0.1296
Large pr. 0.0086 0.8134 0.0058 0.716 0.0081 0.6856 0.006 0.7363
Table 3.1.: Distribution of rural land tenure in Peru over time according to agricultural censuses. Table displays area of
landholding (hectares, right column) and number of agricultural production units (left column) for different
categories of landowners in each census.
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The data show an overall high level of inequality in land tenure, even in the period following
the agrarian reform. Most of the agricultural land is held by large estates of over 200ha in size,
and there is a high degree of fragmentation in land holding, as micro-estates smaller than 5ha make
up the vast majority of agricultural landholdings.3 These micro-estates are barely large enough to
provide for an average peasant family; in the 2012 census, the average size of these estates was 2.1ha
across Peru.
There is evidence of an important improvement in the levels of land inequality as a result
of the agrarian reform period in the 1970s. The 1972 census, conducted during the beginning of
the reforms, reveals an increase in the total and relative area controlled by small and medium sized
estates, and a corresponding reduction in the land of large estates. This tendency grew and held until
well after the reforms were concluded, as the 1994 census reveals an even greater change toward
equality. However, this trend has suffered a reversal since 1994, with the latest census showing
land is once again concentrated in large estates. In addition, the 2012 census reveals a growing
fragmentation of smaller and medium-sized estates into micro-estates, likely due to land sales and
inheritance. The distribution of land is once again at levels similar to the pre-reform period of the
1960s.
3.2.1. Rural Armed Conflict in Peru
Despite having successfully reshaping the patterns of land tenure in the coast and highlands,
the reforms were unable to spark economic development or prevent the emergence of armed conflict
in the countryside. By the mid-1980s, the country was embroiled in an armed conflict with the
Sendero Luminoso, a maoist revolutionary movement based in the southern highlands, an area which
had been particularly hard hit by economic recession and a series of droughts at the start of the
decade (Degregori, 1990). The Sendero Luminoso was founded in 1968 in a newly reopened regional
university in Ayacucho and quickly spread in the region, gaining support among the peasantry in the
3It should be noted, however, that these data might exaggerate slightly the concentration of land in large, private
estates. This is because they do not distinguish between large estates held by collective titles for peasant or native
communities (which typically benefit a large number of peasant or indigenous families), and large estates held by
individuals or for-profit corporations. Under the given summary, both types of land holdings would be included
in the large estate category.
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early 1980s. By 1984, the government had declared an emergency zone in response to the Sendero
threat which covered 13 provinces in three departments and affected nearly 12% of the country’s
peasant population (McClintock, 1984: 52).
The emergence and support for the Sendero Luminoso in the southern highlands was orig-
inally viewed as a reaction among the peasantry to poor economic conditions and lack of access
to agricultural land (Degregori, 1990; McClintock, 1984). However, later analyses revealed that
the movement was not an organic, peasant revolt against oppressive landlords, but rather an effort
driven by urban intellectuals who were largely disconnected from the Sendero’s putative peasant
base. As Degregori (1996b: 197) notes, “by 1980, the great ‘semi-feudal’ landscape in which the
Sendero Luminoso imagined unleashing its epic battles, was in reality in ruins, destroy by actions
of the market, the state, peasant pressure, great migrations, and the Agrarian Reform.”
After an initial repressive military response, the government eventually changed tactics and
won the cooperation of the peasantry in many areas of the Southern Highlands, reducing the
Sendero’s base of operations considerably by the 1990s (Starn, 1996; Degregori, 1996b). The emer-
gence of the armed conflict caused the displacement of many families, particularly in Ayacucho,
the department most affected by the insurgency. However by the late 1980s and early 1990s most
families had managed to return to their communities and resettle following the diminishment of
hostilities (Degregori, 1996a; Watters, 1994).
3.2.2. Formality of Tenure and Land Titling in Peru
More recent land reform efforts in Peru and many other developing countries have shifted
focus away from land distribution toward tenure informality and access to formal state institutions
among rural families. This change in policy direction follows a new general consensus among policy-
makers that it is not inequality in land tenure that is the root cause of rural underdevelopment, but
rather tenure informality. This, in turn, limits access to property rights protections, credit markets,
and government benefit programs that leads to the concentration of rural land in large estates and
the fragmentation and further impoverishment of smallholding families (De Janvry, Sadoulet, and
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Wolford, 2001; Deininger, 1999). Following this shift in focus, agrarian policies now emphasize
titling and formalization of property rights for peasants.
Informality in rural land tenure is endemic throughout the countryside in Peru. A recent
agricultural census in 2012 has shown that approximately 61% of all agricultural landowners in Peru
have at least one plot that lacks a formal title. Most former officials in Peru and experts working
on land titling attribute this situation to two primary causes. The first is a result of the agrarian
reform of 1969. The breakup of many of the failed cooperatives into individually-held parcels at
the end of the reform period resulted in the de facto transfer of property without subsequent state
recognition with a formal title (Deere, 1990; De Soto, 1989). In addition, many of the large estates
that sold off land prior to the reform did so informally with simple contracts that were seldom
properly registered.
The second cause is related to the lack of access to formal state institutions. Properly regis-
tering the transfer of a title in a land sale or an inheritance is often a costly procedure that involves
considerable bureaucratic steps and excessive costs such as hiring a land surveyor, who frequently
must travel from Lima or another major urban center (De Soto, 2000). The combination of these
high costs and the far distances needed to travel force many small landholders to forgo a formal title
and the protections and benefits these may provide. Instead, peasants will typically record transfers
of land through informal contracts known as “purchase letters” (cartas de compra-venta) or through
a testament in the case of inheritance. Although these documents may be notarized by the parties
involved, they do not constitute a legal title under Peruvian law. When resolving internal disputes
within a village, only having informal documents typically is not a problem. However, a challenge
by an individual holding a formal title to the same area of land could easily leave a peasant farmer
without any recourse before courts, police, or other state institutions.
Starting in the early 1990s, the Peruvian government initiated a new wave of policies di-
rected at reversing the high degree of informality in rural land tenure. The massive, rural titling
program in Peru known as the Proyecto de Titulacio´n y Registro de Tierras Rurales (PTRT; Rural
Land Titling and Registration Project), is one of Latin America’s earliest and broadest reaching
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land titling policies. Between 1996 and 2007, this ambitious program measured, registered, and
titled 725,894 rural properties, mostly in Peru’s coastal and highland regions. The main motiva-
tions behind this massive titling effort—the belief that formal property rights can spark economic
development through increased access to credit, more fluid land markets, and stronger tenure se-
curity—was popularized by the Peruvian economist, De Soto (1989), and still justify massive land
titling programs today (Besley, 1995; Conroy et al., 2014). However, a significant part of the early
arguments for land titling also came from De Soto’s insistence that the formalization of property
rights could help build support for the government and lure communities away from rebel groups.
Land titling efforts first began on a less ambitious scale in 1992, and later expanded into
massive titling programs in 1996, when the Fujimori administration began the first phase of the
PTRT program with financing from the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB). Titling contin-
ued as a major policy up until the end of the Fujimori regime in 2001. The general popularity of the
policy and continued IADB funding led to a second PTRT wave under the Toledo administration,
which expanded the program’s reach further into the highland region. In 2007, the newly elected
Garcia administration ended the massive titling program and merged the PTRT with the urban
titling agency, COFOPRI (Organismo de Formalizacio´n de la Propiedad Individual), a move which
slowed rural land titling and shifted from the broad-sweep methodology to a more targeted and
demand-oriented one. Since 2012, rural land titling was completely decentralized and now depends
on individual regional governments. However, continued popular support and demand for titling
has sustained titling in urban areas since, and has led to a third round of PTRT titling starting in
2017 in the Amazon region.
The impressive mobilization of state resources for the rural land titling program has also had
questionable impact on the overall levels of informality in the countryside. This largely is related to
persistent problems with incentivizing owners to register land titles and transfers of ownership. In
many areas, state institutions and land registry offices are still relatively inaccessible, and therefore
peasants face high costs to maintaining a formally registered deed. As newly titled land is then sold
or bequeathed to relatives, each new transfer must be recorded, which requires both travel and the
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payment of fees, including a land survey in the case of the division of a parcel. As many peasants
are unable or unwilling to pay these costs, informality levels gradually return over time.
3.3. Land Tenure and Land Reform in Colombia
Historically and today, Colombia’s countryside has suffered some of the highest levels of
inequality in land tenure in the region (UNDP, 2011). This situation has persisted despite having
abundant state land along several frontiers and agricultural policies that actively promoted the
colonization of these areas by peasant farmers. Similar to the case of Peru, Colombia’s recent
experience with agrarian reform in the past century has focused on two drivers of land inequality:
(1) the concentration of arable lands into large hacienda estates and (2) the excessive fragmentation
of small parcels into economically unviable units (Restrepo and Morales, 2014). In contrast with
Peru, however, agrarian reform efforts in the 1960s faltered and never successfully broke up large
estates in the countryside. Rather, reform policies consistently favored the transfer of state land to
peasant colonizers along the frontier, a practice that has continued until today, now under the guise
of titling and formalization policies.
The geography of Colombia is heavily accented by the Andean mountain range, which sep-
arates into three smaller ranges near the border with Ecuador continuing north to transect the
entire country. The Andes divide the country into five principal geographic regions. The central
highland region, together with the multiple valleys and lowland areas in the western Pacific region
and the northern Atlantic coast, comprise the three main regions of agricultural production. The
large expanses of lowland plains extending out to the east of the Andes forms the fourth region, the
eastern plains, which is dedicated principally to cattle ranching. The fifth region, consisting of the
extensive tropical forests of the Amazon bordering Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru, is largely
unpopulated and has relatively limited agricultural production.
Unlike Peru, the countryside in Colombia is generally suitable for agriculture and successive
governments have promoted the expansion of the agricultural frontier through homesteading and
land grants. The opening of these frontier regions followed the expansion of agricultural export
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markets in Colombia at the end of the 19th century, particularly for coffee, banana, and cattle
(LeGrand, 2003). Initial colonizations focused on the low western mountains in the region of Antio-
quia and Viejo Caldas, that were particularly suited for labor intensive, non-mechanized crops such
as coffee (Zamosc, 1989). However, over the first half of the 20th century, homesteading opened
up several additional frontiers including the interior of the Atlantic coast, the Magdalena River,
and the forested lowlands in the south (LeGrand, 2003). While the mountain regions were apt for
smallholding agriculture, the northern valleys and eastern plains were mostly developed as large
haciendas and cattle ranches, eventually leading to a greater demand for access to land in those
regions (Zamosc, 1989).
The vast majority of the frontier land in Colombia is formally owned by the state, under the
legal concept known as “tierras bald´ıos.” Bald´ıos were first defined under Law 110 of 1912 as “urban
or rural land without construction or cultivation and which are property of the state because they
are located within territorial boundaries and lack any other owner.”4 The main form of acquiring
new rural land was through transfers from the state to an individual, either through a large land
grant or through individual colonization (LeGrand, 1986). Homesteading was promoted through
several pieces of legislation at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century that allowed
the allocation of bald´ıo land to smallholding families who put the land to agriculturally productive
use. However, the main form of transfer was through larger grants to multiple families that would
establish new towns along the frontiers known as “poblaciones” (LeGrand, 1986; Arango Restrepo,
2014). A new poblacio´n, once recognized, would receive designation as a town and also individual
land grants for all residents. Larger land grants were also periodically available to entrepreneurs to
set up productive hacienda estates. However, the lack of technical land surveys, vague definition of
boundaries on formal titles, and limited state presence in frontier zones frequently led to overlapping
titles and claims (LeGrand, 1986). Conflict erupting from these multiple land claims marked the
early 20th Century history in Colombia and its effects still persists today (LeGrand, 1986, 2003).
This conflict was principally between peasant homesteaders and large haciendas over newly
4Art. 44: “terreno urbano o rural sin edificar o cultivar que forma parte de los bienes del Estado porque se encuentra
dentro de los l´ımites territoriales y carece de otro duen˜o.”
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developed frontier land (Rengifo Gardeazabal, 2011). The central government in Bogota´ would
promote new settlements by allowing allocations of bald´ıo lands through a series of rural land
laws. Peasant homesteaders would then occupy and begin exploiting areas along the frontier, either
through a land grant as a poblacio´n or in the hopes that their occupation of unclaimed state land
would make them eligible for a future homesteading transfer. Entrepreneurs and land sharks would
subsequently arrive to a newly colonized region and attempt to secure formal title over a large
area of land (LeGrand, 1986; Flores, 2014). Large estates could be recognized either through a
direct transfer under existing land legislation, or sometimes through a forged title (Meertens, 2000).
In either case, large landowners with connections to state officials in major urban areas or the
capital would have an advantage over peasant colonizers in securing formal land rights. These new
haciendas often overlapped homesteader claims, and the new owner would then attempt to convert
homesteading families into sharecroppers, requiring them to pay a portion of their production as
rent. The homesteaders, under the expectation that they had rights to the land according to existing
legislation, would then enter into conflict with the large hacienda owners, frequently attempting
“land recoveries” (recuperaciones) by invading haciendas in the hopes of forcing the government to
allocate formal titles (LeGrand, 2003).
The growing unrest in rural areas resulting from these conflicts prompted the government to
attempt a new legislative solution through law 200 of 1936. This agrarian reform revised the require-
ments for receiving transfers of bald´ıo land and recognized all prior invasions of hacienda land up
until 1934. Although the new law did title several peasant occupations, it was ultimately favorable
to large estate owners as it also legalized any large estates which had illegally possessed bald´ıo lands
and expressly prohibited future hacienda invasions by colonizers or sharecroppers (LeGrand, 1986;
Herna´ndez, 2011). Over the subsequent years, only a few large estates were redistributed, with the
majority of the reform focusing on recognizing homesteading rights to new areas of state land, pri-
marily in areas of export agricultural production. Sa´nchez, del Pilar Lo´pez-Uribe, and Fazio (2010)
in their analysis of bald´ıo adjudications note that formal titling accelerated significantly following
the law 200 reform, with the average number of new land titled each year rising from 36,000ha to
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150,000ha in the period from 1918-1931. However, this reform did little to settle ongoing tensions.
Many large estates, in anticipation of the new law, expelled colonizers and sharecroppers, effec-
tively turning them into wage labor and thereby avoiding liability for land claims (LeGrand, 1986;
Arango Restrepo, 2014). In addition, many former homesteaders and sharecroppers misinterpreted
the law 200 to grant them a continued right to occupy and claim unproductive hacienda lands, and
thus the “recuperation” invasions continued (LeGrand, 1986).
This situation eventually contributed to the eruption of a period of armed conflict known as
“La Violencia” between 1948-1958. This period is tipically understood as a political conflict between
the Liberal and Conservative parties that had dominated Colombian politics up until that point
(Orquist, 1980; Sa´nchez and Bakewell, 1985). However, with the exception of a series of violet riots
in Bogota´ at the outbreak of La Violencia, the majority of the conflict was waged in agricultural
frontier zones that were the stage of previous land disputes (LeGrand, van Isschot, and Rian˜o-
Alcala´, 2017). Karl (2017) in his analysis of the La Violencia period, notes specifically that conflict
often centered on areas with large estates that had also been locations of previous homesteading
and peasant colonization.
Following the ending of the period of La Violencia, the united Frente Nacional government
set about launching the first concerted effort for land reform under Law 135 of 1961 (Restrepo and
Morales, 2014). This new piece of land legislation gave the state expanded powers to acquire and
redistribute land to landless peasants through expropriation or purchase. Law 135 also established
the Colombian Institute for Agrarian Reform (INCORA, Instituto Colombiano de Reforma Agraria)
which oversaw the execution of land reform policy and later efforts at titling and formalization.
INCORA’s activities under Law 135 and later legislation focused on two main policy instru-
ments for distributing rural lands. The first was the Program for the Allocation and Titling of
State Lands. This program sought to grant formal title to small holders that were occupying or
otherwise putting to beneficial economic use bald´ıo land, and was essentially an extension of previ-
ous efforts to title state land for homesteading peasant farmers. The second policy mechanism was
through the Program of Land Acquisition, which attempted to go further than prior reform efforts
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by redistributing unproductive land held in large estates, rather than simply recognizing possession
rights or formalizing existing occupations. The law formally canalized powers of expropriation and
extinguishing property rights over large and unproductive estates, and created a new program for
purchasing lands for redistribution.
Toward the latter half of the reform period in the late 1960s, President Carlos Lleras pro-
moted spaces for the political participation of newly organized peasant federations such as the
National Peasant Farmer Coalition (ANUC) (Gutierrez Sanin, 2010). ANUC and other federations
soon began staging land invasions in the Atlantic coastal and the eastern plains regions to increase
pressure for more redistribution (Zamosc, 1989). However, despite the potential for forced redis-
tribution of land, rural elites managed to maintain control of the executive body directing reform
policy (Albertus and Kaplan, 2013: 204), causing the redistributive efforts of INCORA to ultimately
fall short of expectations (Balca´zar Vanegas et al., 2001; Zamosc, 1989). The vast majority of land
titles delivered to peasant farmers during this period continued to come from state bald´ıo lands
(Restrepo and Morales, 2014). According to the Agustin Codazzi Geographic Institute (Instituto
Geografico Agust´ın Codazzi, IGAC), from 1962-1967 only 1.8% of newly titled land came from the
Land Acquisition Program, the rest consisting of state bald´ıo lands titled to occupying homesteaders
(IGAC, 2004: 164). The distribution of bald´ıo lands was more equitable during this period than in
previous reform efforts, with over half of the total land area titled benefiting smallholder peasants
(Arango Restrepo, 2014: 105).
Nonetheless, the growing threat of land invasions by peasant federations in the Atlantic coast
and plains and increasing resistance of large landowners eventually halted the reforms (Zamosc, 1989;
Arango Restrepo, 2014). The little redistribution that was possible was almost entirely cut short
after the passage of a new agrarian law (Law 4 of 1973). This legislative about-face followed an
informal agreement between Conservative and Liberal factions known as the “Pact of Chicoral” that
largely sought to preserve the property interests of landed elites. Among other policy changes, the
new law curtailed expropriation and redistribution through the Program of Land Acquisition and
shifted the focus of state intervention in the countryside toward agricultural credits and subsidies.
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The influx of this new agricultural aid drew support of the stable, landed peasantry away from
radical reformist in ANUC and other federations, reducing the political appetite for further land
invasions (Zamosc, 1989). Bald´ıo titling efforts, however, continued apace in areas where peasant
homesteading claims were not contested by large land holders.
Agrarian land policy remained relatively stable until 1994, when law 160, a new agrarian
reform, was passed following the constitutional reforms of 1991. The new law moved further away
from expropriation and state purchasing as policy tools for land distribution, and instead embraced
a “market led reform” model (Deininger, 1999; Restrepo and Morales, 2014). In this new version of
agrarian reform, the role of the state is secondary and limited to providing subsidies for the purchase
of rural estates for redistribution. The new law still maintained the previous titling program for
peasant farmers and restricted access to these titles to families with low incomes. It also placed
a cap on the total area of land obtainable through the reform sector. This second policy was set
by creating the figure of the “Family Agricultural Unit” (UAF, Unidad Agricola Familiar), that is
equivalent to the amount of land that can provide a modest income to a rural family. No single family
is legally allowed to accumulate former bald´ıo lands above this number, although it is permissible
to possess lands from other sources (private transfer, etc.). In addition, the new law shifted the
responsibility for promoting new land distribution and productive projects to the local municipal
government (Deininger, 1999). Similar to earlier efforts, this latest version of rural land reform only
made modest gains in redistributing land through subsidized purchases (Machado, 2004), achieving
only approximately 10% of its original goal of a million hectares redistributed by 2000 (Thomson,
2011: 242).
New rounds of bald´ıo land titling, however, continued at a steady rate (Arango Restrepo,
2014; Restrepo and Morales, 2014). Later, in May 2003, INCORA was replaced by a restructured
rural agency, the Colombian Institute for Rural Development (INCODER) which continued IN-
CORA’s activities of titling and allocating state and purchased lands until INCODER was finally
liquidated in 2015. Despite renewed efforts to provide new lands to landless peasants, actual land
distribution continued to form only a small fraction of INCODER’s land reform activities, which
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focused primarily on titling lands already in peasants’ full possession (Villaveces and Sa´nchez, 2015).
3.3.1. Armed Conflict in Colombia’s Countryside
The continued disputes over rural land and the failure to address the dual problems of
land accumulation and fragmentation in the countryside over the first half of the 20th century
eventually helped sow the seeds for the larger armed conflict that has plagued Colombia until
recently. During the period of La Violencia, some groups of internally displaced peasants began
forming new colonizations that were self-declared “independent peasant republics” (Gonza´lez Arias,
1992; LeGrand, 2003). These new settlements concentrated in areas of the western highlands around
Tolima, Huila, and Cauca that had also been bases for Communist Party organizations. Following
the end of La Violencia, the Frente Nacional government began a military campaign to breakup these
settlements, displacing them further into areas from which the rebel forces of the FARC (Armed
Revolution Forces of Colombia) would later emerge (LeGrand, 2003; Flores, 2014). In a sense, the
more recent armed conflict can be understood as a continuation of land conflicts and political strife
originating from the period of La Violencia. However, the larger armed conflict quickly took on new
dimensions, with the emergence of the drug trade and then the powerful paramilitary movement in
the 1990s and early 2000s (LeGrand, 2003).
These two new dynamics, the involvement of the drug trade and paramilitary groups, also
had consequences on rural land tenure, leading to mass displacement and the growing concentration
of land holdings. Paramilitary groups in Colombia’s armed conflict had origins in self-defense
forces organized during the 1980s in response to the growing insurgency. After being temporarily
outlawed in 1986, these groups found a new legal basis in a 1994 law permitting the forming of
new CONVIVIR security organizations (Cooperativas de Vigilancia y Seguridad Privada). New
paramilitary groups then emerged out of these organizations and proliferated with a strategy of
state capture and cooperation with landed elites (Lo´pez, 2010; LeGrand, 2003; Grajales, 2011).
The emergence of the drug trade also had a significant impact the countryside, and not only by
providing financing to allow illegal armed actors on both sides of the conflict to continue hostilities
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(Angrist and Kugler, 2008; Vargas, 2012). New drug lords began accumulating rural lands as a
strategy to convert rents from the drug trade into a stable form of capital (Lo´pez, 2010; LeGrand,
2003). This quickly aligned the interests of drug traffickers with the landed elites and contributed
to the consolidation of the paramilitary movement, and the accumulation of frontier lands into large
estates (LeGrand, 2003; Grajales, 2011).
The greatest impact of the armed conflict on the countryside, however, manifested itself
through a massive internal displacement, one of the 20th Century’s largest (UNHCR, 2009: 317-
320). This displacement reached its apogee in the last two decades of the armed conflict, and in
particular during the waves of paramilitary activity in the late 1990s and early 2000s. A report
based on official government figures estimated that between 1995-2010, there were over 3.6 million
displaced persons that had to abandoned or had forcefully disposed from them at least 250,000
properties, totaling over 6.5 million hectares (INDEPAZ, 2010).5 Although the internal displacement
affected landholders of both large and small estates, approximately 60% of the lands abandoned or
dispossessed during the armed conflict were from smallholding families with only 0.5 UAF (Family
Agricultural Unit) in land or less.
Exacerbating the crisis of displacement was an effort by landed elites and paramilitary allies in
some areas to take advantage of the armed conflict to appropriate agricultural lands from displaced
communities. Although the exact extent of these dispossessions is not known, there is notable
evidence of attempts by land sharks to obtain land through forced sales, forgery, unscrupulous
notaries, and intermediaries following mass displacements (Lo´pez, 2010; Berry, 2014). Efforts to
restitute these dispossessed lands are currently underway through the 2011 Victims Law, which
created a special procedure for expediting land claims of victims of forced displacement (see Chapter
6). However, in practice these efforts are further complicated by the high degree of informality in
land tenure among displaced families: the Ministry of Agriculture estimates that approximately 61%
of displaced households possessed bald´ıo lands without a formal title (Restrepo and Morales, 2014:
5The report was commissioned by the Agencia Presidencial para la Accio´n Scoial y la Cooperacio´n Internacional,
and based its estimates off of data from the Registro U´nico de Poblacio´n Desplazada and the Registro U´nico de
Predios y Territorios Abandonados (RUPTA3).
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132). One of the enduring consequences of this displacement has been a renewed concentration of
lands, which some commentators have referred to a “counter-agrarian reform” (Herna´ndez, 2011;
Grajales, 2011).
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Figure 3.2.: Distribution of rural land tenure in Colombia over time according to agricultural cen-
suses (1960 and 1970) and survey and cadastre data (1984, 1997, 2002). Plot shows



































1960 1970 1984 1997 2002
Number Area Number Area Number Area Number Area Number Area
Total 1,105,900 15,895,500 1,060,800 17,372,100 1,583,000 22,233,000 2,149,400 24,987,200 3,453,500 52,196,500
Micro (< 5ha) 737,300 955,800 678,500 868,700 987,900 1,147,100 1,391,900 1,447,100 2,333,000 2,189,400
Small (5-20ha) 225,400 1,885,900 219,300 1,835,300 336,800 2,558,500 444,500 3,232,800 651,300 4,480,200
Med. (20-200ha) 126,900 5,772,600 144,400 6,577,000 232,600 9,623,400 288,200 10,569,300 424,500 15,983,600
Large (200+ha) 16,300 7,281,200 18,600 8,091,100 25,700 8,904,000 24,800 9,738,100 44,700 29,543,300
Proportion
Micro pr. 0.667 0.05 0.64 0.05 0.624 0.052 0.648 0.058 0.676 0.042
Small pr. 0.204 0.106 0.207 0.106 0.213 0.115 0.207 0.129 0.189 0.086
Med. pr. 0.114 0.378 0.136 0.378 0.147 0.433 0.135 0.422 0.123 0.306
Large pr. 0.014 0.466 0.017 0.466 0.016 0.4 0.012 0.389 0.013 0.566
Table 3.2.: Distribution of rural land tenure in Colombia over time according to agricultural censuses (1960 and 1970) and
survey and cadastre data (1984, 1997, 2002). Plot shows total area of landholdings (hectares, right column) and
number of agricultural production units (left column) for different categories of landowners.
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Table 3.2 and Figure 3.2 below show the distribution of rural land in Colombia over the later
half of the 20th century. These data are reproduced from IGAC (2012: 73), which draw information
from several different sources.6 Unfortunately, the Colombian government has not conducted a
rural census since 1970. Data from later periods are estimates based on cadaster information, and
therefore these data only provide a rough approximation of the evolution of land tenure over time.7
Nonetheless, the trends in time that these data indicate follow similar trends revealed in other
studies that rely on representative surveys and alternative measures of land tenancy (e.g. Machado,
2004; Arango Restrepo, 2014).
The data reveal a high degree of concentration of rural property similar to the situation in
Peru, but with more land area held by medium sized estates (20-200ha in size). There is a gradual
increase in the equality of tenure over time until 1994, after which there is a tendency toward
higher concentration of land in large estates. Authors examining land tenure in recent decades in
Colombia typically point to two principal causes for this tendency. The first is the result of the
internal armed conflict: a combination of displacement of smallholder peasants and the accumulation
of land by drug lords and businesses with ties to paramilitary organizations (e.g. Deininger, 1999;
Gutierrez Sanin, 2010; LeGrand, 2003). The second is due to macroeconomic inflation and rural tax
and credit subsidies that favored large estates (e.g. Arango Restrepo, 2014; Bank, 1996; Deininger,
1999).
3.3.2. Formality of Tenure and Land Titling in Colombia
Despite having different trajectories in the evolution of rural land tenure over the past century,
Colombia’s current situation of endemic tenure informality, particularly for small holder estates,
is similar to that of Peru. While there is no recent agricultural census in Colombia that could
provide accurate information on informality in rural land tenure, in 2011 the Ministry of Agriculture
6Data from the agricultural censuses of 1970 and 1980 and the 1984 cadaster are from Lorente, Salazar, and Gallo
(1984); 1997 cadaster data are from Rincon Diaz (1997); and 2002 cadaster data are from Bank (2004)
7Difficulties with analysis stem principally from the possibility that land cadaster data underrepresent informal land
claims (which tend to be micro or small estates), and use different unit of analysis than census data. Regarding the
later problem, the censuses of 1960 and 1970 use the “Agricultural Unit” as the level of analysis, which corresponds
to a family farm and can cover several individual plots, while the cadaster is based on land plots (IGAC, 2012:
45-46).
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estimated from surveys that 48% of rural land lacks formal title (Restrepo and Morales, 2014: 132).
However, this number could be as high as 50%-70% in some areas (Bank, 2013: 123).
The ultimate causes of this informality also mirror the situation in Peru and can be classified
according to two main drivers. The first is a legacy of prior agrarian policy and the failure to
adequately respond to the demand for land in the countryside. As noted above, Colombian agrarian
law has consistently encouraged the colonization of frontier lands through homesteading provisions
that create an expectation of legal ownership for small parcels that are economically exploited.
For much of Colombia’s recent history, occupying frontier lands and applying for adjudication or
formalization programs have been the principal means for obtaining legal rights over land in most
rural areas (LeGrand, 2003). However, the inability of the state to respond to the growing demand
for new land titles in many parts of the country has left a historic deficit that is still visible in the
high levels of land informality in many regions. Over time, this land has been transferred through
informal documents, such as purchase letters, or inherited through testaments. As a consequence,
much rural land—even land that has been held for many years by a family—may still legally be
considered state bald´ıo land.
The second factor contributing to the current state of informality is the weak presence of the
state in many rural areas. Even when lands have been formally transferred from the state to private
ownership, all subsequent transfers require registration with the land registry for the title to remain
current and formalize (Pen˜a Huertas, Parada Herna´ndez, and Zuleta R´ıos, 2014). In areas that are
distant from urban centers, registering new transactions can be excessively costly in terms of time
and money. Divisions of lands resulting from sales or inheritance between multiple heirs require the
additional costs of hiring surveyors. Complicating this situation further is a general culture in many
regions of informality, in which informal documentation are acceptable for land sales and transfers
as much as formal titles (Restrepo and Morales, 2014: 123–124).
The procedure for formalizing possession of state land is technically open to individuals at
any time and can be accessed through a number of different channels. The first is by petitioning
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INCODER directly.8 The main requirements are that the land occupied is state bald´ıo land (oc-
cupied private land is not eligible), has been under continuous possession for at least 5 years, and
that the beneficiaries are from a lower economic strata (possessing no more than 1000 minimum
monthly salaries in total wealth) (Decree 2664 of 1994). Interviews with beneficiaries and former
INCODER officials both reveal that, in practice, this standard procedure was inaccessible to most
peasant farmers. This is because potential claimants would often have to hire a lawyer to handle
paperwork or personally travel to the department capital to followup on the application. In addi-
tion, the landholder would have to pay a private land surveyor to take measurements of the plot and
neighboring properties. The total costs for the procedure could easily extend into the millions of
Colombian pesos (hundreds of US$). To reduce costs and make titling more accessible, local offices
of INCODER organized titling campaigns in which they first accumulated requests and then titled
a large batch of land within a municipality at one time. State officials would then coordinate titling
campaigns with the local municipal government, which would often contribute funds to subsidize a
proportion of the costs.
Other options for titling include petitioning the courts directly for recognition of land rights
and hiring a notary republic to register a formal title (Pen˜a Huertas, Parada Herna´ndez, and
Zuleta R´ıos, 2014; Restrepo and Morales, 2014). The judicial avenue still requires the owner to pay
for survey costs and in practice is a lengthly procedure often taking many years. The notary option
is much quicker, but also has the drawback of being costly. In addition, notary offices, while able
to deliver a title to the land holder, have a further complication in that they are not authorized to
transfer bald´ıo land to private individuals. Therefore, the new title could potentially suffer from a
legal deficiency known as a falsa tradicio´n (invalid chain of title), in which there is an illegal transfer
of rights in the title’s history, technically invalidating the title (Pen˜a Huertas, Parada Herna´ndez,
and Zuleta R´ıos, 2014; Gutierrez Sanin, 2010). In practice, however, titles with the falsa tradicio´n
are virtually identical to a fully formalized and valid title without an exhaustive research into the
8Prior to 2003, the same procedure was available by petitioning INCORA. Currently adjudication of bald´ıo titles
and formalization is also available through the new National Land Agency (Agencia Nacional de Tierras), which
replaced INCODER in 2015 and subsumed its competency in this area of agrarian policy.
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land registry to confirm the origins of the title.9 While complicating efforts to fully clarify legal
land tenure in rural areas, titles with a falsa tradicio´n are less of a concern to small landholders,
as they do not significantly limit the ability to sell or transfer the title or access credit and state
benefits.
Given the costs and delays associated with titling individually, the vast majority of smallhold-
ing farmers petitioned titling through INCORA and later INCODER’s Program for the Allocation
and Titling of State Lands mentioned above. Later efforts financed in part by the Inter-American
Development Bank sought to expand INCODER’s formalization activities to include massive for-
malization and titling efforts in both rural and urban areas, based on similar programs in Peru and
other parts of Latin America (Fort, 2007). The government later scaled back these programs to
focus entirely on updating the national land registry and continuing existing rural titling efforts
(IADB, 2014). In practice, the land allocation and the rural formalization policies accomplished the
same end—to formalize property rights for peasant farmers who are already in possession of land.10
3.4. Formal Rights and Land Conflict in Peru and Colombia
The above summaries of land tenure and agrarian reform policy in Peru and Colombia demon-
strate that patterns of concentration and fragmentation of land in both cases are deeply intertwined
with the eruption of rural conflict. Policies responding to these emerging conflicts and tackling the
“agrarian question” in each country were different. In Peru, the Velasco military government chose
to promote redistributive efforts that successfully broke up large estates in the central highlands
and transferred ownership of those in the coast to peasant cooperatives. In contrast, successive
governments in Colombia opted for only limited redistribution, concentrating instead on distribut-
9During fieldwork, I had the opportunity to examine several titles that had falsa tradicio´n and compare them with
fully formalized titles. The former are almost exactly identical in every aspect with the exception of an extra letter
on the final page that indicates that the history of the title was not properly verified.
10Although individuals may be in possession of a document indicating some property ownership, such as a will or a
land sale contract, if the original possessor of the property never formalized their rights to the land, the technical
legal ownership of the land will still be vested in the state under Colombian law. Thus, land holders with informal
documents and those with no document were both equally eligible to benefit from land allocation and titling under
Law 160.
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ing abundant state frontier land.11 Both countries eventually converged on similar policy options
toward the later half of the 20th century, following a growing consensus on titling and formalization
programs among agrarian policy-makers internationally.
This final section examines the role of formal, state-granted property rights in the develop-
ment of land policy and emergence of land conflict in both cases. Despite taking different courses
of action to respond to rural unrest and restructure land in the countryside, legal property rights
played a very similar role in both histories. First, formal rights shaped the direction of emerg-
ing land conflict as they encouraged claim-making by peasant families and communities over land.
These claims emerged more consistently in areas where formal rights had previously been recognized
for individual or collective land, or over which there was a strong expectation of legal rights from
new legislation and constitutional provisions. Second, the top-down manner of recognizing and al-
locating rural property rights secured a strong role for the state as the primary source for accessing
rights. This differs from many mature rural land markets in which land is acquired primarily from
private transfers between individuals and the state plays a more limited role of verifying privately
acquired rights.
3.4.1. Legal Rights and Peasant Land Claims
Peru’s landscape, although expansive, offers only a scarce amount of arable land in key river
valleys and relatively limited grazing land in the highland region. While there is a predominance of
peasant families in the Peruvian countryside with individually held and managed small estates, the
majority of the conflict over land did not center around individual claims. Rather, they concerned
community lands that were frequently backed with historical titles originating in colonial times and
reinforced by constitutional recognition. Most historians characterize the early 20th century rural
development in Peru as a process of gradual encroachment of large haciendas over collective lands of
peasant communities in the Central and Southern highlands (Watters, 1994; Mallon, 1983). These
11The consequences of these different policies regarding efforts to redistribute and reduce the concentration of land
also had likely significant consequences for the structure of subsequent land conflict and differences in the armed
conflicts afflicting both countries in the later part of the 20th century. However, that is a question that goes
beyond the bounds of this current work, and has been addressed by authors elsewhere (e.g. Boix, 2008; Jensen and
Sørensen, 2012; Flores, 2014).
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encroachments later became flash points of rural conflict where peasant communities repeatedly
invaded and occupied haciendas to reclaim land formerly held under a collective title. These were
also the same invasions that prompted land reform in the 1960s and were the first locations of the
large redistributive effort starting in 1968 (Bourque and Palmer, 1975; Watters, 1994).
Even after the massive redistribution of land during the reform period and the break up
of these large haciendas, historical claims to legally recognized titles also drove rural conflict over
the next few decades. Peasant communities which had lands expropriated into newly formed co-
operatives soon directed their claims against the state and continued a pattern of invasions and
occupations—this time of land held by cooperatives putatively managed for the economic benefit
of these same communities.
Watters (1994) provides an illustrative example of this continued conflict over former peasant
community lands in his ethnographic account of peasant communities in the Pampa de Anta, in the
southern highlands area near Cusco. This area was among the first 53 haciendas to be expropriated
in 1969 following the initiation of the agrarian reform. Subsequently, hacienda lands were transferred
to a new cooperative, the CAP Tupac Amaru II, in June, 1971. Although the cooperative directly
benefited the peasant communities in the area, these communities were also forced to cede significant
areas of land from their communal claims to the newly established CAP (Watters, 1994: 220).
This caused a considerable amount of friction with several communities, who soon found access to
traditional grazing lands was more restrictive under the cooperative management than previously
when the lands were formally owned by haciendas. A series of mismanagements by the cooperative
leadership, who where mostly bureaucrats from urban areas, further enflamed tensions with the
peasant communities (Watters, 1994: 224-225).
In December 1976, only a few years after the formation of the cooperative, peasant communi-
ties began organizing a series of land invasions to reclaim land formerly recognized under collective
titles (Watters, 1994: 230). While the property claims underlying the invasion were collective in
nature, they were often expressed in the form of individual claims of usufruct rights over particular
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parcels, and therefore not entirely different from individual rights claims.12 In the specific case of
the peasant communities affected by the creation and subsequent dissolution of the Tupac Amaru
II cooperative, many originally hoped that the cooperative lands would be distributed individu-
ally (Watters, 1994: 219) and following the invasions the “reclaimed” lands were later distributed
individually among community members (Watters, 1994: 298).
This experience contrasts sharply with the cooperatives in the coastal region, which survived
the reform period largely intact and without the continued invasions of the highlands. The haciendas
that were expropriated to form cooperatives in the coast were mostly dependent upon wage labor
and not sharecropper or tenant relationships such as in the highlands. Much of the wage labor
was migrant labor originating from other parts of Peru where workers had a separate family claim
to individual plots that could be maintained while working on the coast (Deere, 1990). Therefore,
hacienda lands on the coast did not have the same series of overlapping property claims as in the
highlands. Leading up to the agrarian reforms, these haciendas experienced mostly conflicts with
unions and workers over wages and working conditions, and not access to land (Harding, 1975).
Followings reforms, control of coastal haciendas was transferred to cooperatives, which maintained
the organization structure of the unions and maintained similar agricultural operations as before
the reforms. As a result, the coastal cooperatives were economically sustainable and experienced
little renewed conflict over land (Lowenthal, 1983; Watters, 1994).
This difference illustrates the potential for formal property rights to shape land claims by
smallholding farmers. In the highlands, where communities and individuals had constitutionally
backed rights with historic titles, perceived encroachment of these lands (whether by hacienda
owners or state cooperatives) led to land invasions both preceding and following the reforms. In
the coast however, where peasants had fewer prior rights claims, land invasions were less common
and conflict emerged along different lines. Even in a context where formal rights are quite weakly
enforced such as during a period of intense agrarian reform and redistribution, they can still exerted
influence over how property claims were manifested and where land conflict appeared.
12As noted previously, management and control over most lands in peasant communities is held by individual families
(Burneo, 2013).
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A similar pattern of land conflict that maps onto preexisting rights claims can be seen in the
case of Colombia. Unlike in Peru, the conflict in Colombia centered around land claims for individual
families that were often eclipsed by conflicting claims to larger estates. These conflicts appeared in
areas where peasant smallholders had a legal expectation of a right—either through a formal grant
from the adjudication of bald´ıo land, or through an expectation of a future right promised under
multiple reform laws. Conflict emerged as land sharks attempted to appropriate prior colonizations
by staking a claim to an area as a large estate. Although legal ambiguities underly problems
with overlapping claims, these conflicts also closely follow official policy granting legal recognition
of property rights to peasant families, who then attempted to regain their rights through “land
recuperations” (LeGrand, 1986: 165). Although not all of these cases involved homesteaders which
had already received formal titles, they did take place within the context of broadly disseminated
policies promoting the legal property rights of colonizers, therefore generating a strong expectation
that these families at least “ought” to have a legal right.
LeGrand (1986), in her comprehensive history of land conflict in the early 20th Century in
Colombia, notes how legal rights and the law influenced the evolution of land tenure and relations
in rural frontier regions:
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, colonos were the only Colombian
peasants with rights defined by law. This juridical status comprised an integral aspect
of the colonos’ identity, motivating them to take collective action against hacendados
who denied them their land rights. Despite the landlords’ effective use of the law to
reinforce their property claims, estate owners found it impossible to persuade many
colonos of the validity of their titles. . . . Thus the contradictory proprietary norms
embodied in Colombian jurisprudence provided both the landed elites and the colonos
with ideological justifications—opposing justifications. (168)
LeGrand also notes how the land reform Law 200 of 1936, which only recognized peasant claims for
occupations occurring prior to 1934, did not ultimately stop land invasions and new conflicts from
erupting. This was because many peasants continued to interpret the law as recognizing ownership
rights from occupation and exploitation of any rural land, even those held by large estates (LeGrand,
1986: 160). Thus, conflicting legal rights continued to devolve into conflicts between peasants and
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large estate owners even following changes in legislation that favored the later’s claims.
Saffon Sanin (2015) builds on LeGrand’s work by showing evidence that peasant claims for
homesteading land drove not only land conflict in the early 20th century in Colombia, but also
demand for the 1936 agrarian reform. Her study examines a collection of historical correspondences
regarding conflicts over state bald´ıo lands from the National General Archive in Colombia. This
data set contains over 600 telegrams, letters, and communications from peasant families asking
central authorities to intervene in land disputes. Many of these requests originated from groups
of families or neighbors collectively petitioning state intervention regarding conflicts with hacienda
estates. These petitions did not simply request clemency or demand redistribution from land lords,
but rather made claims of dispossession from previously recognized rights. The vast majority of
these (89%) expressly claimed a right to the land in conflict, and 24% claimed to have rights backed
by a legal title (Saffon Sanin, 2015: 133–136).
In addition, Saffon Sanin demonstrates that the municipalities where these petitions origi-
nated from were also more likely to have benefited form later land reform. Using data from land
allocations of bald´ıo lands following the 1936 agrarian reform law, she found that areas with at
least one petition regarding a land conflict received a large and statistically significant increase in
subsequent distribution of state land. She concludes that this evidence indicates that the allocation
of state lands was driven not just by calls for redistribution or inequality in land tenure, but by
peasants with rights-based claims over dispossessed lands (Saffon Sanin, 2015: 163).
In highlighting the role of legal property rights to shape the emergence of land conflict, I
do not imply that considerations of economic distribution of assets and control over the means of
agricultural production are not central to the histories of land relations in either country. The
economic potential of property and increasing value of land are ultimately at the heart of these
conflicts and of peasant struggles for recognition of property rights. In both cases, the emergence
of rural land conflict follows closely behind the development of export agriculture markets and the
changing value of land (LeGrand, 1986; Harding, 1975). Land is also central to the peasant economy
as it is the principal factor of agricultural production and means of subsistence for peasant families.
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In addition, both cases present a number of land invasions and conflicts that were not preceded by
legal recognition of rights or prior property claims by peasant farmers.
However, economic motivations cannot fully explain the patterns of land conflict in Peru
and Colombia. Prior legal recognition of property rights for peasants preceded a considerable
number of these conflicts, as noted repeatedly in historical accounts. Rural land conflicts in both
countries principally erupted in areas of agricultural frontiers where the presence of the state is
considerably lacking (Rolda´n, 2002; Gutierrez Sanin, 2010). In addition, the little involvement of
state institutions in these conflicts seldom favored peasant families. Elite landholders, often based
in capital cities or major urban areas, had much greater access to both the central state and local
politicians responsible for enforcing property rights (LeGrand, 2003; Flores, 2014). Under such
circumstances, a legal right to property likely would not change peasants’ rational expectations
that they will successfully defend a claim to land, particularly in the face of powerful landholding
elites. This suggest that another mechanism is prompting peasants to make property claims where
they have state-recognized rights—namely, that rights also define legitimate behaviors and thus a
state right will increase the belief that the state “ought” to enforce rights even if this contradicts
expectations of what the state will actually do.
3.4.2. State Recognition of Property Rights
My second argument in this final section is that the state plays a central role in allocating
rural property rights in both Peru and Colombia. Whereas in a more mature land market the
state would only play a secondary role as a guarantor of rights or by registering and verifying
rights, throughout much of the 20th century the governments in Peru and Colombia were still
actively engaged in the allocation and creation of new legal rights. In many cases, the state was the
primary source of accessing rural land through agrarian reform policies, and even today most rural
peasants must petition the state in both countries to obtain legal recognition of rights. Under such
circumstance, the acquisition of a formal right is more than a simple transference of rights between
private parties, and comes to play a greater symbolic role as an important means of accessing the
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state and its benefits.
In Peru, the significant redistribution of land during the period of agrarian reform in the
1960s and 1970s gave the state its central role as allocator of rural land itself. During the period,
nearly half of all rural land was affected by the reforms and 400,000 peasant families received land
transfers (Watters, 1994: 171). Other forms of land acquisition, such as the internal distribution
within peasant communities of collective grazing lands or individual sales and transfers through
inheritance, remained prevalent during this time. However, the agrarian reforms left an indelible
mark on the countryside that continues to define the personal histories of many peasant families
that I spoke with (see Chapter 4).
As mentioned above, the bureaucratic disorder following the reform and the breakup of
many cooperatives into smallholding estates also left a deficit of formally defined property rights.
As individuals laid claim to previously collective property, the state never formally recognized the
new allocation of rights, leaving a large number of small properties without formal titles (Deere,
1990). The recent titling policies, which primarily distribute legal rights, have thus continued
to reinforce the state’s central role in accessing property rights. However, now the state is no
longer concerned with the distribution of physical property, but rather the distribution of formal
rights. From a certain perspective, this second wave of reforms (titling) is only a formal recognition
of preexisting tenure patterns in areas where the state and formal institutions do not otherwise
intervene in the lives of peasants, and therefore should be relatively insignificant in the lives of most
families. However, as I discuss in the next chapter, peasant landholders in Peru view land titling as
important to them as the de facto redistribution of land under the Velasco government, and titles
are highly significant as symbols of access to the state and the benefits of citizenship.
In Colombia for most of the 20th century, access to property rights in rural areas was almost
entirely dependent upon the state. Frontier land was by definition state property and the only means
of access it was by formally petitioning the state through adjudication or formalization programs
(LeGrand, 2003). Today, accessing rural property, although possible through individual transac-
tions, is still largely conducted through state transferrals of land to peasant families (Pen˜a Huertas,
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Parada Herna´ndez, and Zuleta R´ıos, 2014; Gutierrez Sanin, 2010). While informal markets in small-
holding land with no titles or formal rights associated with them are common in many parts of the
countryside, such sales and transfers are done under the knowledge that the state will eventually
need to intervene in order to formally validate that right. Therefore, the formal imprimatur of the
state is still a necessary and crucial step to the consolidation of property rights for many peasant
landholders, even when the land itself was originally acquired from private transferrals.
3.5. Conclusion
The above discussion provides important context for my theory on the symbolic effect of
rights. Specifically, it demonstrates that legal property rights are about more than just securing
the economic benefits of land or the means of agricultural production (although this is a significant
aspect of legal rights as well). Legal rights have guided land claims by peasant farmers throughout
the 20th Century in both countries. In addition, the state has been central to the recognition
and distribution of these privileged claims. Both support essential claims of this study that legal
property rights are important symbols that legitimize claim-making and define the relationship
between the citizen and the state.
It is also important to note the role legal property rights have played even where the state
is weak and largely absent. As can be seen from the histories of rural land tenure and conflict in
Peru and Colombia, state-defined, legal land rights were central in the emergence and development
of land conflict, particularly where the law had created ambiguous and overlapping legal claims to
rural property. However, in these same areas, state institutions had either atrophied in the presence
of powerful hacienda owners (Peru) or were yet to be developed because settlements were opening
up distant frontiers (Colombia). Despite the weak state presence and experience with institutions
that were notoriously biased against their interests, smallholding peasant farmers still favored claims
based on legal rights and directed their disputes toward the state.
The next chapter will focus on the titling programs that emerged as the current policy
solution to the challenges of agrarian reform and rural development. I examine the experiences of
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smallholding peasant farmers in two regions: the highland area of the A´ncash department in Peru,
and the southern department of Narin˜o in Colombia. These interviews reveal that, for smallholding
farmers who lack access to state institutions, formal rights, or legal protections, the recognition
of a formal property right—even if it does not otherwise affecting tenure security—is a significant
moment. It is important not only because it can help guarantee a primary source of economic
income, but also because it symbolizes their claim to a piece of land that forms an integral part of
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4.1. Introduction
Former officials would frequently comment on how popular titling programs were, particularly
among the smallholding peasant farmers who were the intended beneficiaries. They would often
recall how farmers would be quite eager to participate in the program and be overjoyed upon
receiving their titles. Yet these same officials were also skeptical about the ultimate impact that
land titling had in the lives of the rural poor. Many were aware of the dearth of any evidence
indicating that formal titles had increased access to credit in practice (e.g. Zegarra, Escobal, and
Aldana, 2008; Deininger and Feder, 2009), or that titling had unleashed rural develop as once hoped
(De Soto, 1989).
When pressed to explain the disconnect between the fervor with which many rural families
clamored for land titles and the lack of concrete impacts of the program, officials I interviewed
had two typical responses. First, many would fall back on the primary economic justification
of titling—access to credit—often contradicting their prior admittance that the programs failed to
help peasants acquire loans. The second response would concede that, despite apparent enthusiasm,
legal titles “simply are not significant for the lives of most peasant farmers.”1 Nearly all interviewees
were ultimately unable to resolve this contradiction. Why are legal titles so popular and seemingly
important for rural peasant families if the tangible benefits of titles are relatively small and likely
superfluous in their daily lives?
In this chapter, I attempt to respond to this question by analyzing the meaning of formal
land titles for rural, smallholding farmers. I base this analysis on interviews with peasant farmers
I collected over two field visits to the departments of A´ncash, Peru and Narin˜o, Colombia in 2017.
During this fieldwork, I led a team of research assistants to understand the importance of land and
formal titles for peasant families, the role titles played in resolving land disputes (if any), and how
peasants participated in local politics and interacted with the state. I also supplement this analysis
with a series of interviews with current and former governmental officials who had experience in
1Interview PE-7-15.
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land titling programs, which I collected over a series of trips to both countries between 2014-2017.
I begin this chapter with a description of the main titling programs in each country, including
how titling was conducted in practice and the experience of peasants and smallholders who benefited
from them. For that analysis, I draw on an original data set of land titling in Peru and Colombia
and official documents, both of which I supplement with qualitative interviews. I then describe
typical experiences with accessing land, local political participation, and resolving land disputes in
the villages I visited. Finally, I examine evidence regarding the significance and meaning of titles
in the lives of smallholding families in those areas.
My goal in this chapter is to understand the meaning of legal titles for smallholding peasant
farmers in Peru and Colombia and the role legal property rights play in how these individuals
interpret their political identities and decide whether to engage the state. In doing so, I aim to
provide empirically grounded support for my main thesis in this study: that legal property rights
are more than just means to secure economic benefits from land. Rights also convey symbolic
meaning that legitimizes appropriate political behavior, helps construct political identities, and
ultimately justify claim-making and participation before the state.
For this analysis, I adopt the perspective of historic institutionalists in understanding rights
as an institution that can inform political identities and provide structures for appropriate behavior
(e.g., Hall and Taylor, 1996). This approach differs from the typical institutionalist perspective
taken by many political economy scholars of property rights, which understand legal rights as insti-
tutions which primarily inform expectations of future behavior for individuals engaging in strategic
interactions with others (see e.g., North, 1990; Barzel, 1997; Besley, 1995). Under this view, legal
rights provide information on the extent of property claims, the likelihood of extracting benefits
from property, and the possible choices of other actors in recognizing a particular claim. Rather,
for this analysis I view institutions as “symbols, scripts and routines, which provide the filters for
interpretation, of both the situation and oneself, out of which a course of action is constructed” (Hall
and Taylor, 1996: 939). In this sense, institutions not only constrain the behavior of others, but also
construct preferences and identities and give meaning to appropriate behavior (March and Olsen,
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1996; Dworkin, 1986). Thus a legal right could influence behavior not only because it changes the
likelihood of a successful outcome (e.g. protecting one’s claim before a court of law), but because
it dictates what is the “appropriate” or “correct” form of action to take.
This is not to deny that legal rights also affect political behavior by informing the rational
calculus of individuals. As mentioned elsewhere in this study, a long line of theoretical and empirical
research has shown the importance of legal titles in providing better definition of economic property
rights and in affecting expectations of state enforcement and protection for those rights (e.g. Besley,
1995; Feder and Feeny, 1991; Firmin-Sellers, 1995). My analysis is entirely consistent with this
dominant perspective. However, I argue that to have a complete understanding of how institutions
such as legal rights affect behavior, we also need to study how institutions provide meaning to indi-
viduals and ultimately construct identities and preferences themselves. This theoretical framework
is particularly important when attempting to explain how institutions can sometimes produce af-
fects that are difficult to reconcile with a purely rational calculus, such as the puzzling importance
of legal property rights for peasant farmers that opens this chapter.
I find that the first impressions of many titling officials were correct in that legal titles are
highly significant for peasant farmers in both Peru and Colombia. While my interviews also reveal
that the skeptics are justified in questioning the material benefits of titling, legal property rights
are still quite significant for constructing political identities and defining the relationship between
peasants and the state. Specifically, land titles bolster the identity of peasants as land owners and
create a sense of entitlement to future state access and state services. Land rights and land ownership
in general are also central to local political participation in rural villages, and the rights and duties
associated with land ownership form the basis of much political activity for village residents.
Most interestingly, the importance and meaning of the title itself is disconnected from prior
experiences of peasants with the state. Formal titles are equally important for smallholders in
villages where state institutions are weak or nearly absent as they are for those who live in areas
with strong local institutions for protecting rights. Similarly, there is no qualitative difference in
the meaning of titles between peasants who have very little or high trust for state institutions or
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the government. All respondents placed equally high value on formal legal titles and used titles in
similar ways. This analysis is important as it highlights the non-instrumental value that peasants are
associating with legal rights, which is consistent with a historical institutionalist approach mentioned
above (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 951–952).
The only exception to this trend in my fieldwork was in a collectively-titled peasant com-
munity in Peru, where the state did not recognize nor play a role in assigning individual property
rights. This last finding highlights the importance of the role of the state in defining and distributing
rights for legal rights to affect individual behavior. When the duty of the state to recognize and
protect individual property is absent, the meaning of legal property rights for peasants is radically
different.
4.2. Land Titling in Peru and Colombia
This section provides an overview of the two main titling projects that are the center of this
study: the Rural Land Titling and Registration project in Peru (PTRT, Proyecto de Titulacio´n y
Registro de Tierras Rurales); and the Program for the Allocation and Titling of State Lands through
the Colombian Institute for Rural Development (INCODER). I describe the design and procedures
for titling smallholding land in each program and summarize experiences with titling in practice.
The impetus behind these efforts was the same as in agrarian reform policies described in
Chapter 3—to spark rural development and reduce rural poverty and inequality. However, contrary
to prior reforms that attempted to alter the distribution of land directly, these later efforts were
not based on the theory that rural underdevelopment was driven by unequal access to land per se.
Rather, they attempted to address unequal access to legal state institutions such as formal property
rights, which hindered investment and restricted the rural poor from using land as collateral for
credit (De Soto, 1989; Conroy et al., 2014). Formal titles would increase the clarity of economic
property rights, thereby reducing the risk for lenders and eliminating transaction costs related
to verifying property ownership (Besley, 1995; Feder and Feeny, 1991). Titling could also spark
development by increasing tenure security, incentives for investment, and the liquidity of rural land
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markets (De Soto, 2000; De Janvry, Sadoulet, and Wolford, 2001).
Both policies attempted to increase access to formalization procedures, which while techni-
cally open to any landholder at any time, in practice entailed high costs and long delays with many
bureaucratic steps usually carried out in regional capitals. As a result, land titling was generally
inaccessible for poor, peasant farmers in the countryside. Although the objectives were the same,
the methodology employed in each country differed.2 In Peru, the PTRT sought to bypass these
difficulties by providing the titling and registration service free of charge, and by covering massive
areas through a “broad sweep” methodology (Zegarra, Escobal, and Aldana, 2008; Conroy et al.,
2014). Instead of waiting for land holders to present a formal request for titling before a government
office, the PTRT, through a centralized and top-down process, selected large areas of the country-
side and attempted to measure, register, and title all rural property therein, thus greatly reducing
individual selection into the program.
PTRT officials first selected an area for intervention that had a high destiny of individually-
held property, typically corresponding to a mountain valley.3 They would then use areal photog-
raphy and available information in the land registry and cadastre to identify existing properties.
Finally, officials would move from one end of the selected area to the other in a sweeping pattern,
attempting to survey and register all properties and title all those in possession of land.
Property owners who already possessed a formal title had their existing land registry verified
and updated. Those that did not have title were eligible for titling if they possessed a national ID
card and could demonstrate evidence of peaceful possession of the property for at least one year,
if the individual possessed state land. If the individual was on private property, they would have
to show peaceful possession as if they were the owner (i.e. not as sharecroppers of leasees) for at
least five years. Interviews with former PTRT officials and beneficiaries all coincide in affirming
2Together, they represent the two dominant strategies for land tilting employed in most countries. See the discussion
in Chapter 1 on case selection.
3The PTRT did not use a strict procedure for selecting new intervention areas. Rather, practical considerations
of budgetary efficiency, density of demand for titling, and availability of areal maps were often the main criteria
employed in practice (Zegarra, Escobal, and Aldana, 2008). Interviews with former PTRT and COFOPRI officials
over 2015 and 2016 confirm that while there was some discretion in giving priority to certain sites, the need to fill
ambitious titling goals set by the IADB meant that discretion in site selection was curtailed by the need to expand
the project’s reach as much as possible (Interviews PE-6-15; PE-1-17; PE-9-16).
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that, in practice, a lack of official documents were not an obstacle for accessing land titling, and
possessors could prove peaceful possession through an informal letter of sale (carta de compra-venta),
a testament, or a certificate of possession issued by the local municipality.4 If none of these options
were available, possessors could also get signed declarations by neighboring property holders.
In contrast, titling in Colombia followed a “targeted” selection method that responded to
immediate demand for titling, but which covered much less area. Another significant difference
in the titling program in Colombia is that it was only open to individuals possessing state lands
(tierras bald´ıos). Those attempting to claim possession over private property had to apply for state
subsidies to attempt to purchase the land directly or access judicial proceedings for claims of adverse
possession, which were typically long and costly procedures with uncertain probabilities of success.
The program was also targeted specifically at the rural poor, and only small holders from a lower
economic strata (possessing no more than 1000 minimum monthly salaries in total wealth) were
eligible (Decree 2664 of 1994).
While available at any time, interviews with beneficiaries and former INCODER officials both
reveal that, in practice, the standard titling procedure was inaccessible to most peasant farmers.
This is because the potential claimants would often have to hire a lawyer to handle paperwork or
travel to the department capital constantly to followup on the procedure. In addition, the land
holder would have to pay a private land surveyor to take measurements of the plot and neighboring
properties. The total costs for the procedure could easily extend into the millions of Colombian pesos
(hundreds of US$). To make titling more accessible, local offices of INCODER would frequently
organized titling campaigns in which they would accumulate requests and title a large batch of
land within a municipality at one time. State officials would coordinate these campaigns with the
local municipal government, which would often contribute funds to subsidize a proportion of the
costs. Officials would then open titling to all those interested within the targeted area and charge
a relatively small contribution to cover some of the costs of the surveying team. This brought
the total cost per parcel to approximately 60,000-80,000 pesos ($30-40 USD), which while not an
4E.g. interviews PE-2-17; PE-4-15.
101
Accessing Citizenship: Legal Titles and Smallholding Peasants
insignificant sum, was well within the economic ability of most potential beneficiaries to pay.
For both programs, the final stage of titling was to record new titles in the national registry,
which would then verify the legal requisites for the program and publish a notice for a short period
(typically 30 days) for anyone wishing to contest the title. The new titles were then delivered to
their intended beneficiaries. In Peru, government officials would return within a few months and
deliver titles in a public ceremony in the nearby town center. Interviews described these events as
a large “party” or “graduation,” and were festive events with food and music where beneficiaries
would receive a large title printed on thick cardstock confirming their status as formal property
holders.5 Some beneficiaries noted that these celebrations were held on June 24th, the official “Day
of the Peasant” in Peru.6 Interviews in Colombia recalled that the process typically took longer
than in Peru, between 6-12 months, and sometimes titles would be distributed by the mayor in large
ceremonies and others recalled collecting their title individually in the local municipality.
In Peru, once new titles were fully registered through the PTRT program there was no
restriction on sale or transfer, although no respondents recalled having any neighbors who sold or
transferred their lands immediately after the program. In Colombia, there is similarly no restriction
on selling or transferring newly titled lands. However, there is a restriction on the accumulation
of rural land that has been allocated through the titling program. Specifically, no individual is
permitted under current law from owning more than one UAF (Family Agricultural Unit, Unidad
Agricola Familiar) worth of land at any time, as fixed by INCODER, whether they were the direct
beneficiary or obtained the land through subsequent sales.7
Both titling programs were significant moments in the lives of those who benefited. All of
my interviews with former beneficiaries in Colombia and Peru vividly recalled details of the titling
programs and the procedures with little or no prompting. In addition, nearly all were also able to
5E.g. interviews P1-1A-AH; P3-3-AH.
6E.g. interviews P1-4-ES; P3-1-AH.
7Law 160 of 1994 Art. 67. A UAF is a variable measure of land that is fixed by regulation according to the average
level of productivity in a given department and the type of productive use (agricultural, livestock, or mixed). These
range from 6-430ha and are calculated based on the area needed to provide for at least two minimum salaries for
a standard family (INCODER. Resolution 046 of 1996). However, there is an exception for third party purchasers
in good faith who obtain possession without knowledge of its origins as titled bald´ıo land for 15 years (Law 160 of
1994. Art. 39).
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correctly identify the specific government agency that was directing the titling process. This was
despite the long period of time since many interview respondents had received titling, which often
occurred 15-20 years prior. Several of the older beneficiaries in Peru seemed to equate the titling
program in importance with the agrarian reform which heavily redistributed land under the Velasco
administration in the 1970s: “Velasco gave us peasants the land, and under Fujimori we were given
titles.”8
The response to the titling programs in the countryside was almost universally positive.
Former titling officials and beneficiaries in both countries noted that the titles were largely welcomed
by villagers who were eager to receive a formal property right. However, interviews also revealed
that there were some initial doubts when the titling processed first arrived in a village. Some recalled
that a few individuals were concerned about having to pay property taxes following titling (although
these were generally low, see discussion below),9 or doubted whether the government would actually
follow through and deliver the titles.10 Although these concerns were shared by individuals in both
countries, they were more common in Peru, where officials were under pressure to fulfill centrally
mandated titling goals. Respondents also recalled that socialization meetings with titling workers
calmed the concerns of most individuals and that ultimately everyone “accepted and welcomed the
titling.”11 In Colombia, where titling was demand driven, interview respondents that did not take
advantage of the titling would express regret of having lost the opportunity and then try to enroll
in subsequent titling campaigns.12
Although titling was overwhelmingly accepted in benefited villages, the demarcation process
also tended to generate occasional disputes. According to interviews with officials and peasants
present during titling, these disputes fell into one of two categories. First, there were occasional
disputes regarding the exact placement of the boundary between neighboring plots of land.13 These
disputes occasionally resulted from a neighbor with malicious intent trying to claim a few extra
8Interview P-14-ES. “Velasco nos dio´ a los campesinos la tierra, con Fujimori se nos dieron los t´ıtulos.”
9E.g. interviews C5-2-CG; C3-2A-NR; P4-1A-AH
10E.g. interviews P4-1A-AH; C3-3-JM
11E.g. interviews P4-1A-AH; 6-6-NR
12Interviews C6-1-JM; C3-3-JM; C3-2A-NR.
13E.g. interviews C3-5-NR; P5-1-AH.
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meters of property, but most likely originated from honest misunderstandings regarding ambiguous
boundaries. The second type of dispute was when an individual renting land attempted to claim
possession at the expense of the current landlord.14 This second type of dispute arose only in Peru,
as Colombian legislation only allows for titling of state lands. They also tended to involve absentee
landlords living in the regional capital or Lima.
In both countries, titling staff had a similar procedure for dealing with disputes between
neighboring landholders. Officials never adjudicated disputes themselves. Rather, they would halt
the titling process and force the claimants to resolve the disagreement amicably or risk foregoing the
opportunity to obtain a formal title. Interviewees commented that this method effectively resolved
disputes over borders, usually resorting to the existing physical landmarks when demarcating the
final boundary.15 For absentee landlords, these disputes were not revealed until following demar-
cation and would quickly be resolved in the department capital following publication of notice.16
Former functionaries generally insisted that both types of disputes were relatively isolated incidents,
and were likely limited by the need to get signature of peaceful possession by neighboring property
holders.17
The titling programs in both countries covered a large geographic area, but focused mostly
on agriculturally productive regions. Figure 4.1 shows the geographic distribution of titling by
districts in each country. For Peru, titling focused mostly in the fertile valleys of the coastal region
and in the productive valleys of the central and northern highlands. The eastern jungle region had
relatively low coverage as settlement and production in that area was not as extensive during the
time of the PTRT program. Many southern highland districts also received less titling as much
land in those regions consists of collectively held grazing lands for peasant communities that were
not legally eligible for individual titling. In Colombia, the titling concentrated in the central and
southern highlands that are principal areas of agricultural production, particularly in the coffee
growing region of southern Antioquia and Viejo Caldas that were the focus of previous reform
14E.g. interviews P5-1-AH; P1-5-ES.
15E.g. interviews P4-2-AH; C3-2A-NR
16Interviews P1-5-ES; P3-4A-ES.
17E.g. interviews PE-9-16; PE-6-15; PE-1-17; CE-4-17.
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Figure 4.1.: Geographic distribution of land titles granted by districts in Left: Colombia through the
INCODER titling program (1994-2015) and Right: Peru through the PTRT program
(1996-2007).
efforts (Zamosc, 1989; LeGrand, 2003). These are also areas which tend to have a high proportion
of land held by smallholding estates (?), which would be eligible for titling.
Figure 4.2 show time series plots of the number of titles distributed over the main years of
the titling programs in each country. For Colombia, the plot shows the INCODER Land Allocation
and Titling Program since the passage of Law 160 in 1994. There is a slight drop in activity in 2003
due to the institutional change in which INCORA was replaced by INCODER. However, subsequent
years experience an uptick in titling due to renewed emphasis on rural land formalization in national
agrarian policy. For Peru, titling begins to slow in 1996 but then increases dramatically with a peak
toward the end of the first wave of titling in 2000. The second wave shows a more consistent trend
with a second peak around 2005 which then drops off toward the end of the second wave in 2007.
Although titling programs had a less ambitious strategy for altering land tenure patterns
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Figure 4.2.: Time series of titles granted by year in Left: Colombia through the INCODER titling
program (1994-2015) and Right: Peru through the PTRT program (1996-2007).
than previous reform attempts, their ultimate goals were the same: to foster economic development
and help bring peasant farmers out of endemic poverty. Unfortunately, much like their predecessors
(see e.g., Lowenthal, 1983; Arango Restrepo, 2014), there is little evidence showing that land titling
accomplished its promotors’ lofty goals. In Peru, many experts are skeptical of whether the first
two waves of the PTRT achieved the intended economic impact of sparking investment or increasing
access to credit. The most positive evidence comes from a study that found some increase in time
savings and investment in urban areas benefited by titling (Field, 2005). Field and Torero (2006) also
find some increase in access to state credit programs for rural households following titling, although
there is no similar change for private credit approvals. Later studies find a modest increases in
certain investments, particularly in areas with a high concentration of titling (Fort, 2007; Zegarra,
Escobal, and Aldana, 2008). However, these studies also found little evidence of increased access to
credit for rural beneficiaries. In Colombia, there are currently no studies on the economic impact of
the program (see Conroy et al., 2014). These limited results reflect the underwhelming experience
with land titling programs in other countries (Deininger and Feder, 2009). Lawry et al. (2017) in
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a systematic review of literature on land titling find no evidence of an increase in access to credit
(although they note that there are a dearth of studies on the subject), but do find a positive increase
in investment.
Ultimately, addressing systemic problems with tenure informality and lack of state access re-
quires deeper reforms than just demarcating land and delivering titles to poor farmers (see Deininger
and Feder, 2009; De Janvry, Sadoulet, and Wolford, 2001). While many titling programs also made
advances in improving land registries and centralizing land cadasters (Conroy et al., 2014), main-
taining these registries has still proven a challenge. Following titling and registration, a land registry
can quickly become out of date unless property owners take it upon themselves to continuously reg-
ister changes to the title, such as would be required in the case of sale, division, or inheritance.
However, lack of access to city centers and costs of updating registries typically dissuade poorer
peasants from bothering with this bureaucratic step. As a result, the overall levels of formal prop-
erty tenure are still quite high in both countries. In Peru, levels of tenure informality have actually
increased between the agricultural censuses of 1994 (46.2% of owners hold land without title) and
2012 (61% of owners hold land without title), despite titling efforts. While in Colombia there is no
census data available on informality, the Ministry of Agriculture estimates that approximately 48%
of all rural land is held informally (Restrepo and Morales, 2014: 132), although some estimate that
this could be as high as 70% in certain regions (Bank, 2013: 123).
Despite the limited evidence on the broader impacts of the programs, official data and in-
terviews with beneficiaries both are highly suggestive that titling efforts were enormously effective
at delivering formal titles to rural peasant farmers. The titling programs were also widely popular
politically. In Peru, they became a central campaign promise during the second Fujimori adminis-
tration and his bid for a third term. So popular was the program, that the Toledo administration
continued the program for a second cycle, ending in 2007. Continued popular support and demand
for titling has sustained titling in urban areas since, and has led to a third round of PTRT titling
starting in 2017 in the Amazon region (IADB, 2014). In Colombia, the demand for titling has con-
tinued and prompted the Santos administration to pursue a broad-sweep titling program modeled
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after Peru’s PTRT.18
This review of the program leads back to the question I initially presented at the beginning
of the chapter: if legal titles provide little economic benefit for peasants and the rural poor, why do
they continue to be demanded by rural smallholders and highly valued by peasants even decades
after they received them? The remainder of this chapter focuses on this question and inductively
building support for my theory on the symbolic effect of legal rights.
4.3. Presentation of Cases and Methodology
In the following section, I present the methodology I used to collect and analyze interviews
with rural farmers in Peru and Colombia. The goal for this fieldwork was to obtain information
about the significance of legal titles for peasants, common practices for resolving property disputes,
and how peasants participated in local village politics. To do so, I selected two regions, one from
each country, that would be both representative of experiences with land titling and also be rela-
tively comparable with each other. I employed a purposeful selection strategy based on theoretical
significant variables that could help build an inductive theory on the meaning of legal titles (Warren,
2011; Holstein and Gubrium, 1995). The two variables most central to my theoretical perspective
were experience with titling programs and the strength of local state institutions. The first of these
variables covers the main effect I aim to study (receiving a legal property right), while the second
variable is a key factor that mitigates the potential for legal titles to provide economic benefits
and meaningful protection from the state (see Chapter 2). The second variable is crucial for un-
derstanding how legal titles can affect behavior even in areas where legal titles do not improve
tenure security, such as in rural villages with limited or weak state presence (see discussion on state
presence, below).19
I then chose two departments that presented the highest number of districts with variation
along these two variables, and which also shared similar geographic and socio-economic characteris-
18Agencia Nacional de Tierras. “La gran apuesta del barrido predial.” (Apr. 6, 2018)
http://www.agenciadetierras.gov.co/2018/04/06/la-gran-apuesta-del-barrido-predial-masivo/. See also (Re-
strepo and Morales, 2014).
19For complete information on the construction of these two variables used for selection, see Chapter 5.
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tics. Specifically, my aim was to maximize the probability of selecting ideal districts for comparing
each of the four different combinations of the titling and local institutions variables, represented
in see Table 4.1 (high-tiling and strong institutions; high-titling and weak institutions; low-titling
and strong institutions; low-titling and weak institutions). I selected A´ncash in Peru and Narin˜o in
Colombia, both of which presented the highest variation in titling and institutional strength. They
also have similar geographies with a large proportion of agricultural production in highland areas
dominated by smallholding tenure.
The department of A´ncash is located just north of the department of Lima and crosses
two of Peru’s main geographic regions, including a section of coastal area and part of the central
highlands. A central valley in A´ncash runs parallel to the Pacific coast and lies between two
prominent mountain ranges of the Andes, the Cordillera Blanca and the Cordillera Negra, and has
a significant level of agricultural production, particularly for fruits and grains. Part of A´ncash
consists of highland plains (pampas) where the main sources of agricultural production are sheep
herding and potato cultivation, typical of other highland regions. The department also has a high
proportion of smallholder estates, with 92.5% of farms holding less than 5ha, corresponding to 10.9%
of the total agricultural land in the department according to the latest agricultural census of 2012.20
Narin˜o is a department along Colombia’s southern border with Ecuador that has a similar
variety of climates ranging from lowland tropics along the Pacific coast to temperate and cool
highland toward the east. Agricultural production in Narin˜o is centered along the highland area
where the Andes mountain range splits into three small ranges, known as the “macizo.” This region
has a variety of elevations and climates that are suitable for different crops ranging from coffee and
sugar to wheat and potato. According to data from the national registry (IGAC), Narin˜o also has
a high proportion of land held in small estates, with 25.9% of all land held in micro estates (< 0.5
UAF, mean of 2 hectares) and 18.0% held in small estates (0.5-2 UAF, mean of 23 hectares).21
Within each department, I then chose four districts that met the conditions corresponding
20This proportion of area held by micro estates is much higher than for the entire country, which is at 5.8%.
21The UAF is a standardized unit of land measurement roughly equivalent to the land needed to produce enough
income for two minimum salaries, and in Narin˜o is set at 27 hectares.
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Titling
High Titling / Low Titling /
Strong Institutions Strong Institutions
Institutions
High Titling / Low Titling /
Weak Institutions Weak Institutions
Table 4.1.: Site selection criteria for qualitative interviews used in each department.
to each quadrant in Table 4.1. In addition to representing the appropriate level of titling and
institutional weakness, I also selected for districts with a high proportion of land held by smallholding
farmers (< 5 hectares) and no presence of collective territories (peasant communities in Peru or
indigenous resguardos in Colombia), based on the most recent agricultural census. This additional
selection criteria was necessary to isolate interview respondents who are most theoretically relevant
for this study: smallholding peasant farmers with individual land claims. Finally, I prioritized
districts that had favorable conditions for security and accessibility.
Next, I selected villages within each district that were most representative of the titling,
institutional weakness, and proportion of smallholding estates variables used to select districts. For
each district, I initially devised a list of candidate villages based on available titling and census
information. I then consulted with titling officials (from the Direccio´n Regional de Agricultura in
A´ncash, and former INCODER and current URT officials in Narin˜o) and with local authorities in
municipality and provincial governments. I also verified security and accessibility conditions with
local representatives of the municipal government and armed forces. Unfortunately, during the
field visit in Peru in March 2017, the coastal region experienced a record level of flooding due to
the El Nin˜o weather phenomenon. This caused several remote districts that had previously been
selected to be completely inaccessible due to flash flooding and land slides. I selected alternative
districts, but ultimately was unable to select a suitable district for the condition of low-titling, weak
institutions. Table 4.2 shows the final selection of districts and villages in both A´ncash, Peru, and
Narin˜o, Colombia.
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High Titling Low Titling
El Alto, San Pablo (CO) La Victoria, Guaitarilla (CO)
Strong Institutions Llipta, Chilla (PE) Chahuarca´n, Llamell´ın (PE)
Chingas, Chingas (PE)
Matituy, La Florida (CO)
Weak Institutions Buenos Aires, Ticapampa (PE) Guapuscal Alto, Funes (CO)
Llullucachi, Ticapampa (PE)
Land Restitution El Recuerdo, Tablo´n de Go´mez (CO)
Pitalito Alto, Tablo´n de Go´mez (CO)
Peasant Community Ataquero, Ataquero (PE)
Table 4.2.: Sites of qualitative interviews in Narin˜o, Colombia and A´ncash, Peru.
Figure 4.3.: Map of fieldwork sites in Left: Narin˜o, Colombia and Right: A´ncash, Peru.
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In addition to the four categories in Table 4.1 above, I also selected additional sites that
would be theoretically insightful for building my theory. First, in Peru I selected a district which
was completely covered by a collective title for a peasant community (Ataquero). As the role of the
state in recognizing property rights is key to my theory, this case provides an interesting comparison
with an area in which the state does not play a role in defining or regulating individual property. In
Colombia, I also selected two additional villages (Pitalito Alto and El Recuerdo) that were benefited
by the land restitution policy. While I describe these cases in more detail in Chapter 6, I also include
them in this discussion as they both previously experienced some traditional land titling through
the INCODER titling program.
Figure 4.4 shows the distribution of titling by district in each department and Figure 4.5 plots
the number of titles granted in each department over time. In both regions, titling focused mostly
in the fertile and agricultural productive areas of the central valley in A´ncash and the highland
region in Narin˜o. Titling was ultimately much more extensive in Peru, and mostly occurred during
the first wave of the PTRT project in 1999-2000, while in Narin˜o the peak of titling was in 2005,
after which it maintained at relatively high levels until the end of the program in 2015.
All interviews were conducted in Spanish by myself and a team of three research assistants
who were all nationals of the respective country, trained in qualitative methodology, and had prior
fieldwork experience in rural settings. Before starting fieldwork, I trained all research assistance
in the interview guide and the research design for both qualitative data collection and the broader
study. I then worked with assistants throughout the field work process to integrate their feedback
into the interview guide, question wording, and research design. I participated directly in approx-
imately one-third of the interviews to help continue to train research assistants, ensure interview
quality, and take personal notes and observations. Following each day of interviews, I would con-
vene with the research team to reflect on the interviews of the day, address potential problems,
and discuss new themes and evidence that emerged over the course of fieldwork. While I am fluent
in Spanish and have several years experience working and conducting research in both countries,
collaborating with experienced assistants from Peru and Colombia provided an advantage of having
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Figure 4.4.: Geographic distribution of total title granted by districts in Left: Narin˜o, Colombia
through the INCODER titling program (1994-2015) and Right: A´ncash, Peru through





























































































Figure 4.5.: Time series of titles granted per year in Left: Narin˜o, Colombia through the INCODER
titling program (1994-2015) and Right: A´ncash, Peru through the PTRT program
(1996-2007).
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additional feedback for interpreting subtle linguistic and cultural cues that can enrich an interpretive
qualitative analysis (Bernard, 2011).
Respondents were selected through a purposeful selection process and a snowball method-
ology that identified villagers based on theoretically guided variables with the help of community
leaders (Warren, 2011: 87-88). I specifically sought out agriculturalists who possessed land, and
attempted to gain a diversity of perspectives from landholders who both had and had not bene-
fited from the program, and from different ages and genders. I also selected respondents based
on demonstrated communicative competence and capability of narrative production to ensure high
quality interview data (Holstein and Gubrium, 1995: 24). New respondents were selected until
reaching saturation on the main themes identified in the interview guide, which occurred generally
after 4-7 interviews. In total, the field work produced 70 interviews with smallholder farmers from
both countries.22
All interviews were semi-structured and based upon a guide with three thematic groupings
of questions: (1) Patterns of land tenure and land use; (2) Experience with and perceptions of land
titling; and (3) Local political participation and dispute resolution. Together, the questions in these
three themes were designed to elicit “descriptions of the life-world of the interviewee with respect to
interpreting the meaning of the described phenomenon” (Kvale, 2007: 51-52)—namely, experience
with land titling and formal titles. I structured interviews around a body of principal questions that
were asked of all respondents, and also included suggestions for probes and followup questions to
prompt more reflection by respondents (Rubin and Rubin, 2011: 145–146). In addition, after the
main interview I included a brief, structured survey with questions on state trust and perceptions
of titling policies. Interviews were all recorded, and following the field work, assistants transcribed
all interviews and included field notes taken during and after the interview.
The discussion in the remainder of this chapter is based on an interpretive text analysis
of interview transcripts and field notes. The purpose of this analysis was to engage in grounded
22In addition, we conducted a series of pilot interviews with four respondents in each country to refine question
wording and interview methodology. These interviews were not transcribed but still informed my analysis more
generally by providing additional context during the fieldwork process and analysis.
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theory building (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) that could provide a descriptive explanation of how
peasant farmers use legal property rights in practice. I also sought to understand the meanings that
peasants ascribe to legal rights and how they interpret these meanings in their political lives. My
analysis began by reviewing transcripts and coding portions of the text according to an evolving list
of themes. I based these themes on the three that originally structured the interview guides (land
tenure, legal titles, and local participation), but then expanded this list with new codes covering
additional concepts and categories that emerged from the interview texts themselves until reaching
saturation. A full list of themes is included in the Appendix Section A.1 and includes a total of
98 unique codes under 23 themes. I then wrote a memo for each interview transcript interpreting
salient themes and linking them with others interviews in a narrative form (Bernard, 2011: 435).
My final analysis is based on these memos and retrieved coded segments of text.
The remainder of this chapter is an interpretive description of how rural farmers in the
villages of A´ncash and Narin˜o understand formal rights and property ownership as meaningful in
constructing identities and defining their relationship with the state. This discussion stands alone
as evidence of the role that legal property rights play in the lives of respondents and the meanings
that they ascribe to these rights. It also provides a method for building on earlier theorizing in this
research project (Chapter 2) in order to ground my theory in empirical realities, verify assumptions,
and correct misperceptions. Although I compare theoretically relevant categories, such as titled to
non-titled landholders and areas of weak and strong state presence, the purpose of this exercise is
not to directly test hypotheses. Rather, it is to build a solid theoretical basis that can later serve
for hypothesis testing which I conduct in Chapter 5.
4.4. State Presence
Part of my analysis is a search for meanings and patterns of behavior that the traditional
institutionalist view of legal property rights cannot explain—that is, evidence of how legal rights
influence behavior even when they do not otherwise affect economic value or tenure security. As
I describe elsewhere (see Chapter 2), a key variable for this analysis is the strength of local state
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institutions. Legal property rights are dependent upon the capacity of the state to enforce and
respect those rights in order for them to provide economic value (Feder and Feeny, 1991). There-
fore a comparison of contexts in which the state provides weak or strong enforcement of property
rights should be theoretical meaningful for understanding the non-material, symbolic value of rights.
Where the state is weak or not present, smallholders might have different strategies for protecting
property rights and regulating land that do not require formal titles. The meaning and importance
of the title itself might also change.
In the following section, I set up this comparison by describing the presence of local state
institutions in my fieldwork sites and how these should, from a economic perspective, qualitatively
alter the expectations of peasant farmers regarding the value of their legal rights. I then engage
in my principal analysis in which I describe, among other findings, that respondents appear to
draw meaning from legal rights independent of the actual economic value rights may reasonably be
expected to provide.
The countryside in both Colombia and Peru provides a wide degree of variation in the
presence of state institutions and their capacity to protect property rights. Like many rural areas
in Latin America and other developing nations, state capacity is largely concentrated in urban
centers and regional capitals, with the strength of the state weakening as one moves out toward
the agricultural frontier. In such regions, the state is seldom completely absent, as even small
villages will frequently have economic contact and locally appointed representatives that liaison
with municipal authorities. However, the access to state institutions designed to protect property
rights—police, prosecutors, or courts—can be quite limited.
4.4.1. State Presence in Nariño, Colombia
In Colombia, many historians have noted that the strength of the state is highly varied in ru-
ral areas, particularly in the frontier where settlement is a rather recent, 20th century phenomenon
(Hartlyn, 1985). This was particularly true for central state authorities, as one historian notes:
“For most Colombians the central state was an abstract concept and power was largely exercised
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and determined locally” (?: 296). This pattern is true today, even in regions that are particularly
important for commercial and export oriented agricultural production (LeGrand, van Isschot, and
Rian˜o-Alcala´, 2017). The best way to illustrate the practical differences in state presence for res-
idents in such areas is to compare villages with different degrees of capacity and presence of local
state institutions. To do so, I provide brief narrative descriptions of two villages in Narin˜o: El Alto
in San Pablo municipality with relatively robust local institutions; and Matatuy, La Florida with
weaker local institutions.23
El Alto, San Pablo (strong local institutions)
The village of El Alto is a quick 15-minute trip by bus or mototaxi down a paved highway
from the municipal seat in San Pablo. It sits on the northern edge of Narin˜o along the border
with the neighboring department of Cauca. The land is accented but lower in altitude than the
central mountains of Narin˜o, making the area ideal for coffee cultivation. The municipal offices in
San Pablo are modern and security for the police station is also bolstered by a regional base of the
armed forces. Many residents in El Alto are actively engaged in municipal projects, and village
leaders frequently take jobs as regional promotors for different municipal and state programs. The
presence of state benefit programs was patent during fieldwork visits, as some interview coincided
with representatives from the Colombian Family Welfare Institute (ICBF), a central state agency
which promotes childhood welfare and family benefit programs. The village had also just received
a 4 million peso grant to construct a water treatment facility and the local coffee grower association
had received another large grant for a brand new coffee processing and roasting plant as well as
training on how to roast and commercialize locally produced coffee.24
Respondents from El Alto generally felt secure in their rights and comfortable engaging with
municipal authorities. When asked about security concerns or problems with land tenure, they would
compare their situation to villages over the municipal boundary to the north in Cauca. Those areas
were accessible only by dirt road that was frequently closed in poor conditions. Interviews would
23It should be noted, however, that many of the areas of weakest state presence are also those with high levels of
violence and which were excluded from site selection due to security concerns. Therefore these cases are likely not
representative of the extremes of either category of weak or strong state institutions.
24Interviews 3-2A-NR and 3-1-JM
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also comment that the area has a high presence of coca cultivation and armed actors.25
Matatuy, La Florida (weak local institutions)
The village of Matatuy is in the center of the municipality of La Florida and also at an
elevation and climate that is suitable for extensive coffee cultivation. Although geographically in
the center of the department and much closer to the regional capital of Pasto than El Alto, Matatuy
has a feeling of greater isolation. The municipal seat of La Florida is well connected with the rest
of the department, lying upon a principal highway. However, the majority of the municipality is
cutoff from town by a series of mountain valleys. The main town in the neighboring municipality
of El Tambo is closer in distance and many residents frequently travel there to access state benefit
programs, even though the town is separated by a large river which presently is only crossable by
a small footbridge.26
Travel from the town of La Florida to the village of Matatuy takes over an hour by car along
a dirt road and is accessible only by public transportation once per week. The trip only increases
the sense of isolation one feels in Matatuy, as the road passes several abandoned farmhouses that are
still emblazoned with slogans from the ELN rebel group, which until recently had been present in
the area. Although a rather large sized village, residents complained that they lacked a corregidor, a
local municipal official typically elected for villages of that size.27 There was also no police presence
since an attack by rebel groups several years ago.28 For any security issue or to speak with a police
inspector, residents would have to make the journey to the municipality offices in La Florida, which
would be difficult unless a family had access to private transportation.
4.4.2. State Presence in Áncash, Peru
Variation in local state capacity in the country side is similar in Peru. Historically, state
authorities for protecting property rights such as courts, police, and municipal officials were even
less present in the countryside than in the case of Colombia. Instead, enforcement of social order in
25Interviews 3-2A-NR, 3-1-JM, and 3-3-JM
26Interview 6-3-NR
27Interviews 6-2-NR and 6-3-NR
28Interview 6-4A-JM
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rural regions was dominated by large hacienda owners who would typically employ private means
to exercise authority and preserve rights (McClintock, 1984; Huber, 1995). Peasants who wished to
settle disputes or had claims to adjudicate would frequently seek justice through hacienda owners
rather than travel great distance to municipal authorities, who would often use the opportunity to
extract bribes (Huber, 1995: 11). The retreat and breakup of large haciendas during the agrarian
reform period largely dissolved this alternative authority system, leaving a large power vacuum in
many rural areas (McClintock, 1984; Huber, 1995: 78-79).
This situation led to a steep increase in theft and property crimes in many isolated rural
villages and eventually created the conditions for the emergence of a vigilante justice movement
known as the Rondas Campesinas, or“peasant watch groups.”29 These groups consisted of organized,
local committees of adult males who would take turns patrolling the village to prevent property theft,
mostly of livestock and personal possessions. These groups first emerged in the northern highlands
of Cajamarca in areas with weak state presence in 1976 (Gitlitz and Rojas, 1983; Huber, 1995).
However, the model quickly spread by word of mouth and imitation to many parts of the northern
and central highlands and coast, particularly in the wake of a large economic shock in the early
1980s caused by a series of intermittent droughts and flooding due to the El Nin˜o weather pattern
(Starn, 1999: ch. 2).
Starn (1999), in his ethnographic account of Rondas Campesinas groups in Cajamarca pro-
vides a detailed account of life in these areas. Villagers would recall frequent break-ins that would
happen while they were asleep and small livestock disappearing even when tied to bed posts. There
was also a tacit understanding that the perpetrators were often from the very same village and
that “just about everyone was involved” (44). These villages, although distant from town centers,
will still highly integrated into the regional economy. However, in terms of access to state author-
ities, they were quite isolated as the main government offices, police, and courts would only be
found in distant towns. The sense of vulnerability from the growing wave of property crimes was
compounded by frustration with corruption, slow proceedings, and limited judicial resources as one
29The presence of these groups comprise the principal measure of institutional weakness in Peru that I use in Chapter
5. More details on the history if the Rondas Campesinas and the construction of this variable can be found there.
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judge or prosecutor might have jurisdiction over a wide area of countryside. Experiences such as
these led to a rapid expansion of the movement in the countryside despite having no centralized
organization promoting the Rondas as a model of community justice (Starn, 1999; Huber, 1995).
Today, the Rondas Campesinas are not as present in A´ncash as they once were 10-20 years
ago. However the signs of state absence are still notable in some areas. The village of Buenos Aires
in the district of Ticapampa had a strong Rondas group during the 1990s, but which has since
disbanded as the security of the area improved. The village is located on the edge of the central
valley in A´ncash and at the beginning of a large highland pampa. Police and municipal authorities
are in the Ticapampa town, about an hour by car on the highway recently constructed by a mining
company. Before the mine, the town would only be accessible by a precarious footbridge that crossed
the Santa river and would frequently collapse during periods of heaving raining and floods. Police
presence in the town is limited and the municipal and provincial offices are rustic. Currently no
judge is stationed in Ticapampa, and all cases are instead referred to courts in the regional capital,
two hours by highway, or handled by the district’s Justice of the Peace. Although the access to the
state has improved in recent years, many residents still expressed a desire to re-organize the Ronda
in order to respond to a growing sense of insecurity in the area.30
Given the above, one might surmise that formal, legal titles have a different meaning for
smallholding farmers in areas of weak state presence as compared to those areas where state capacity
is relatively robust. After all, a legal title is only as good as the state commitment to defend and
recognize the underlying property right. If police, court officials, and municipal government are
distant or not capable of enforcing a title, then rational actors should not alter their beliefs about
the security of land tenure, ability to secure credit, or other benefits a legal title might otherwise
convey. Similarly, the significance and meaning of a legal title might be different in areas where
titles are effectively worthless scraps of paper.
However, during my fieldwork I uncovered no qualitative difference in the practices of peasant
farmers in regards to formal titles between villages with high or low state presence. In both areas,
30E.g. interviews P3-2-AH; P3-3-AH; P3-7-GC
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smallholders used a very similar mix of informal and formal strategies to regulate property within
the village and resolve disputes. Even more interestingly, formal titles and the titling programs
were highly important to nearly all of the respondents, and this belief was apparently independent
of the presence of state institutions or trust toward the government, courts, or police.
The following section outlines patterns of land tenure and local practices for participating in
village politics and resolving property disputes in the villages I visited in A´ncash and Narin˜o. I then
describe the significance of legal titles for these same individuals. The results I find have helped
construct my theory on the symbolic effect of rights and provides empirical support for two basic
assumptions underlying my theory: that legal rights are highly significant for smallholder farmers;
and that rights have important symbolic value even when they do not necessarily have economic
value.31
4.5. Land and Political Participation in the Countryside
In this section I describe the patterns of land tenure and local political participation among
the smallholding farmers in the villages of A´ncash and Narin˜o that I visited. This description
provides the context for understanding the connection between legal rights, agricultural land, and
local political life in these villages. Although most respondents participated in electoral politics, I
focus on political participation at the village-level, which is below the lowest level of elected political
offices (the municipal government). Specifically, in this section I examine how village residents
coordinate collective action to resolve common challenges, provide public goods, and regulate land
use and disputes over property. Two central findings emerge from this section which are significant
for grounding my theory on legal property rights. First, access to and regulation of agricultural
land is central to much of the political life in all of the villages I visited. Second, land regulation
and dispute resolution uses a mixture of formal, state-driven strategies and informal, local methods.
However, I find no qualitative difference between the types of strategies used between areas of strong
31While I find no qualitative difference in either of these analyses between areas of strong or weak state presence, my
theory still predicts important differences in the frequency and degree in which peasants engage in politics between
these two ares, which is the focus of my statistical analysis in Chapter 5.
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or weak state presence.
4.5.1. Access to land
Across both fieldwork sites, smallholding peasants had very similar patterns of land tenure
and acquisition. Most families held less than a hectare or two of land in total, usually divided among
several smaller parcels that they accumulated through a mixture of inheritance or purchase, the two
of which comprise the main modalities of acquiring land. A third method is direct occupation of
state land, which while not as common as in previous decades, still occurs in some areas. For all
three cases however, acquisition of land seldom confers a formal property right; peasants still must
undergo a separate process to formalize their right and obtain a full title. To help illustrate the
patterns of land acquisition common in my research sites, I provide three brief vignettes describing
common experiences.
Purchase (Matatuy, La Florida)
Horacio Lo´pez32 is a retired farmer who lives in a modest cement home near the center of
Matatuy, a large village in the highlands to the northeast of the department capital of Narin˜o,
Colombia. He originally came from another village in a neighboring municipality over 50 years
ago looking for work and eventually found employment helping manage the coffee plantations and
livestock of a local landlord’s estate. Mr. Lo´pez was loyal and hardworking, but after 15 years of
employment he felt the urge to start his own farm and be self-sufficient. At that time the landlord
was of failing health and looking to reduce the size of his estate to a more manageable portion. Mr.
Lo´pez convinced the owner to sell off a small parcel from the estate in exchange for back-wages
which the landlord still owed to him. The owner agreed and thus Mr. Lo´pez acquired his first piece
of agricultural land.
After transferring the parcel to Mr. Lo´pez, the former landlord wrote a simple letter noting
the land as a donation to his employee. However, Mr Lo´pez soon became worried that his rights may
not be secure: if the landlord passed away, a relative might try to claim his parcel as an inheritance.
To secure his rights to his new parcel, Mr. Lo´pez requested that the former owner write a letter of
32All names here are pseudonyms to protect the confidentiality of respondents.
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sale (carta de compra-venta), in hopes of improving his claim. Mr. Lo´pez reasoned that, “well since
it was a payment for services, it’s different; it’s a payment for services so everyone will respect it,
like it was sold! So of course the document that was made with [the landlord] over there wasn’t like
a donation, but like a land sale.”33
Using the profits from his first parcel, Mr. Lo´pez eventually purchased additional plots
of land. This form of gradual accumulation is quite common among villagers in both research
sites, although in most instances the purchase is often from a relative such as an uncle or aunt.34
Similar to his first plot, these subsequent purchases were documented with a letter of purchase, an
informal document which shows evidence of possession, but not of a full legal right. In fact, under
Colombian law both his original plot obtained from his former employer and subsequent purchases
were all technically state bald´ıo lands, which made them eligible for titling which he eventually did
under the INCODER program. Mr. Lo´pez still holds title to all his lands, although he works only
a small plot these days. The rest of his land is divided up among his children who work the land
that they will eventually inherit.
Inheritance (Buenos Aires, Ticapampa)
The family of Cecilia Herrera was originally part of the Catac peasant community in the
highland pampas to the south of the department capital of A´ncash, Peru. She moved to the village
of Buenos Aires in the 1970s after marrying the son of a local landowner with a large extension of
approximately 250ha. At that time, the agrarian reform under the Velasco government was well
underway. The government seized her father-in-law’s estate and transferred the majority of the land
to the Catac community, which was newly recognized and endowed with land as part of the agrarian
reform. Catac is also where Ms. Herrera’s parents still reside and have plots of land for grazing and
potato cultivation. The remainder of her father-in-law’s estate included several hectares of pampa,
which he eventually bequeathed to her and her husband. Although her father-in-law’s land was
formally titled prior to the agrarian reform, following the breakup of the estate she no longer had a
33Interview C6-1-JM. “Pero entonces como era un pago de servicio, la cosa era diferente, es un pago de servicio
entonces todo el mundo lo respeta. Entonces como era comprado. Claro que en el documento que se hizo con el
doctor ah´ı ya no entro´ como en donacio´n, sino como en compra y venta.”
34E.g. interviews P1-2-AH; C4-5-JM; C3-5-NR
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title to the remaining area and only a testament to show evidence of possession. In the late 1990s
the PTRT titling program visited her village and she took advantage of the program to have her
inheritance formally titled in both her and her husband’s names.
Ms. Herrera no longer manages her land, which she has since divide up among her children
who work individual plots as separate farms. Although each of her children manages their allotted
land individually, the land is all still titled in their mother’s name (Ms. Herrera’s husband has since
passed away). In fact, her eldest son Juan, does not identify himself as a landowner and claim’s
that he is “landless,” since his mother still owns the land and her name appears on the title.35
This pattern of inheritance was quite common among other farmers interviews in both A´ncash and
Narin˜o, and many respondents also suggested that they didn’t own their parent’s land although
they worked and profited from the land without paying rent.36
Occupation (El Recuerdo, Tablo´n de Go´mez)
The village of El Recuerdo lies in the municipality of Tablo´n de Go´mez in the northeast
corner of Narin˜o. 50 years ago the village was a large plain of about 96 hectares that was on the
top of a mountain ridge overlooking the town of Tablo´n de Go´mez. The area, then known as El
Llano (the plain), was largely unoccupied but commonly used as grazing land or to extract timber
for construction. Most residents from neighboring villages presumed that the land belonged to the
municipal government. In 1983, a local landowner, who was an active member of the church and
concerned with the welfare of poor families in the region, organized a group of about 20 landless
families from villages in the surrounding area. Together they occupied a small part of El Llano
and petitioned the mayor to donate part of the land to the families. The municipality eventually
agreed, over the objections of several nearby landowners who continued to graze cattle in El Llano,
and the mayor wrote an informal document transferring enough land to the families for housing,
35Interview P3-4A-ES
36E.g. interviews P1-2-AH, P4-1A-AH. As one interview noted: “Well yeah, there are many people who still work
the land of their parents, and the parents are the ones that have the title. For example, the parents say ‘this little
piece of land is what you’ll work,’ and they won’t have given over the title yet because, as they say, you don’t
inherit in life.” Interview C3-2A-NR. “S´ı, pues hay mucha gente que todav´ıa trabaja en la tierra de los papa´s y
los papa´s son los que tiene t´ıtulo. Por ejemplo, los papa´s le dicen este pedacito traba´jelo usted y todav´ıa no le ha
entregado t´ıtulo porque se dice que uno no hereda en vida, entonces.”
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but without access to additional land for cultivation or livestock grazing.
Later in 1991, it was discovered that El Llano was not municipal property, but was actually
state bald´ıo land. While technically invalidating the earlier transfer, this discovery also meant
that the land was available for homesteading and eventual titling. The original group of families
occupying El Llano then began to expand their occupation to cultivate more lands and several more
families moved into the area to join the occupation. This quickly created tension with neighbors
who still wanted access to El Llano to graze cattle.
Jairo Pe´rez’s father was one of the organizers in the original occupation. Mr. Pe´rez is now
an active leader in the village and remembers vividly the tensions caused by the occupation. They
would often plant fields one day to awaken and find cattle had entered and destroyed their plots
over night. Mr Pe´rez recalls : “The powerful families in that time had their lands and their cattle,
and while they had their corrals over there, here [in El Llano] we had the need. And so they would
say ‘I’m from around here too, I can also use [the land] for whatever I want.’ Meanwhile those of
us over here didn’t have anything. Nothing to do but just watch while they raised their cattle, cut
timber, raise their pigs. . . ”37 Tensions continued, but the occupying families kept cultivating the
land to strengthen their claim, inspired by experiences in other regions.38
This situation continued and the occupiers persevered until an attack on the area by guerrilla
forces in 2003 displaced many families in the municipality. The confrontation was over after a few
months, and many families began to return. During this time, Mr. Pe´rez would frequently travel
to Pasto and nearby towns to help organize humanitarian aid for the village. He soon learned of
the INCODER titling program and organized a titling campaign for the village a few years later.
Thanks to the program, all residents now have full legal titles for the land they possess and cultivate.
After gaining legal titles, the residents decided to rename the area El Recuerdo to mark a new phase
in the life of the village.
37Interview C5-1A-CG Familias pudientes en ese entonces ten´ıan sus tierras su ganado y en ese entonces la envidia
se podr´ıa decir porque ellos ten´ıan sus potreros pero la gana era de aca´, si porque aca´ era un predio pues como le
digo es que son 96 hecta´reas y planas entonces ellos como decir yo tambie´n soy de alla´ yo tambie´n puedo meter lo
que yo quiera, mientras que los que esta´bamos por ah´ı alrededor que no ten´ıamos nada. Era mirar no ma´s cr´ıen
ganado, que saquen madera, que cr´ıen sus cerdos.
38Interview C5-4-CG.
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4.5.2. Participation
In this section I describe some of the more common forms of political participation I uncovered
during my visits to A´ncash and Narin˜o. These political activities provide a glimpse of the ways in
which village residents collectively organize to promote development projects, petition municipal
and central state authorities for benefits, and resolve disagreements. Here I do not specifically
discuss participation in electoral politics, although nearly all respondents reported that they voted
in national and municipal elections. Rather, I examine more of the quotidian political life and forms
of civic engagement that occur below the elected, municipal-level of government. When asked about
political participation in local affairs, this form of engagement was nearly always the first example
that respondents gave. Voting and municipal electoral politics also came up during interviews, but
were always secondary to internal village engagement.
Most of village-level political activity involves volunteer work through locally organized de-
velopment or neighborhood committees. Village leaders are sometimes elected into positions on
these committees, but more often are just individuals who stand out as frequent volunteers with
a heightened sense of civic duty. However, it is important to note that while this form of politics
in quite local, is it far from reflecting purely informal institutions and is not divorced from the
state. Rather it is an amalgam of both formal and informal and state and non-state actors, as
local committees are always established in response to state development initiatives and local lead-
ers frequently also take on roles of appointed extensionists or liaisons for municipal or provincial
governments.
Village-level politics in both areas largely centered around one of two goals, both of which
were ultimately directed at interfacing with the state. The first was for the procurement of public
goods for the village, which could range from services such as connecting households to the mu-
nicipality’s electricity grid or building a new school house. By far the most frequently cited and
important services were access to irrigation systems, usually centered around an irrigation com-
mittee that petitioned for state projects to build infrastructure and subsequently govern access
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to irrigation water.39 In order to develop and maintain canals and other infrastructure for these
projects, irrigation committees would often organize collective efforts in which residents would vol-
unteer labor, referred to as “mingas” in Narin˜o or “faenas” in A´ncash. Committees could charge
fines or cut services for those not participating, and would often organize minga/faena labor for
other public good projects such as road and trail maintenance.40
As these services centered around land, and in the case of irrigation committees specifically
around agricultural land, land ownership was frequently a requirement for participating in these
spaces.41 Some residents who no longer had land would comment on how they“no longer participate”
in the village anymore after stopping work or losing access to their land.42 Respondents that had a
house in one village, but agricultural land in another, would mention participating mostly in other
villages where they had land. One landowner said that after he acquired his land in a neighboring
village, his new neighbors insisted that from then on he would “have to collaborate in favor of the
village, so that the village can develop. So that’s what they told me: ‘you have to participate in
meetings, you have to be in the faenas, everything that is necessary for the village.”’43
The second goal of local political participation centers around access to central state benefit
programs. Such benefits typically target individual families, and can include aid to small children,
health and nutrition programs, and other welfare programs. These also include policies aimed at
smallholding farmers, including agricultural subsidies for seed, fertilizer, or pesticides and small
grants for establishing new crops, animal husbandry projects, or substituting out illicit crops.44
Like in the case of other development projects, access for these benefits would frequently occur
through and promoted by locally organized committees. They would also tend to focus on land
ownership, as many of these committees would focus specifically on agricultural benefits.
39E.g. interviews C1-4-CG; C3-2A-NR, C3-1-JM, P5-3-GC; P 6-4-GC; P1-1A-AH
40E.g. interviews P3-3-AH, P4-1A-AH
41E.g. interviews P6-3-ES; P6-4-GC; P1-8-GC; C3-2A-NR.
42Interviews P3-3-AH; C2-5A-CG
43Interview P6-3-ES. “...hay que colaborar en favor del pueblo, para que el pueblo desarrolle. As´ı me dijeron, “tienes
que participar reuniones, tienes que estar en faenas, todo lo que es necesario del pueblo.”
44E.g. interviews C1-1-CG, C1-4-CG, C3-2A-NR, C4-3-NR, C4-6A-NR
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4.5.3. Land Disputes
Local political life and the regulation of land in villages frequently touches on the subject
of land disputes. While the procurement of public goods and state services was a collective effort,
involving land owners in the entire village, the resolution of disputes was a more individual affair.
In all villages, disputes would be resolved between those directly involved and occasionally with
the intervention of local or state authorities. Two important characteristics stand out among the
practices used to resolve land disputes. First, dispute resolution typically incorporates a mixture of
formal and informal mechanisms, and parties in a dispute escalate to higher-level state authorities
only in extreme cases. Second, although respondents noted that documentation providing evidence
of possession was helpful in resolving disputes, is was seldom necessary for these documents to be
formal, legal titles—that is, smallholders were just as willing to refer to informal documents such
as the letter of purchase as they would a full legal title. These trends were also consistent across
areas of both strong and weak state institutions.
The most common form of land disputes were between neighboring landholders. Interviews
frequently cited that neighbors might quibble over exactly where the border between two plots
ran, and these complaints sometimes featured accusations of moving fences or physical markers.45
Other common sources of disputes between neighbors include access to footpaths running through
property,46 damage by animals trampling or eating crops,47 and burning of underbrush that crosses
into a neighbor’s field.48 A second form of dispute would involve competing claims over ownership.
This could be from a former owner returning to claim that a land sale was not finalized or legal,49
or from a relative and co-inheritor claiming the land as part of their inheritance.50 Less common
were disputes that involved expropriation from government or an outside company.51
When queried on how villagers typically handled land disputes, nearly all interviews would
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respond that they were settled through amicable discussion between the parties. Some interviews
mentioned that local leaders from the village would, at times, be called upon to help resolve dis-
putes.52 Local leaders would often also double as municipal or provincial representatives, and thus
act out of a mixture of semi-formal state authority as part of their official capacity, and also informal,
non-state authority as leaders from within the community.53 Many interviews insisted that disputes
would almost always end in these informal spaces, although others noted that parties would some-
times escalate the disagreement by referring it to municipal authorities, such as a police inspector,
justice of the peace, or municipal ombudsperson from a nearby town.54
When resolving these disputes, formal titles played an inconsistent role. Some respondents
denied that titles were necessary at all. One landowner, who was currently trying to formalize
his property, insisted that the title was not required for resolving most disputes: “No, no, no, we
all know where we have crops, where we planted seeds, where we have our own places.”55 When
pressed on the subject, many noted that having a title could be helpful, although several stated
that other written documents such as an informal letter of purchase would also be acceptable.56
Another frequent comment is that the best way to resolve and avoid disputes ultimately was by
providing clear physical boundaries such as fencing.57 Even when an owner had a full title, they
would sometimes desist and lose land to a neighbor because they “didn’t want to fight” or they
“didn’t like to cause trouble.”58
Interestingly, the role of titles and the mixing of formal and informal dispute mechanisms
were similar between interviews in areas both with strong and weak state institutions. That is,
smallholders in a village with weak formal institutions were willing to rely on state authorities
and formal titles59 and also to seek informal dispute resolution mechanisms.60 Similarly, peasants
52E.g. Interviews P6-2A-ES; C3-4-NR; C6-4A-JM
53E.g. Interviews P1-1A-AH; C3-2A-NR
54E.g. Interviews P3-1-AH; P4-2-AH; C4-5-JM.
55Interview P5-2-ES “No, no, no, pues, cada cual sabemos do´nde tenemos cultivos, do´nde hemos sembrado, do´nde
tenemos sitios conocidos.”
56E.g. interviews P6-3-ES; C5-2-CG; C3-4-NR
57E.g. interviews P3-7-GC; P4-1A-AH; C1-1-CG; C1-5A-JM; C6-2-NR.
58Interview C3-4-NR. See also interviews P3-6-ES; C1-1-CG
59E.g. interviews P3-1-AH, P4-2-AH, C6-1-JM, C2-4-CG
60E.g. interviews P3-7-GC, P4-1A-AH, C6-4A-JM.
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in villages with relatively strong state institutions expressed preferences for relying on informal
mechanisms and documents,61 but were also willing to seek out state authorities when necessary.62
The only exception to this trend was for disputes that involved outsiders from the village, such as
a former land owner, a distant relative, or a company that might have alternative claims to the
land.63 For these cases, respondents believed that titles were more effective in resolving the dispute
or protecting property.
4.6. Legal Rights—Accessing the State and Citizenship
In the following section I discuss the relevance of legal property rights in lives of smallholding
farmers and the meaning that those individuals ascribe to formal titles. My theory on the symbolic
impact of rights posits that state-granted rights provide meaning to two sets of political behaviors.
First, it defines appropriate settings and conditions for making claims towards the state, and second,
it helps construct political identities of rights-bearers as citizens and legitimate landowners in a
privileged relationship with the state. In this section, I demonstrate how interviewees understand
legal titles and formal ownership of land as one basis (out of many) for constructing political
identities. Specifically, I show how smallholders perceive titles as increasing access to the state and
strengthening identities as a legitimate owner.
Interestingly, the meaning that smallholder peasants associate with legal titles is not depen-
dent on actual experience with the state or state institutions, as titles hold qualitatively similar
meanings in areas of strong and weak state presence. This finding is consistent with my theoretical
assumptions that formal rights convey meaning beyond mere changes in economic value of the land.
However, this is not to assert that titles do not also inform perceptions of economic value. Legal
rights represent both an expected economic benefit and a privileged relationship with the state, and
this is quite clear in how smallholders understand their legal titles. While I argue that receiving
a formal right strengthens identities as legitimate owners, they also increase expectation that this
61E.g. interviews P1-1A-AH, P 5-3-GC, P6-3-ES, C3-4-NR
62E.g. interviews P1-1A-AH, P5-2-ES, P6-1-AH, C4-5-JM, C1-1-CG
63E.g. interviews C6-1-JM; C3-6-JM; P4-2-AH
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stronger claim can result in improved access to credit, state aid, and other material benefits. My
purpose here is not to deny that the material benefits of a legal title are consequential, but rather
that they coexist with other mechanisms through which legal rights shape political behavior.
The potential economic benefits of formal titles were quite salient to most of the smallholders
interviewed. Although as mentioned above, titling program did not change the actual amount of
land possessed or controlled by any beneficiary, there are still ways in which a title can increase the
expectation of economic benefits. The primary benefit that respondents cited was improved access
to credit; with a formal title, they could (in theory at least) use land as collateral to get credit
from public or private banks. This is unsurprising given that access to credit is still the primary
justification for rural titling programs today (Conroy et al., 2014; Lawry et al., 2017), and featured
heavily in promotional activities by titling officials in both countries. However, it was unclear the
extent to which most smallholders actually leveraged their new legal titles to gain credit. Many
interviews noted they either never attempting to secure a loan,64 or had managed to secure credit
with an informal title through state programs (see below).
Another economic benefit that some respondents noted was that titles could potentially raise
the value of land and facilitated land sales.65 As one commented: “With a title you can sell your land.
They will ask you: ‘does this land have a title?’ If you don’t have a title, how can you negotiate?”66
Again, it is ambiguous whether this perceived change in value affects behavior or could result in a
substantially higher price for land, as these same respondents also had purchased their own land
without formal titles, as did nearly every interviewee who had purchased land recently.
When queried about the benefits of legal titles, the most common response from smallholders
is that titles strengthen tenure security. Many shared a common sentiment that “if you have a title,
no one can take [your land] away from you!”67 When asked about the source of the threat, some
respondents could not specify who or under what conditions another individual would be able to
64E.g. interviews C5-4-CG; C6-3-NR; P4-4-ES
65E.g. interviews C3-2A-NR, C 1-5A-JM, P4-3-ES
66Interview P4-3-ES
67C 1-3-CG “si tienes escritura quie´n te va a quitar”
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appropriate their land.68 However, most suggested that it would be another individual or possibly
a former owner returning to claim the land as their own. As one respondent related:
It’s that the landowner that sold you the plot, if he was a bad person, he could take it
away from you! Yeah, he could take it without any problem. And well, if you couldn’t
present any document that said that you’re the owner of this [land], and he was acting
in bad faith, well he could take it from you. But thank God this won’t happen to any
of the land here now that they are all titled by INCODER!69
Most of the threats to tenure were articulated in this way, as a protection against third-party
claimants. Very few respondents mentioned protection against government expropriation, which
largely seemed a minor concern.70 Similar to the case of perceived economic benefits, respondents
seemed to have strong expectations for increases in tenure security independent of whether the
respondent lived in an area with strong71 or weak institutions.72 No respondent thought that the
title had a negative or inconsequential impact to tenure.
However, the title also seemed to have a meaning that went beyond mere expectations of
tenure security or ability to access credit. It also came with a stronger sense of identity as a
legitimate landowner.73 Many peasants noted that the title made them feel more like “owners.”
Common sentiments along these lines included: “Well now with the titling we are truly going to be
real owners, under the law!”74 Another former beneficiary of land titling noted that after receiving
a legal titles:
Well you feel content, no? You could say that now we are owners, and that now we have
a representation that were owners and all. . . . Just having a document doesn’t mean
as much as having a title, and now that we got it, the title is a representation that, yes,
68E.g. interviews P4-5-GC, C6-1-JM
69Interview C3-6-JM “Es que el duen˜o de tierra que vend´ıa el lote, si e´l era mala gente, e´l pod´ıa quitarlo. S´ı, lo
quitaba y no hab´ıa problema. Y si uno no presentaba un documento pues que dijera, usted es duen˜o de esto, y si
e´l lo usaba de mala fe, pues se lo quitaban. Pero gracias a Dios, ya no pasa as´ı porque los pedacitos de aca´ ya por
el INCODER esta´n escriturados.”
70Interview P4-2-AH.
71E.g. interviews P5-1-AH; C 3-6-JM
72E.g. interviews P 4-2-AH; 6-4A-JM
73E.g. interviews P6-4-GC, C6-5-NR, P6-1-AH
74Interview P5-3-GC “bueno ya, verdaderamente con la titulacio´n vamos a tener, co´mo se llama, vamos a ser duen˜os
verdaderos, de acuerdo a la ley”
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we are owners.75
This feeling of being a more legitimate “owner” came for many individuals even though their
land was inherited or purchased and was in their possession for many years. One individual waiting
to title land that had been in their family for two generations already still did not feel like a true
owner without the legal title. When asked whether he felt that either he or his family was the
owner of his land he responded: “Of course not because there is no land title! You have to have a
land title.”76 These perceptions also seemed to contradict other assertions about the use of titles
in resolving disputes. For example, several respondents that asserted the title was important for
feeling more like an owner, also noted that most land conflicts were resolved informally and that
everyone “knows where everyone’s land is.”77 Finally, this perception was also likely independent of
the strength of local state institutions, and was common among smallholding peasants in villages
with both strong,78 and weak,79 state institutions.
Legal titles also implied greater access to the state in general for respondents. Many small-
holders noted that a title was important for getting access to state programs such as irrigation
services80 or agricultural subsidy programs.81 However, even though formal title would certainly
be helpful in showing land possession, many programs do not actually require formal titles (just
evidence of possession), and many interviewees claimed to have accessed the same programs with
only an informal document.82 Respondents even stated that they had successfully taken out agri-
cultural loans through state programs in practice with an informal document.83 Peasants in villages
currently undergoing land restitution in Colombia (El Recuerdo and Pitalito Alto) also frequently
75Interview C5-5-JM Y uno pues se siente contento ¿no? Uno decir ya somos duen˜os, ahora ya tenemos una repre-
sentacio´n de que somos duen˜os y no nada, . . . Tener un documento no es tan importante como tener una escritura
y ahorita ya la tenemos, la escritura es una representacio´n de que s´ı somos duen˜os.
76Interview P6-4-GC “Claro que no porque no cuenta con un t´ıtulo de propiedad. Tiene que haber un titulo de
propiedad.”
77Interview P6-1-AH, also interviews P6-3-ES; C6-5-NR
78E.g. interviews P6-4-GC; C3-1-JM
79E.g. interviews 6-1-JM; C2-1-CG
80Interview P3-6-ES
81Interview C6-2-NR
82E.g. interviews P6-3-ES, C4-1-JM, C6-3-NR
83Interviews C2-5A-CG; C1-6-JM; C4-1-JM; C6-1-JM.
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commented that the restitution process was made possible due to the fact that they had previously
titled their land through INCODER.84 This was despite the fact that possession of a formal land
title is not a prerequisite for land restitution and that many applicants for land restitution did not
previously have a formal document of ownership (Restrepo and Morales, 2014: 133).
Improved access to the state does not imply just greater access to benefits, but also a re-
quirement to fulfill one of the principal duties of citizenship—namely, paying taxes. Rural property
taxes are one of the main sources of revenue for municipalities in both Peru and Colombia, and,
similar to other countries in Latin America, are collected and utilized locally. All respondents were
well aware of their obligations to pay the property tax as landowners, but they were also aware of
the loophole for land that was not formalized.85 That is, if they avoided formalizing and registering
their land, they could also avoid property taxes.86 Nonetheless, many respondents noted that the
total annual contribution was relatively small and not much of a burden.87
This perception of increased access to state programs also followed a discourse of moderniza-
tion shared by several smallholders when discussing the titling program. Many equated the arrival
of titling as part of a general sense of progress and development within their village.88 As one
respondent commented:
Having a title for folks—how do I put this?—it gives them confidence. They can work
feeling more satisfied. But you know that the people are modest in our region, so with
the title it’s like having something kind of important, no? So it’s security, it’s progress,
because [with it] even the mentality of the person progresses!89
Another smallholder had a similar comment: “When we finally had the titles in our hands—how
84E.g. interviews C 5-3-CG; C5-4-CG.
85E.g. interviews P5-3-GC, P6-4-GC, P1-4-ES, C 3-2A-NR
86It is worth noting that paying property taxes could also be a form of securing greater protections for property rights,
as landholders could use tax receipts as evidence of possession. E.g. interview C2-3-CG.
87E.g. interviews P3-6-ES, P4-1A-AH, C 3-1-JM; C6-2-NR. The exact amount of taxes varies by the size and value
of the land, and can be anywhere from 1− 2USDannuallyforverysmallparcelsoruptoof15-25 USD per year land
totaling a few hectares. Most respondents felt at ease discussing property taxes and several respondents freely
admitted that while they generally attempted to stay current on their payments, they often fell behind and did
not pay them on time.
88E.g. interviews P1-5-ES, C3-6-JM
89Interview C6-4A-JM “Tener la escritura a la gente, como se dice, le da confianza, trabaja con ma´s gusto. Pero
usted sabe que la gente es sencilla en nuestra regio´n. Entonces con su escritura es como tener algo grande, ¿no?
Entonces es la seguridad, es el progreso, porque hasta la mentalidad de la persona progresa.
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wonderful! This is my land, this is my property! . . . With this I can now think about something
bigger, and that’s how we a progressing in this sense.”90
Others also noted a general sense of a shift from informality to formality over time and that
now land transactions required legal formalities, whereas previously they could be conducted just
by the “word” of the parties involved. Respondents often commented that before, everything was
done:
...according to your word, without documents like that. But now the time has come
that [informal] documents are no longer worth anything, it’s like not having anything at
all! The law arrived to the village, that they were titling bald´ıo lands in INCODER. . .
If you just had documents and didn’t take advantage of the opportunity to title with
INCODER, you would lose out!91
Another respondent noted that: “Now you can say that it’s the law, that everyone has to
have a title, and that it has to be like this, as much for the state as for the landowner. Not to have
a title is like not having any property.”92
Finally, nearly all of the respondents in both countries viewed titling programs in general as
highly important and beneficial for themselves and their communities. Many of these perspectives
are already reflected in the above quotes and discussion regarding the importance of titling. In
addition, I conducted a short structured survey at the end of each interview that asked respondents
to rate the importance of the titling program for their community.93 Responses to this question
were nearly universally positive, with an average response of 9.3 and median of 10 on a scale
from 1 to 10. The responses were equally high for respondents in areas of strong and weak state
institutions and regardless of the level of trust that respondents expressed toward state institutions
90Interview C3-6-JM “Ya cuando tuvimos la escritura en la mano, ¡que belleza! Esta es mi tierra, esta es mi propiedad
. . . Con esto ya puedo pensar en algo ma´s grande, y es ah´ı como estamos progresando en ese sentido.”
91Interview C 3-6-JM “A punta de palabra, sin documentos as´ı. Pero ya vino el tiempo que el documento ya no val´ıa
nada, era como no tener nada... llego´ la ley al pueblo que lo estaban escriturando en el INCODER, que a eso lo
llamaban predios bald´ıos. Al tener usted un t´ıtulo con documentos y al usted no aprovechar la oportunidad que
el gobierno mandaba a ser titular con INCODER, llegaba el tiempo en que usted lo perd´ıa.”
92Interview C5-2-CG “Ya se puede decir que hay una ley, que todo el mundo tiene que tener los t´ıtulos, y eso tiene
que ser as´ı, tanto para el Estado como para el duen˜o. No tener t´ıtulo es como no tener la propiedad.”
93The text of the question is as follows: “Please respond if you agree or disagree with what I am about to say, when
you respond, say a number from 1 to 10, 10 means that you totally agree with what I tell you, and 1 means that
you totally disagree: Land formalization and titling are very important for this community.”
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in general (the government, courts, police or elections).94 Although interviews were not drawn from
a random sample of all village residents, the lack of variation in responses is highly suggestive that
the importance of titling goes much further than any specific material benefits that formal titles can
reasonably provide. The only exception to this trend is within one village in A´ncash, Peru, where
land is titled collectively as a peasant community and the state is not involved with recognition or
protection of individual property rights, a case which I address more below.
Combined with the lack of variation in perspectives between villages in strong and weak in-
stitutional settings, the above discussion supports my theoretical assumptions that state-recognized
property rights provide meaning not just because of material benefits, but because of the relationship
between the individual and the state that it symbolizes. While formal property rights do present the
potential for direct material benefit, for example from increased property values, access to credit,
or state benefit programs, they also represent a deeper promise of an increased connection between
the state and the individual. This connection is related to a greater perceived claim to access the
state and state institutions, which respondents feel regardless of their expectations that they will
actually be able to successfully make those claims. Smallholders see titling as strengthening tenure
security, although they feel safe resolving disputes informally between neighbors; they see titles
as opening doors to state programs, although they are able to access many in practice with the
documents they previously held. More interestingly, they also see titling as deepening their sense of
identity as a “real owner” and as contributing to “progress” in their village. Together, this evidence
indicates that titles play a part in constructing meaning and identities for smallholders regarding
their relationship with the state, and appropriateness not only for claiming identities as landowners
but also broader access to the state.
4.7. State and Non-State Property Rights
I argue that state-recognized property rights have an important significance for smallholder
farmers because rights legitimize claim-making and strengthen their political identity as citizens.
94The two responses have an estimated Pearson Correlation Coefficient of 0.094 which is not statistically significant
(p-value: 0.5431).
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Central to this effect is the role of the state as the guarantor of legal rights and the relationship
between the citizen and the state which the right represents. However, what happens when the
state no longer plays an important role in the protection of individual property? Under my theory,
severing the relationship between the state and the individual that a property right presents should
drastically alter the meaning of a right, and therefore its symbolic effect. To explore this implication,
I briefly examine the experience of smallholders with non-state property rights that are regulated and
defined by a collective peasant community (Comunidad Campesina) in Ataquero, A´ncash. Within
the territory of Ataquero, families still have rights over individual property similar to those outside
the peasant community. However, state-recognized titles take on a different meaning and are of
much less importance than for other villages in A´ncash.
Peasant Communities are large agricultural communes that are collectively managed and
controlled by peasant farmers. They are most prevalent in the southern and central highlands of
Peru in areas with a majority of ethnically indigenous population. Many peasant communities,
particularly in the southern highlands, predate colonial occupation and have formal titles dating
from the period of the Spanish Crown (Burneo, 2013). Peasant communities have been recognized
constitutionally in Peru since 1920, although most have received official recognition and titles only
since the agrarian reform period in the 1970s (Watters, 1994; Lowenthal, 1983). As of 2016 there
were 6,248 peasant communities formally recognized in Peru, of which 5,137 also had collective title
over their lands (IBC, 2016).
The Ataquero community lies in the central valley of A´ncash, an hour’s ride by public
transportation from the department capital. The entirety of the Ataquero district is enclosed by
a collective title in the name of the Ecash peasant community, which itself encompasses several
other districts and is divided into 32 sectors, Ataquero being one of the largest. Community lands
in the Ataquero district were previously part of a large, private estate that covered the extent of
the district. Under the agrarian reform, these lands were expropriated in 1971 and redistributed
to the Ecash community, along with the lands from several other estates in neighboring districts.95
95Interview P2-4-ES.
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This relatively recent history follows a general trend of many peasant communities in the northern
highlands, which do not have a deep history of communal tenancy, unlike in the southern Andes
region (Huber, 1995).
Although collectively titled, agricultural lands in Ataquero are managed individually in a
similar way to many other peasant communities in both the northern and southern highlands (see
R´ıos Burranca, 2012; Burneo, 2013; Huber, 1995; Watters, 1994). Land is divided into two cat-
egories within the community: private and communal land.96 “Private” land (also referred to as
“inheritance” land), is agricultural land which was possessed by families prior the 1971 agrarian
reform, when most families in the area were sharecroppers and paid rent to the hacienda owner.
These lands are managed very similar to private property outside the community, and landholders
can transfer and dispose of their land freely with other community members (although transfers to
non-members are not permitted). Respondents also had a strong expectation that they would be
able to bequeath these private lands to their children.97 These lands also have a “certificate” issued
by the peasant community government that functions as the equivalent of a formal title.98
The other type of land is “communal” land, which is former hacienda land not possessed by a
peasant family prior to the 1971 reform.99 This land is typically high altitude grazing land, although
it can also comprise of unclaimed agricultural land at lower altitudes. Communal land is distributed
centrally by the peasant community government, and can potentially be redistributed every two
years when the community reassesses the land tenure situation. Although actual redistribution of
communal land happens infrequently, respondents all suggested that communal land had a much
lower expectation of tenure security than so-called “private” plots. Neither the “private” nor the
“communal” plots are eligible for state titling unless the community votes to separate out a plot
from the collective title.
The community government has jurisdiction over the regulation of both “private” and “com-
96Interviews P2-2-AH, P2-4-ES, P2-6-GC
97Interviews P2-3-ES, P2-4-ES, P2-7-GC




Accessing Citizenship: Legal Titles and Smallholding Peasants
munal” lands, and arbitrates all disputes involving land within the community’s collective title.100
At the same time, Ataquero also has a municipal government with concurrent jurisdiction over the
area. Interviews with local leaders and community members revealed that in practice, the commu-
nity government handles most issues involving land use and local governance, while the municipal
government coordinates states services such as water and local infrastructure.101 The municipal
government can also be involved in local security concerns, although several interviews boasted that
“not even the police can enter without the community’s permission.”102
It should be noted that while peasant communities like the one in Ataquero have a distinct
system of land rights, culturally and ethnically the peasants living in Ataquero are identical to
those living in other villages in A´ncash. Membership in the community is required to receive a
plot of communal land, but is optional and some members have decided to forgo access to grazing
land in favor of opportunities outside the district.103 It is common for community members living in
Ataquero to have private lands outside the community.104 Similarly, many peasants in other villages
in A´ncash often have membership in nearby communities even though they do not live there, which
allows them access to additional land for grazing or cultivation.105 This is a similar pattern to other
peasant communities, particularly in the coast and northern highlands (see R´ıos Burranca, 2012;
Burneo, 2013).
The perspective of Ataquero residents toward formal titles differs considerably from those
living outside the community. Unlike in other areas, none of the interviewees considered possession
of a formal title to be important nor did they consider titling programs to be relevant. As one
respondent remarked when asked about the importance of formal titles for individual land: “Since
[the land] is of the Community, they don’t matter to us.”106 Access to state services such as irrigation
districts or benefit projects was not mediated through formal titles or individual land holding, but
100Interviews P2-3-ES, 2-4-ES, 2-7-GC
101Interviews P 2-2-AH, P2-5A-GC, P2-4-ES
102Interview P2-4-ES, also interview P2-3-ES.
103Interview P2-3-ES
104Interviews P2-3-ES, P2-4-ES.
105Interviews P1-1A-AH, P1-2-AH, P3-7-GC, P3-4A-ES.
106Interview P2-2-AH “Como es de la comunidad, no nos importa.”
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rather through the community government which formed the primary channel for access these state
programs.107
Similar to other communities in the area, the peasants in Ataquero primarily participated in
politics as landowners, and membership in the community is synonymous with access to community
lands. Although all members possessed certificates distributed by the community government recog-
nizing their individual land rights, these certificates were not the main form of securing land tenure
or accessing benefits from the community. Rather, status as a “qualified” member (those with land,
and therefore a right to vote) and regular participation in assemblies and collective work (faenas)
was required.108 Not participating could potentially endanger one’s land rights and possibly risk
losing access to communal land.109
When asked to directly compare the“certificates” for land and formal state titles, all residents
felt that the community rights was equally strong as formal titles. This was the case for “inherited“
or“private” land that was in family possession before the reform, which most respondents considered
to be functionally the same as private land outside the community.110 The main difference in these
lands and private lands outside the community were taxes (members are not required to pay property
tax) and lack of access to credit. Some expressed that the community provided greater protection
and security for this kind of property: “Here solidarity makes us stronger, we all rise up whenever
theres a problem.”111 It was also not uncommon for respondents feel as if they were “owners” of
their private lands, even though the community held the formal title: “Yes, I am a landowner and
we live in the community, we have just one title as the Ecash community.”112 The exception was for
“communal” land, which most felt was less secure and required active participation,113 a perception
held by interviews in other areas.114
107Interviews P2-7-GC, P2-2-AH, P2-4-ES.
108Interviews 2-3-ES, 2-4-ES, 2-6-GC.
109Interviews 2-3-ES, 2-6-GC. Although respondents mentioned this in reference to “communal” land and not “private”
land that was held since the agrarian reform days.
110Interviews 2-2-AH, 2-3-ES
111Interview P 2-7-GC “aca´ es ma´s fuerza unio´n s´ı, todos se levantan cuando hay una problema.”
112Interview P2-7-GC “S´ı, soy duen˜o y que vivimos en la comunida, un solo t´ıtulo tenemos de la comunidad de Ecash.”
113Interviews P2-3-ES, P2-6-GC.
114Interviews P1-1A-AH, P1-3-AH, P1-5-ES.
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The above case is an informative comparison because it shows how legal property rights
help define the relationship between the individual and the state. When the role of the state in
recognizing and protecting individual property is removed, as in the case of the peasant community
in Ataquero, land rights take on a different meaning.115 Much like other villages in A´ncash, local
participation and politics revolve around land ownership and regulation. However, the political
relationship that is central for those in Ataquero is that between the member and the community;
the relationship with the state plays a much lesser role.
4.8. Conclusion
I began this chapter by proposing a question: why are legal titles so important for rural
peasants if the material benefits they provide are relatively slim? The argument I have developed
here forms the nucleus of my theory in Chapter 2 and the basis for understanding the role that
legal rights play more generally in modern, liberal societies. Put simply, rights are more than
just assets—they are also important symbols that justify claim-making and define the privileged
relationship between a citizen and the state.
Particularly for smallholder peasants, who in both Peru and Colombia have suffered from
systematic exclusion from formal state institutions, titles hold not only the promise of accessing
credit and benefit programs, but also of a closer relationship to the state and the benefits of citizen-
ship. I show remarkable consistency in this understanding of formal property rights and land titles
across both Peru and Colombia and in villages with strong and weak state presence. In all villages
I visited, titling and formal rights represented a stronger identity as an owner, a sense of progress
and modernization, and a greater claim to accessing state services and programs.
Titles also presented contradictions, as many of the perceived benefits of titling, including
tenure security and access to state programs, are typically resolved locally with informal documents.
115This is not to say that members of peasant communities have no interest in obtaining a state-recognized, formal
title for their individual lands. While respondents in Ataquero felt no need for individual titling, there have been
controversies on other peasant communities, particularly those in the coast, where members have tried to obtain
a formal title (Burneo, 2013; Cruzado Silveri, 2001; R´ıos Burranca, 2012). However, even in these cases, authors
have noted that community members still recognize the ultimate authority of community government to regulate
land (Burneo, 2013).
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Some of these responses are likely the result of overinflated expectations produced by government
efforts to promote titling programs. However, they also suggest that peasants draw meaning from
the formal title not simply because of a rational calculus of the economic benefits they can obtain,
but also from the political entitlements that the right symbolizes.
Finally, when the state is no longer a relevant actor in defining or protecting individual
property rights, the meaning of state-granted rights changes significantly. Smallholding farmers
in the peasant community in Ataquero, Peru still participate locally based on land ownership and
seek to secure rights to their land. However the important relationship is not with the state, but
with the political body that owes the duty to protect property. In their case, this is the peasant
community government which defines and regulates property rights and also arbitrates disputes
around property.
In the following chapter, I will seek to test some of the implications of the theory I laid out
in Chapter 2 and have developed further here. The evidence from interviews described above shows
that formal titles are indeed significant to beneficiaries of land titling and smallholding peasants in
parts of both Peru and Colombia. It also reveals that there is considerable overlap in how titles are
used and the meanings they convey in both contexts. However, whether these meanings or ideas
actually influence behavior requires further evidence and different methodology. Skeptics might
argue that peasants view titles favorably because of the high hopes of inclusion in the state that
they promise, but that when it comes to costly decision-making, peasants will only react to rational
expectations of the economic benefits that a title can reasonably afford. To verify my theory, I
employ data on land titling in both countries and measures of actual political behavior over time
to test whether formal titles can influence political engagement, and if these changes are likely
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5.1. Introduction
Legal property rights are highly meaningful as symbols of citizenship and markers of just
claims. However, can rights qua symbols actually empower political participation? Or do they only
influence behavior by changing expectations of tenure security and material benefits? In previous
chapters, I have argued that legal property rights provide meaning to peasant farmers in Peru
and Colombia when construing political identities, their relationship with the state, and legitimate
claim-making. But can the idea of a right as a just claim affect behavior even in the absence of
a material benefit? A skeptic may argue that while legal rights have a certain rhetorical value for
rural smallholders, this is essentially “cheap talk.” Under this perspective, actors will ultimately
make decisions based not on symbolic ideals but rather on rational expectations of economic benefits
and material self-interest. This chapter provides evidence that the symbolic effect of legal titles not
only provides meaning, but also influences actual behavior of peasant farmers. Specifically, I show
that titling is associated with increases in political engagement in both countries over time and that
this effect is strongest in areas where property rights protections are the weakest—precisely where
formal titles provide the fewest material benefits for landholders.
I demonstrate this “symbolic effect” using original panel data on land titling in Peru and
Colombia and a difference-in-differences statistical model to estimate the impact of changes in legal
rights on political participation over time. This method allows me to compare rates of political
engagement in areas before and after titling, thereby isolating a change in de jure legal rights that
does not otherwise affect de facto land holdings.
I also rely on two additional methodological strategies to provide further evidence on the
symbolic effect of rights. First, I triangulate data over two different countries and a variety of
outcome measures to eliminate alternative explanations and test the external validity of my results.
An examination of Peru and Colombia as parallel cases and which covers multiple forms of political
engagement, including electoral participation, demand for judicial protection, and behavioral survey
results, provides greater confidence that my results are not due to idiosyncratic factors related to
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one country or measure. Second, I exploit variation in local state capacity to enforce property rights
to better isolate the symbolic effect from the material effect of rights. I do so by comparing the
impact of titling in districts with weak rights enforcement with those where enforcement is relatively
robust. This allows me to eliminate any residual changes in economic value that titling may provide,
under the assumption that the material benefits of titling are related to the institutional capacity
of the state to enforce property rights.
Consistent with my theory, I find evidence that legal rights do have an empowering effect,
but which is only expressed in areas of weak rights enforcement. The estimated effect on behavior is
also far from inconsequential. For districts with the weakest levels of enforcement, titling increases
electoral turnout from 0.94 to 3.21 percentage points on average, and can increase demand for
courts by as much as 33.26 percent. Conversely, similar titling efforts in areas with strong state
enforcement have little effect in Peru and may result in a decrease in engagement for Colombia.
Given the political popularity of land titling programs, changes in turnout rates could be
an indication that incumbent politicians are using titling similar to a targeted benefit to gain an
electoral advantage. While I do find that titling is associated with an increase in vote share,
this change follows the same patterns of prior results, and is manifest only in areas where rights
enforcement is weak and titles provide little material benefit. In addition, the gains in vote share
are primarily for national candidates, while increases in overall participation concentrate on local
elections (which likely have greater relevance for protection of local property rights), thus indicating
the change in participation is distinct from any increase in support for incumbent candidates.
Finally, I find that titling increases reported political engagement for survey responses re-
garding interest in politics, political discussions, and willingness to access state institutions. Again
these effects occur only in areas of weak enforcement. This dynamic is likely related to the potential
for rights to increase legitimate grievances in such areas, as I also find some evidence that titling
leads to lower levels of trust toward the state in these same districts. While all results are observa-
tional, and thus cannot show causality without additional assumptions, they are robust to a variety
of tests for parallel trends assumptions and alternative model specifications.
145
Legitimate Grievances: Legal Property Rights and Political Engagement
5.2. Theoretical Predictions and Hypotheses
There are two empirical claims which I verify in this chapter. The first is that rights have
a “symbolic effect” on individual political behavior. Legal rights are highly significant political
institutions that provide both moral justifications for claims (Dworkin, 1977; Scheingold, 2010) and
define citizenship (Turner, 1997; Holston, 2008) and the relationship between the individual and the
state. When the state recognizes new legal rights, this symbolic effect can then increase willingness to
participate in politics, either by empowering the new rights-bearer’s sense of legitimacy and fairness
in making public claims toward the state, or by increasing the perceived legitimacy of the state
itself (see discussion Chapter 2). This “symbolic effect” is conceptually distinct from what I term
the “material effect” of rights—which is a change in behavior resulting from the change in material
benefits directly related to the property itself. This would include changes in expected assets,
economic value, or access to land. This also includes the probability of successfully accessing state
institutions for protecting a right (e.g. increased tenure security), or in the strength of the state’s
commitment to refrain from encroaching on an entitlement (e.g. protection from expropriation).
My second empirical claim is that the symbolic effect has the greatest potential to influence
behavior where rights enforcement is the weakest. While I discuss this theoretical argument at
length in Chapter 2, it deserves some additional attention here as it is key to my empirical strategy
for differentiating the symbolic and material effects. Either of these channels can increase the
potential for an individual to make a claim. The symbolic value increases a right-bearer’s sense
of political entitlement and perception that he or she “ought” to make a claim for protection.
Similarly, the material effect can increase claim-making by increasing the expected likelihood of
making a successful claim before state institutions (Priest and Klein, 1984; Cooter and Rubinfeld,
1989).
However, additional factors—primarily the expectation that the right will be enforced—will
determine whether rights-recognition will translate into increased political engagement. The exact
nature of this expectation of enforcement will depend on the specific right in question and on each
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individual’s subjective experience with the state. High expectations of enforcement may result from
prior beliefs that state institutions (e.g. courts, prosecutors, ombudspersons, etc.) function properly
and effectively, or could result from the belief that there is a political will to guarantee a specific
right or protect rights for a particular group (based on ethnicity, social class, etc.).
Where expectations for enforcement are high, rights-recognition will provide increased secu-
rity that a claim or right can be fully enjoyed. Rights-bearers will thus feel more confident that
state institutions will guarantee their right, and that third parties will respect their right under
fear of sanction. Therefore rights-bearers will not need to engage in additional, costly actions to
protect rights, absent an external threat. This could lead either to no change in participation or
less engagement if rights-bearers feel sufficiently secure. However, if expectations of enforcement
are low, new rights-bearers will have a just claim, but a claim which is precarious and vulnerable
to encroachment. This will effectively create a legitimate grievance against incentivize political
engagement claim-making toward the state (Table 2.1 in Chapter 2 provides a breakdown of these
two hypotheses).
It is also important to note that by comparing the impact of titling across areas with different
expectations of enforcement, we can effectively isolate the symbolic effect of rights for areas of weak
enforcement. This is because when rights guarantees are lax, a formal, legal title is effectively a
worthless scrap of paper. Under such conditions, titling should not change the probability of state
enforcement or otherwise alter expectations that a property right will be effectively enjoyed (Firmin-
Sellers, 1995). Therefore, legal titles should produce no change in behavior through the material
effect. However, the new legal right still provides a symbolic, political entitlement in the form of
just claim and a strengthened political identity that can incentivize engagement and claim-making
toward the state.
147
Legitimate Grievances: Legal Property Rights and Political Engagement
5.3. Methodology and Data
5.3.1. Land Titling
My analysis centers on two original, panel datasets of land titling in Peru and Colombia.
For Peru, the massive, rural titling program known as the Proyecto de Titulacio´n y Registro de
Tierras Rurales (PTRT; Rural Land Titling and Registration Project), was one of Latin America’s
earliest and most extensive land titling policies. Between 1996 and 2007, this ambitious program
measured, registered, and titled 725,894 rural properties, mostly in Peru’s coastal and highland
regions. Data from Peru comes from the official land titling cadastre of the Organismo de Formal-
izacio´n de la Propiedad Individual (COFOPRI), the government agency charged with coordinating
rural land tilting after 2007.1 COFOPRI’s land cadastre contains a record of all applications for
land formalization since the initiation of the first two waves of massive titling during the PTRT,
which correspond to the years 1996-2000 and 2001-2007 and which are the focus of my analysis. I
accessed data from the cadastre through a web scraping program which repeatedly queried publicly
available records on the COFOPRI website, producing a database of 2,917,483 observations for years
1996-2016. Each observation corresponds to a property registered through the PTRT project, and
includes incomplete and rejected applications, successfully titled properties, and previously titled
land. I purged this dataset of all failed applications, duplicate entries, previously titled properties,
and titles pertaining to non-individual property holders, such as state entities, large cooperatives,
indigenous communities, and other collective organizations. The final dataset contains records for
725,894 families benefited between 1996 and 2007.
For Colombia, titling was conducted under the Land Allocation and Titling Program which
exclusively granted titles to smallholding individuals in peaceful possession of state lands and with
limited economic assets.2 After the passage of the main source of agrarian legislation, the Law 160
1Prior to 2007, the rural land titling registry was coordinated through a separate government agency, the Proyecto
Especial de Titulacio´n de TierrasPETT, which was dissolved in 2007. At that time, management for rural titling
was transferred to COFOPRI.
2Law 160 of 1994, art. 71 limits adjudications to individuals whose total assets do not exceed 1,000 monthly minimum
salaries.
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of 1994, the program was initially promoted under the Colombian Institute for Agrarian Reform
(INCORA). Later, competency for titling was transferred to the Colombian Institute for Rural
Development (INCODER) in 2003. I include data from titling of state lands conducted from 1994-
2015, which constitute the main years of the titling program between the passage of Law 160 and
the end of the program with the dissolution of INCODER and the formation of the new National
Land Agency.3 In total, the titling program granted far fewer titles that Peruvian titling efforts,
with only a total of 167,465 titles distributed.
A full description of each program is included in Chapter 4. However, it is important to
highlight here that there is one key difference in the two titling programs that may affect my
analysis, aside from the overall extent of each programs’ respective reach. Specifically, the Peruvian
program utilized a massive “broad sweep” methodology that titled or registered all rural property
within a given geographic zone, while the Colombian program was targeted and titled only in areas
where landholders specifically sought land titling. While I do not expect these differences to alter my
theoretical predictions on the direction of the symbolic effect, they do suggest that Peru might be a
more “difficult” case (i.e. lesser magnitude) for my theory relative to Colombia. This is because the
requirement for prior organization to petition titling in Colombia could potentially prime peasant
farmers on the benefits of engaging with the state, and specifically over issues involving property
rights. Self-selection into the program may also select for peasants who already value legal titles
and are therefore more attuned to the symbolic value of property rights. These differences mirror
experience with mobilization around rural issues between the two countries. An extensive agrarian
reform under the Velasco administration in Peru largely dampened rural mobilizations by satisfying
demand for access to land among peasants (McClintock, 1989). In contrast, Colombia’s limited
land reform efforts, which were soon redirected toward land titling, left greater unmet demand that
in turn sparked a greater degree of peasant mobilization in the countryside (Zamosc, 1989). Due to
these difference, I expect that evidence and effects sizes should be larger in Colombia, while Peru
3The National Land Agency is currently piloting a new titling program based on the Peruvian PTRT and which will
significantly increase the amount of future titles granted. As of the end of 2018 this new project has not yet begun
normal operations.
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Peru Colombia
Program/Agency PTRT I & II INCODER
Years 1996-2007 1994-2015
Titles Distributed 725,894 167,465
Districts Benefitted 998 546
Selection Method Broad sweep Targeted, based on local demand
Table 5.1.: Comparison of the titling programs in Peru and Colombia.
should offer a hard test case in which positive results will be strong initial evidence for my theory.
A comparison of the two titling programs in summarized in Table 5.1 below.
The independent variable of interest for this study is a measure of the intensity of land
formalization through the respective land titling programs in each country. I construct the titling
intensity measure by dividing the total number of land titles distributed in a given observation-year
by the district’s population according to the latest census following the end of titling (2007 census
in Peru; 2015 census in Colombia). This results in a measurement from 0 to 1 that captures the
intensity of land titling efforts relative to the size of the district. The use of a time-invariant measure
of population also ensures that variation in intensity over time only responds to titling efforts, and
not to migration.
Figure 5.1 below show the geographic distribution of titling intensity throughout Peru and
Colombia for the final year in each data set. Tables 5.3 and 5.2 show a breakdown of the summary
statistics for each dataset.4 As can be seen, the majority of the district-year observations in each
dataset report little or no titling. However, the areas that primarily benefited from titling were
distributed throughout the principal regions of agricultural production in each country. In Peru,
this was primarily in the fertile river valleys of the coast and the central and northern highlands.
Meanwhile in Colombia, titling centered on the central highlands, the northern coast, and the
4Figures A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix also show the distribution of titling intensity in the entire dataset
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Figure 5.1.: Geographic distribution of titling intensity in Left: Peru (total as of 2007), and Right:
Colombia (total as of 2015), as a proportion of district population.
eastern plains.
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Table 5.2.: Summary statistics for Peru data set, segregated by districts with tiling (titling intensity
≥ 0.01) and those without titling during the period of 1996-2007. Mean values are given
for each subset of the data with standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table 5.3.: Summary statistics for Colombia data set, segregated by municipalities with tiling (titling
intensity ≥ 0.01) and those without titling during the period of 2000-2015. Mean values
are given for each subset of the data with standard deviations in parentheses.
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5.3.2. Political Engagement
I use a broad definition of political participation that encompasses all forms of political
engagement with the state. Thus, I include any participation before state institutions and claim-
making toward the state, but exclude other forms of political participation before non-state fora,
such as participation in local community or social organizations. This is because the state is the
key source of both rights-recognition and also bears the corresponding duty to protect legal rights.
Therefore, other forms of political participation or collective action not directed at the state will
not be as strongly affected.
In order to try and capture the full effect of legal rights on different forms of political en-
gagement, I triangulate results over a series of different outcome measures. The principal outcome
I examine is political participation in local and national elections. Electoral results have a benefit
of providing reliable data on participation for a wide set of districts and covering a long period of
time, including the main years of both titling programs. In addition, I test the impact of titling on
judicial demand as an alternative form of claim-making for state protection. For this data, I use
the number of new cases presented to trial courts in Colombia (systematic data on court usage is
not available for Peru). Finally, I draw on existing survey data including questions on both political
behavior and attitudes. I use these data to supplement my other findings, as survey questions can
explore multiple forms of political engagement and interest. I can also verify the mechanism in my
theory that rights-recognition can lead to legitimate grievances in areas of weak enforcement by
testing the effect of titling on political attitudes and trust toward the state.
5.3.3. Enforcement
My theory predicts a conditional impact of titling on political behavior depending on an indi-
vidual’s expectation that legal property rights are adequately enforced. Variation in the enforcement
of legal property rights is also important for my methodological strategy to isolate the impact of
the symbolic effect of rights. While expectations of enforcement are subjective and vary depending
on an individual’s personal identity and experience with the state, an objective measurement of en-
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forcement is much more appropriate for purposes of comparison. The capacity and strength of local
state institutions that serve to protect property rights, namely police, courts, and the judiciary, are
the closest to a standardized, objective variable that could proxy for this expectation. The literature
on the political economy of property rights have frequently highlighted these institutions as key for
protecting property rights (Besley and Ghatak, 2010: 4559), and local variation in the strength or
presence of these institutions will have the greatest impact on the ability of an individual to enforce
a legal right.
It should also be noted that the conceptual variable I wish to capture here is local state
capacity to enforce legal property rights. This is to isolate the impact of the change in legal status
of a property claim and a property owner. There are many additional factors that could contribute
to overall tenure security (i.e. economic property rights), such as informal or non-state institutions
(Ellickson, 1986; Milgrom, North, and Weingast, 1990; Alston, Harris, and Mueller, 2012), physical
barriers (Hornbeck, 2010), or political connections (Frye, 2004; Gehlbach and Keefer, 2011). These
alternative methods for securing tenure are unlikely to be immediately affected by a change in legal
status, and are therefore not the focus of my study.
Unfortunately, there are no consistent measures of local state capacity to enforce legal prop-
erty rights for both countries, particularly for rural districts. Therefore, I draw on different sources
of information for each case. For Peru, I use data on the presence of Rondas Campesinas (peas-
ant watch groups) from the 1993 Agricultural Census as a reasonable proxy. These groups are
self-defense forces that were originally organized by remote rural communities in Cajamarca during
the decade of the 1980s in response to cattle rustling and theft in areas with chronic lack of state
presence (Gitlitz and Rojas, 1983; Huber, 1995). Since the 1980s, this form of community-driven
policing has spread to many other regions, and forms a principal source of security and protection for
property rights in remote villages (Starn, 1999). These Rondas Campesinas emerged in situations of
endemic weak institutions and lack of protections for property which would be highly determinative
of expectations of enforcement (see Chapter 4 for a longer discussion on the history of these groups).
I code this variable as a proportion of positive responses to the 1993 census question. I then invert
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the scale so that the final coding ranges from 0 (weak institutions) to 1 (strong institutions).
For Colombia, I use a more direct measure that captures the effectiveness of local judicial
institutions provided by Gac´ıa Villegas and Espinosa (2013), who construct an index of judicial
capacity for Colombian municipalities. I use judicial institutions to proxy for the local state insti-
tutional environment, as courts play a key role in protecting and enforcing property rights. This
measure captures local knowledge about the relative presence, accessibility and effectiveness of
courts in resolving disputes. Local property owners likely rely on this information to determine
whether a land controversy will reach a swift and effective resolution in courts or whether such
cases will languish in the judiciary for many years. Gac´ıa Villegas and Espinosa (2013) create this
index based on two underlying variables: (1) the number of judges permanently stationed in a
municipality (relative to municipal population and area) and (2) the rate at which the judiciary
resolves homicide cases within a municipality. The measurement produces an index which ranges
from 0 to 1, with actual values for Colombian municipalities falling between 0.0 (no courts operating
in a municipality) and 0.647 (highly effective courts).
Both measures are time-invariant, and therefore I compare variation in titling over time
between districts with different levels of local institutional strength. A time-invariant measure of
local state capacity is appropriate given the assumption that institutions are generally “sticky” and
tend to evolve slowly over time (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001).5 Both measures provide
wide-coverage for nearly all the districts in each data set and ample variation to test the interaction
between titling and political engagement. Figure 5.2 shows the geographical distribution of the
institutional measurements in Peru and Colombia, respectively.
One concern with testing variation in local institutional strength is that titling and local state
capacity may be correlated. This could result if titling targets specifically those districts that are
the most remote and with the weakest state presence (and where informality may be particularly
high), or if officials prioritized titling in areas that were relatively more accessible, and thus with
5This is also consistent with the position of authors of other institutional datasets which generally caution against
analyzing the variance in institutional strength measures over time (see e.g. Treisman, 2007; Kaufmann, Kraay,
and Mastruzzi, 2011)
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Figure 5.2.: Geographic distribution of institutional strength measure for Left: Rondas Campesinas
in Peru (total as of 2007), and Right: local judicial institutions index in Colombia.
This variable is coded 0 (weak) to 1 (strength) for the presence and effectiveness of
state institutions within a district.
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stronger state institutions. A comparison of the bivariate distribution of the institutional strength
measures and titling however show that there is common support for both variables and there is
a very weak correlation between either variable.6 Additional concerns include whether results are
affected by to the presence of a few outlier districts in Colombia (with relatively strong institutions),
or that the measurements may proxy for different variables related to political engagement, such
as pre-existing human capital or informal institutions (Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti, 1994). I
therefore run a series of robustness checks on alternative measures and specifications in Section 5.8
below.
5.3.4. Estimation Technique
For my statistical analyses, I employ a difference-in-differences design to estimate the local
average treatment effect of land formalization in benefited districts. For electoral and judiciary
outcomes, I estimate the effect of all titling within a district for a given year on district-level
outcomes. For survey data, I pool individual-level responses at the district-level to estimate the
average effect of titling within districts on political behavior and attitudes. My main estimand
captures the intent-to-treat effect of the titling program on treated districts, and thereby estimates
the average effect of titling in districts which have benefited from some titling during the years in
the data set.
The model which I use to estimate the district-level effects of titling is the following:





d,t + d,t (5.1)
Here, d indexes districts (the lowest level of elected government in both countries, distritos
in Peru and municipios in Colombia) and t indexes years. The Dd,t variable is the policy intensity
measurement for the proportion of a district benefited by titling in a given observation-year, accord-
ing to the criteria outlined above. I estimate the conditional effect of titling intensity on the quality
6See Appendix Figures A.4 and A.3. For Peru, the correlation between Rondas and with titling in 2007 (the end of
the data set) is 0.054 , while in Colombia the correlation between judicial institutions and titling in 2015 is -0.096
.
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of local state institutions by interacting the policy intensity variable with Institutionsd. This is a
time-invariant measure of the quality of and access to local state institutions that are significant for
protecting property rights (Rondas Campesinas in Peru and local courts in Colombia). I include
district and year fixed effects in all models and two-way clustering of standard errors for both dis-
tricts and years. As I do not have a time-variant measure of institutional strength, I include only
the interaction of titling with institutions, and not the institutional variable directly, as any direct
effect of institutions on outcomes is already accounted for by district fixed effects. The coefficient
estimates of interest are δ, which estimates the marginal effect of titling, and λ, which estimates





d,t includes a series of district-level controls for confounding variables
that are likely correlated with both titling intensity and political engagement. Unfortunately, there
are no data on time-variant characteristics of Peruvian districts that cover the years in the panel.
Therefore, my analysis of Peruvian electoral data only controls for time-invariant, cross-sectional
variation between districts and variation in time over years through district and year fixed effects.
For survey data in Peru, I utilize a measure of a district’s level of economic development using the
ENAHO survey’s time-variant estimate of the poverty level of a given district. While this is an
unavoidable limitation of my estimation strategy, the broad coverage and easy access of the tilting
policy under the PTRT program limits concerns for selection effects and bias due to unobserved
trends over time (see below).
Data for time-variant, district-level measures for Colombia have better coverage, and I thus
control for trends in economic development and experience with violence due to the armed conflict.
First, I include a measurement of total municipal income and the GDP per capita of the district as
controls for economic development. Due to the highly skewed distribution of these variables across
Colombian municipalities, I use a natural log transformation. Both of these measures are from the
Los Andes University Data Center’s (CEDE) Municipal Panel data set. A municipality’s experience
with Colombia’s internal armed conflict may also suppress access to the polls and courts as well
as formalization efforts. To account for this, I include controls for the presence of armed actors,
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number of reported displaced persons, and number of reported victims of violence attributable to
the armed conflict. The first of these measures is an indicator variable for reported presence of an
illegal armed actor from the CEDE’s Municipal Panel, which indicates the presence of one or more
armed groups, including guerrilla (FARC, ELN, etc.), Paramilitary, narco-trafficking, and so-called
emerging criminal bands (BACRIM, for the acronym in Spanish). The final two measurements
are from the Colombian Government’s National Registry of Victims, and consist of the number of
displaced persons fleeing a municipality and the number of victims of violence as reported to the
Colombian Government’s National Information Network on victims. I use a log transformation of
both variables.
I employ a similar model as the one above to estimate titling effects on survey outcomes.
However, I pool survey responses at the district-level to estimate the average effect of titling within
a district on individual-level responses:










i,t + i,d,t (5.2)
Here, i indexes individual respondents and d indexes for districts. The additional term∑
c ηcx
c
i,t consist of individual-level covariates for purposes of increasing precision. Specifically, I
include individual-level covariates for a respondent’s gender, age, education, experience with the
armed conflict (Colombia only), and level of community trust.7 Other specifications are similar to
the electoral and judicial models, including district and year fixed effects, district-level covariates,
and clustered standard errors. Finally, given that the number of survey respondents varies between
districts in both countries, I also weight my regression analysis using inverse probability weights
constructed based on the inverse of the sample size within each district-year of the survey.
In order to show unbiased estimates of causal effects, the difference-in-differences method
relies on the assumption that unobserved differences between titled and non-titled districts follow
7These covariates serve to increase the precision of coefficient estimates, but since I estimate district-level treatment
effects, they do not otherwise alter assumptions required for causal identification (Angrist and Pischke, 2008).
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similar trends over time (ie. parallel trends in unobservables). Given the different implementation
methods and reach of the respective titling programs in either country, the set of assumptions
needed to show causality is different for each case. For Peru, the identifying assumptions are
weaker. During the first two PTRT projects from 1996-2007 analyzed here, officials conducted land
titling on a massive scale though a “broad sweep” strategy which attempted to formalize all eligible
properties in a large geographic area. This strategy, while not eliminating all concerns of selection
bias, reduced the amount of individual selection into the land titling program. In a benefited area,
titles were provided free of charge to all those currently in peaceful possession of rural land and
not in legal dispute over ownership or boundaries. Interviews with beneficiaries and former officials
also support the conclusion that the titling project, where implemented, reached most rural land
holders in targeted areas (see Chapter 4).
For the INCODER titling program in Colombia, identification assumptions are relatively
stronger due to two possible sources of selection bias. First, the process of site selection for new
areas to formalize was the result of a coordination between regional INCODER offices and local
mayors. Therefore, correlations in the timing of titling and changes in political participation might
be due to strategic timing by local politicians. Formalization programs might also be timed with
other development programs in the same municipality through coordinated efforts of various national
agencies to both formalize land tenure and initiate coterminous development projects or subsidies.
Second, individuals self-selected into the formalization program, which while open for all land owners
who could meet the legal requirements and contribute a modest amount toward land surveying
fees, required landholders to apply to the program. Coverage was therefore not as complete as in
Peru, although INCODER officials often attempted to reach as many land holders as possible in
intervention areas to reduce costs.
The above sources of unobserved heterogeneity over time are factors that I attempt to control
for, but which unfortunately I cannot eliminate entirely given the observational nature of the data.
However, to account for the potential for selection effects and problems with incomparability between
titled and non-titled districts, I run an additional model for each outcome limiting the data set to
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only districts that experienced some titling. This restricts comparison to districts that were early
beneficiaries to those that were late beneficiaries, making them more comparable groups. I also run a
number of checks to specifically test parallel trend assumptions, which assume trends in unobserved
covariates are parallel between titled and non-titled districts. I conduct three separate tests which
together show good support for this assumption, and which I discuss in section 5.8.1 below.
One final limitation that I am unable to account for, and which merits some discussion is the
potential for bias from the ecological inference fallacy. Specifically, it is possible that district-level
effect estimates are the result of behavioral changes not from those benefiting from titling, but from
other individuals who were not eligible for the program or whose interests were affected indirectly by
the titling process.8 Such would be the case, for example, if land titling significantly altered existing
property lines of already titled property owners or if non-benefitted peasants began mobilizing for
additional titling.
In Peru, the latter is of less concern as interviews with beneficiaries and officials both agree
that coverage in titling areas was broad and included nearly all the residents in a given zone.9 For
Colombia, coverage was relatively low in comparison. However, interviews with beneficiaries there
indicated that those not benefiting from titling generally did so either because they believed the
state institutions would not actually fulfill their promise to grant formal titles, or because they
believed the title was not sufficiently important.10 In both cases, all respondents claimed that the
titling program did not cause conflict with or otherwise affect the lives of non-beneficiaries,11 which
supports the assumption that the primary effect I am measuring in this analysis is that of titling
on actual beneficiaries.
8More concretely, there are three types of residents whose interests would be affected by land titling: (1) informal
land holders benefiting from titling; (2) informal land holders ineligible or uninterested in land titling; and (3)
formal land holders who already posses full title.
9See interviews P1-7A-GC; P4-2-AH; PE-1-17; PE-4-15
10E.g. interviews C6-5-NR; C3-3-JM
11E.g. interviews P4-1A-AH; P4-2-AH; C6-6-NR; C3-3-JM; C3-2A-NR
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5.4. Electoral Participation
Voting is one of the principal forms of political participation in both countries and is a
consistent moment in which citizens have the opportunity to engage politically with the state.
Electoral results also provide a convenient source of data for an initial analysis, as reliable, district-
level records of electoral results since 2000 exist for each country.
Despite much research, there are many questions remaining regarding why individuals turn
out to vote. Many scholars have noted that rational choice models of voter participation often fail
to explain why voters participate in elections at all (e.g. Aldrich, 1993), as the material benefits
and costs associated with voting are too small to be meaningful under an instrumental calculus.
Socioeconomic status has strong predictive power in the United States and Europe (e.g. Brady,
Verba, and Schlozman, 1995), but has proven less accurate in Latin America (Fornos, Power, and
Garand, 2004; Blais, 2006), and in either case do not explain how people of similar backgrounds
decide to vote or not. Expressive theories that rely on subjective preferences to determine whether
individuals participate have had relatively more success in providing a theoretically sound and
empirically founded explanation. Under these theories, turnout depends on subjective perceptions
such as a sense of duty (Fiorina, 1976), legitimacy of the state (Tyler, 2006; Levi, 1997), or social
pressure (Gerber, Green, and Larimer, 2008; Bond et al., 2012). These views coincide with my own
theory, as I predict that rights-recognition strengthens subjective preferences for engaging with the
state.
As noted in Table 2.1 in Chapter 2, I predict that titling should increase political participation
in a district, but only in areas with weak local institutions where the state is relatively incapable of
enforcing legal property rights. Given that I am primarily interested in finding a differential effect
of titling dependent of local institutions, the main coefficient estimates of my statistical analysis are
those for the titling variable and the interaction between titling and local institutions variable.12
12As noted above, all models include district-level fixed effects which controls for all time-invariant variation in
unobserved covariates at the district-level. The institutions variable is time-invariant, and therefore I do not
estimate this coefficient directly, as it is already subsumed by the fixed-effects model.
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I expect the direction of the titling coefficient to be positive, which would indicate an increase in
participation at low levels of institutional strength, and the interaction coefficient to be negative.
I focus primarily on turnout in municipal elections for both countries. Municipal elections
are particularly relevant for the case of property rights, as local decision-making and policies set by
district mayors have strong influence on the protection of rural property and regulating land use.
As a further test, I also examine data for participation in national presidential elections. While
disconnected from immediate concerns for protection of property, these elections could capture a
broader effect of political entitlement beyond immediate concerns related to land rights. For both
countries, electoral data are measured at the district-level and come from official statistics collected
by the National Office of Electoral Processes (Peru) or the National Registry of the Civilian State
(Colombia). Data for municipal elections is available in Peru for 1995-2010 and in Colombia for
2000-2015. Unfortunately, district-level data for presidential elections is only available in Peru
starting in the period after the end of the Fujimori regime in 2001, which limits analysis to the
period of 2001-2011.
My primary prediction is for the direction of the titling (positive) and interaction coefficient
estimates (negative) in my models. While the magnitude of the effect does not have direct relevance
for my theory, there is reason to believe that effect sizes will be larger in Colombia. This is due to
two reasons. First, as mentioned above, Colombia titling required an active solicitation on behalf
of beneficiaries, and therefore this prior mobilization likely selects for individuals who highly value
titles for either symbolic or material reasons. In addition, Peru has mandatory voting laws which
will likely mitigate the effect of additional incentives to turnout. Despite this requirement, there is
still a high degree of variation across districts and over time and which is comparable with turnout
rates in Colombia.13
13Overall turnout rates are higher in Peru, which has a mean turnout of 79.17% over the districts in the data set,
while the mean for Colombia is 64.47%. However, variation is still high in Peru, with a the standard deviation in
turnout rates at 12.01, which is even slightly higher than Colombia (10.50).
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5.4.1. Results
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 show results for electoral participation in Peru and Colombia respectively.
All models include fixed effects for districts and electoral years and clustered standard errors. For
Colombia, where time-variant data is available for district-level covariates, I include reduced form
models and complete models with control covariates included. Models (2) and (4) in Table 5.4
(Peru), and (4) and (8) in Table 5.5 (Colombia), provide a more restricted test on a subset of
districts that benefited from titling during the period under analysis. These models are fully-
specified and provide the strongest evidence of the effect of titling, as they only compare early and
late benefited districts. Due to data limitations for covariates on the presence of armed actors and
district-level GDP, which are only available for half of the years in the dataset, I include these
variables only in models (3) and (7).
Models for municipal electoral turnout show results exactly as predicted, with a positive
coefficient for titling (positive effect in areas of weak institutions), and a negative interaction term.
Both coefficient estimates are also statistically significant for all models, with the exception of model
(3) for Colombia, which reduces the years in the dataset by half due to limitations in available data
for covariates. Results are mixed however, for presidential elections. The PTRT program seems
to provide no effect on turnout for national elections after 2001, however results from Colombia
show a consistent and strong effect across both municipal and national elections. This suggests
that the effect of political engagement may be concentrated in local elections, which, as I argue
above, are more significant for defending property rights. Thus titling may not have a broader
empowerment effect on participation when engagement is not closely related to the protection of
property interests.14
14Results may also be due to weaker power in the presidential models for Peru (which relies on fewer years of data)
and a weaker effect overall there as noted above.
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Dependent variable:
Turnout (Muni.) Turnout (Pres.)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Titling 0.101∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.002 0.001
(0.040) (0.040) (0.029) (0.028)
Tit.:Rondas −0.106∗∗ −0.106∗∗ −0.015 −0.011
(0.042) (0.043) (0.031) (0.031)
Years 5 5 3 3
Districts 1543 642 1731 749
Start Year 1995 1995 2001 2001
End Year 2010 2010 2011 2011
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Titled Only No Yes No Yes
Observations 7,698 3,204 5,004 2,140
Adjusted R2 0.673 0.688 0.752 0.751
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 5.4.: Main regression results for electoral turnout in Peru. Difference-in-differences analysis of
the conditional effects of titling interacted with local state institutional strength (Ron-
das Campesinas) for turnout in municipal (Models 1-2) and presidential (Models 3-4)
elections.
To better interpret the interaction effect for electoral turnout, I include plots of the marginal
effect of titling for different values of local institutional strength in Figure 5.3.15 As can be seen
from the plots, municipal turnout in both countries and presidential turnout in Colombia follow the
pattern predicted by my theory, with positive effects at weak levels of institutional strength that
gradually reduce to zero where institutions are relatively more robust. Interestingly, the marginal
effect estimates for Colombia suggest that titling for districts at very high levels of local institutions
actually has a negative effect on participation. However, the confidence interval bounds are quite
large for the effect of titling at higher levels of institutional strength, and therefore these predicted
marginal effect sizes should be interpreted as indistinguishable from zero.16
15Note that due to the different distribution in the titling and institutional weakness measures (neither variable reaches
the theoretical maximum of 1 on the scale for Colombia), the magnitude of coefficient estimates are difficult to
compare between countries. I calculate predicted effect sizes below for a proper comparison. However, I also test
models with rescaled variables to better compare estimates. These alternative models produce substantively and
statically similar results, and are available on request.
16The number of observations at higher levels of institutional strength is small, so further testing in areas of stronger
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The size of the effect on turnout is substantial. In order to get a comparative sense of these
effects, I calculate the predicted effect of turnout for two types of districts: one each from the top and
bottom 20% of the distribution of the institutional strength variable. I then calculate the predicted
change in turnout from moving from no titling to the mean-level of titling for those districts in the
data set. In Peru, the effect on increasing turnout is positive, although relatively modest, leading
to an average of 0.94 percentage point increase for areas of weak enforcement, and 0.13 percentage
points for districts with strong enforcement. The estimated effects for turnout in Colombia are
much higher than Peru, resulting in a gain of 2.33 for municipal turnout and 3.21 percentage
points for national turnout in districts with weak enforcement. However, these predicted effects are
negative in districts with strong enforcement, reducing turnout by -1.2 for municipal turnout and
-1.79 percentage points for national turnout. As noted above, the negative effects at higher levels
of institutional strength are imprecisely estimated and indistinguishable from zero. Therefore, they
may indicate that titling has a null effect on participation in areas of strong state institutions.
institutions is warranted. If this negative effect exists, it may be due to the positive effect of titling on tenure
security in such areas, which may be sufficiently strong to completely counter-act any symbolic effect by obviating
the perceived need for “costly” political participation. This effect would imply that those with very secure tenure
feel less need to participate in politics (see Engelhardt et al., 2010; Dosh, 2010), indicating that political entitlement
works primarily through causing a perceived sense of grievance for vulnerable rights. However, the negative estimate
is unlikely due to the presence of a few outlier municipalities with very strong institutions scores in the Colombia


































Turnout (Muni.) Turnout (Pres.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Titling 1.127∗∗∗ 1.168∗∗∗ 0.933 0.858∗∗ 1.904∗∗∗ 2.044∗∗∗ 3.221∗∗∗ 1.173∗∗∗
(0.335) (0.344) (0.616) (0.334) (0.403) (0.435) (0.926) (0.336)
Titling:Jud. Inst. −7.896∗∗ −8.366∗∗ −5.491 −7.145∗∗ −11.829∗∗∗ −13.010∗∗∗ −18.801 −10.025∗
(3.548) (3.657) (9.033) (3.612) (4.515) (4.729) (12.861) (5.366)
Rural −0.015 −0.138 −0.143∗ 0.059 0.074 −0.016
(0.082) (0.096) (0.079) (0.068) (0.127) (0.093)
Mun. Income (log) −0.001 −0.002∗ −0.002 0.0003 0.0005 −0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Displacement (log) −0.010∗∗ −0.007 −0.010 −0.011 −0.004 −0.008
(0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.011)
Victims (log) 0.005 −0.002 0.005 0.002 −0.011∗∗ −0.001
(0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.013)
GDP per cap. (log) −0.011 0.053∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.018)
Armed Actors −0.005∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Years 5 5 3 5 4 4 2 4
Municipalities 987 987 986 499 990 987 986 496
Start Year 2000 2000 2000 2000 2002 2002 2002 2002
End Year 2015 2015 2007 2015 2014 2014 2006 2014
Muni FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Titled Only No No No Yes No No No Yes
Observations 4,616 4,604 2,644 2,319 3,945 3,933 1,960 1,977
Adjusted R2 0.770 0.773 0.770 0.750 0.760 0.767 0.790 0.727
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 5.5.: Main regression results for electoral turnout in Colombia. Difference-in-differences analysis of the conditional
effects of titling interacted with the strength of local judicial institutions for turnout in municipal (Models 1-4)
and presidential (Models 5-8) elections.
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Figure 5.3.: Comparison of conditional effects of local institutional strength on the estimated
marginal effects of titling for Left: turnout in municipal elections in Peru, and Right:
turnout in municipal and presidential elections in Colombia. Black lines represent point
estimates of the marginal effect of treatment for different values of Rondas and rug plots
show common support for different values of the interaction term. Grey bands are 95%
confidence intervals.
5.5. Vote Share and Distributive Politics
I argue that the change in turnout rates associated with titling is an indication of the symbolic
impact of legal property rights. However, given the political popularity of titling programs in both
countries and the high level of demand among smallholding peasants, distributive politics could
also be driving these results. In Peru, the PTRT titling programs were signature policies under
the Fujimori administration in the 1990s, and were sufficiently popular that later administrations
continued promoting them for a second wave. Under this alternative explanation, an incumbent
party or candidate could target titling programs to certain districts in order to increase vote share.
Thus, beneficiaries of titling would respond to the program as if it were a targeted benefits program,
which in other contexts have been associated with increases in support for the incumbent candidate
(Zucco, 2013; De La O, 2015).
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Mechanism Strong Enforcement Weak Enforcement
Targeted Benefit (+) Incumbent Support No Effect
Disrupt Clientelism (–) Incumbent Support No Effect
Table 5.6.: Diagram comparing the alternate hypotheses that legal property rights could Disrupt
Clientelism or work as a Targeted Benefit, under conditions of strong and weak enforce-
ment.
A second alternative explanation is that legal titles might affect vote share by weakening
clientelistic structures that prey on the economic vulnerability of the poor. Many have suggested
that weak property rights can contribute to clientelism by increasing dependence on the discretion
of local politicians in order to protect property tenure (e.g., Kitschelt, Wilkinson et al., 2007). The
classic example has been the ejidos in Mexico, which supported clientelistic networks in Mexico
(Magaloni, 2006; Albertus et al., 2012) and the breakup of which likely reduced the control of these
structures over voters (Dower and Pfutze, 2015; Larreguy, Marshall, and Trucco, 2015). Specifically
in urban areas of Peru and Colombia, Holland (2017) shows evidence of weak property rights
underlying electoral relationships between incumbent mayors and informal settlements, indicating
that this dynamic can be operative in either case.
Under either alternative, we should expect that titling would affect vote share primarily in
areas of strong state enforcement. This is because in areas of weak enforcement, legal property
rights will be of relatively low value (in the case of targeted benefits) and will have little affect
on actual tenure security (in case of clientelism). The only difference between the two alternative
theories is the direction of the interaction effect. For targeted benefits, the interaction coefficient
should be positive, indicating a boost in vote share for the incumbent party in areas of strong
enforcement. For disrupting clientelism, the interaction coefficient should be negative, indicating
that titling reduces clientelistic ties as land tenure increases. The coefficient for titling should be
zero in either case, as titles would have no effect in areas of weak enforcement. A summary of these
predictions is given in Table 5.6 below.
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I use vote share for the incumbent party or candidate to test these alternative explanations.
For Peru, I test support of the incumbent national party in both presidential and mayoral elec-
tions. While Peruvian politics are noteworthy for a lack of stable, national-level parties that could
articulate coalitions between national, regional, and local level politicians (Zavaleta, 2014), titling
programs were emphasized consistently in national campaigns. Therefore, any political logic behind
titling should be evident in support for mayors from a party in the government’s coalition. To
account for changing coalitions, I divide this analysis between two separate time periods. For the
period of Fujimorismo (1993-1998), I examine support for mayors from Fujimori’s electoral coalition,
Cambio 90 and Nueva Mayor´ıa. For subsequent years (2001-2010), I employ a measure of vote share
for mayors running in a coalition with the president’s current party. I also examine the possibility
that incumbent mayors may be able to take advantage of the titling process to build support by
using the vote share of the incumbent mayor regardless of affiliations in national coalitions. For
Colombia, I utilize vote share for the outgoing mayor’s party for municipal elections (2000-2015)
and the incumbent president’s party for national elections (2006-2014). I use the mayoral party
instead of the candidate as mayors cannot run for re-election in consecutive terms under Colombian
law. Finally, for both countries I also test whether titling affected vote share for the incumbent
candidate’s party in presidential elections (first round).
5.5.1. Results
Results show that titling has little effect on any clientelistic structure that may exist in the
countryside. However, there is some benefit for the incumbent candidate or party, but this benefit
is felt only in areas of weak enforcement. This result is difficult to reconcile with the perspective
that titles only provide material benefits, but is consistent with my prediction that rights can have
a symbolic effect even when they provide little material value.
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Dependent variable:
Incumbent Fujimorista Official
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Titling −0.023 −0.019 1.408∗∗∗ 1.450∗∗∗ 0.015 −0.016
(0.033) (0.033) (0.398) (0.420) (0.077) (0.078)
Tit.:Rondas 0.029 0.033 −1.294∗∗∗ −1.308∗∗∗ 0.042 0.036
(0.036) (0.036) (0.476) (0.485) (0.084) (0.085)
Years 5 5 3 3 3 3
Districts 1543 642 1545 643 1543 642
Start Year 1995 1995 1993 1993 2002 2002
End Year 2010 2010 1998 1998 2010 2010
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Titled Only No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 7,708 3,208 4,528 1,899 4,629 1,926
Adjusted R2 0.140 0.142 0.479 0.476 0.218 0.212
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 5.7.: Difference-in-differences analysis of the conditional effects of titling interacted with local
state institutional strength (Rondas Campesinas) for incumbent voteshare in municipal
(Models 1-4) and presidential (Models 5-6) elections.
Tables 5.7 and 5.8 show results for Peruvian and Colombia vote share, respectively. Models
follow similar functional form as those used for analyzing turnout, and models (2), (4), and (6)
in Table 5.7 (Peru) and (4), (7), and (10) in Table 5.8 (Colombia) use a reduced dataset with
only benefited districts. For Peruvian mayors results are mixed. There is a strong benefit for
mayors aligned with Fujimori’s coalition during the first wave of PTRT titling. However, titling
seems to provide no effect on vote share for incumbent mayors (“Incumbent”) or for mayors from
the president’s party (“Official”) after 2002, as both the coefficient estimates for titling and the
interaction term are indistinguishable from zero. In Colombia, mayors from the incumbent party
and the president’s party are unable to turn titling into a positive electoral boost, which may reflect
the constraints that mayors are unable to run for reelection. However, unlike Peru, incumbent
presidential candidates in Colombia do receive an electoral boost following titling.
What is interesting to note here is that in both countries, the effects of titling follow a similar
pattern to electoral turnout with a strong effect only in areas of weak institutions. Figure 5.4 more
172
Legitimate Grievances: Legal Property Rights and Political Engagement
clearly illustrates the marginal effect of titling for different levels of local enforcement. The electoral
boost for mayors in the Fujimori coalition in Peru is high for districts with weak enforcement, but is
indistinguishable from zero for areas with strong enforcement. The predicted effect of a shift from no
titling to the mean in the data set in Peru is 10.14 percentage points for a weak enforcement district,
while in areas of strong enforcement the shift is 0.74 percentage points. In Colombia, this effect
on vote share is similar, although it becomes negative at high levels of rights enforcement. There,
the predicted effect size for a weak enforcement district is 3.21 percentage points, while for areas of
strong enforcement the shift is -1.79 percentage points. This could indicate that there is some effect
on pre-existing clientelistic networks in areas of strong enforcement in Colombia, although similar
to turnout for Colombia, these negative predicted effects are indistinguishable from zero.
Together, these electoral results show initial support for my theory, by showing a relatively
large effect on political engagement that appears only in areas of weak enforcement in both countries.
These changes cannot be explained by a change in material benefits as a result in titling in those
areas, as the lack of state protections for property rights makes legal titles of relatively little value
as compared to other areas. However, results are consistent with my theory that legal rights can

































Incumbent (Mayor) Pres. Party (Mayor) Incumbent (Pres.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Titling −1.383 −1.281 2.861 −1.145 1.574∗ 1.586∗ 0.979 8.363∗∗∗ 8.437∗∗∗ 7.952∗∗∗
(1.708) (1.650) (4.096) (1.883) (0.813) (0.825) (0.858) (2.603) (2.566) (2.851)
Titling:Jud. Inst. −2.608 −2.534 −62.959 −7.631 −5.147 −5.125 −2.065 −66.665∗∗ −65.859∗∗ −61.303∗∗
(12.407) (12.767) (49.018) (12.829) (8.423) (8.522) (9.027) (27.516) (26.728) (26.218)
Rural 0.134 −0.139 0.187 0.429 0.674 0.825 0.009
(0.239) (0.326) (0.315) (0.634) (0.412) (0.579) (0.431)
Mun. Income (log) −0.001 −0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.042 0.049
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.014) (0.010) (0.026) (0.042)
Displacement (log) 0.026 0.027 0.042 0.016 0.044 0.017 0.162
(0.016) (0.019) (0.027) (0.039) (0.039) (0.041) (0.129)
Victims (log) −0.026 −0.023 −0.041 −0.023 −0.052 0.003 −0.133
(0.022) (0.020) (0.035) (0.041) (0.046) (0.048) (0.111)




Years 5 5 3 5 3 3 3 3 3 3
Municipalities 888 887 725 445 987 987 499 990 987 496
Start Year 2000 2000 2000 2000 2007 2007 2007 2006 2006 2006
End Year 2015 2015 2007 2015 2015 2015 2015 2014 2014 2014
Muni FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Titled Only No No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 2,320 2,316 1,360 1,158 2,956 2,944 1,484 2,968 2,959 1,487
Adjusted R2 0.217 0.216 0.202 0.274 0.221 0.223 0.240 0.262 0.279 0.263
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 5.8.: Difference-in-differences analysis of the conditional effects of titling interacted with the strength of local judicial
institutions for incumbent and presidential party vote share in municipal (Models 1-7) and presidential (Models
8-10) elections.
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Fujimorista



































Figure 5.4.: Comparison of conditional effects of local institutional strength on the estimated
marginal effects of titling for Left: vote share for mayors in Fujimori’s coalition in
Peru, and Right: vote share for incumbent presidents in Colombia. Black lines repre-
sent point estimates of the marginal effect of treatment for different values of Rondas
and rug plots show common support for different values of the interaction term. Grey
bands are 95% confidence intervals.
5.6. Demand for Judicial Services
While electoral participation is the most common and easily measurable form of political
engagement, there are other state institutions to which rights-bearers can make claims for protection.
The most relevant for the protection of property rights are the judiciary and police. Interviews with
peasants in Peru and Colombia revealed that while most property disputes were handled informally,
usually through discussion or with possible mediation by a local leader, property owners would
also refer cases to formal institutions (see Chapter 4). Most common among these were local
state representatives, such as police inspectors or the municipal Justice of the Peace. However
escalation to municipal courts was also a commonly cited option.17 Unfortunately, systematic data
on complaints to police and Justices of the Peace are not collected in either country. However, data
17E.g. interviews P 4-1A-AH; C1-1-CG
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is available on caseloads for trial courts in all districts in Colombia, which I use to test the impact
of legal rights on the demand for judicial services.
The law and economics literature has robustly debated the theoretical factors that potential
litigants use when deciding whether to pursue a claim in court (e.g. Landes, 1971; Posner, 2014).
This literature has noted consistently that not all potential disputes reach the courts, and not all
cases that are presented are eventually ruled on (Priest and Klein, 1984). Rather, under a rational
choice framework, potential claimants should only bring cases for which the expected benefits of
going to court outweigh the costs. When the expected benefits for a party increase, due to a greater
reward or higher probability of success, then the likelihood of a claimant presenting a new claim
to court should also increase (Cooter and Rubinfeld, 1989: 1082-1084). Under these theories, the
stronger legal right that titling brings would increase the expectation of a successful trial, and
therefore should lead to a greater number of claims presented.18
The above perspective is similar to the material effect I identify earlier, which understands
legal rights as primarily affecting expectations of material benefits (e.g. changing tenure security
or likelihood of making a successful claim). If legal rights only affect behavior through a material
effect, titling should have no effect in areas of weak state enforcement, as they should not affect the
expectation of a successful outcome. Titling would therefore only increase use of courts in areas of
strong enforcement. However, this effect is likely to be weak, as third parties should adjust their
behavior after a large titling program goes through, thereby encroaching less on newly protected
rights (Cooter and Rubinfeld, 1989: 1084-1086).19
18This could also be understood as the effect of increasing access to courts. This would be the case if possession of
legal title is a barrier to entry for bringing a property claim. In both legal systems, lacking a full legal title, while
making it more difficult to prove a legal claim, does not preclude the use of courts. In fact, judicial procedures
exist under each system that allow for the clarification of property rights and the granting of title for peaceful
possession of state land through a judicial procedure (see discussion Chapter 3). Nonetheless, legal title could
still reduce the comparative costs of bringing a claim before a court, and therefore could affect claim-making by
lowering barriers to access. Under this perspective, titling should increase the use of courts, as it lowers costs of
accessing judicial protection, but we should observe these effect should only in areas where rights enforcement is
the strongest.
19Titling could also potentially have an effect just on the clarification of property rights, that is, identifying who
has potential rights claims (Besley and Ghatak, 2010). However, this is unlikely to be the case for either Peru
or Colombia, as nearly all landholders had some kind of informal documentation to provide evidence of potential
rights claims prior to titling (see Chapter 4).
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Mechanism Strong Enforcement Weak Enforcement
Symbolic Effect No Effect (+) Judicial Demand
Material Effect (only) (+) Judicial Demand (weak) No Effect
Table 5.9.: Diagram comparing hypotheses that legal property rights could affect judicial demand
through a symbolic or material effect.
Under my theory, however, even where legal titles do not increase the expectation of success-
fully petitioning enforcement from the state, they will still increase the perceived legitimacy of a
rights-bearer’s claim. Therefore, titling will still incentivize peasants to bring new legal claims out
of the sense that the state “ought” to defend their claims, even if effective enforcement is unlikely.
Thus, titling should increase claim-making before courts in areas in which local institutions are least
able to protect them, leading to similar expected directions on coefficient estimates as with voter
turnout above. A summary of these hypotheses is in Table 5.9 below.
To proxy for judicial demand, I use data from the Higher Council of the Judiciary on the
number of new cases presented to courts within a given district, which is available from 2000-2011.
These cases include only new controversies, and thus exclude existing cases that may have been
re-admitted or transferred between courts. These data also include all cases submitted regardless
of whether they are ultimately admissible. As such, this number should represent the total new
demand for judicial services within a district. Unfortunately, the data are not detailed enough to
reveal the exact subject of a controversy, and whether it is related to property claims. However, as
an additional test, I limit the cases to only those presented before civil courts, thereby excluding all
courts with criminal and specialized jurisdictions.20 The resulting measures for all new cases and
new civil cases are both highly skewed, with values ranging from 0 (for districts with no operating
courts for that year) to over 500,000 (for jurisdictions in the capital city Bogota). I therefore use a
log transformation for both variables in my analysis.
20While I exclude courts with specific jurisdiction not related to civil law matters, I include many small courts in
rural districts with broad subject matter jurisdiction (juzgados promiscuos), which covers both civil and criminal
cases.
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5.6.1. Results
Table 5.10 replicates the main models above on demand for judicial services (Colombia only),
measured as the number of cases presented before any local court (Models 1-4) and before civil courts
specifically (Models 5-8). Models (4) and (8) include a full set of time-variant covariates and are
restricted to municipalities that received some titling. For both outcomes, results estimate strong
and statistically significant effects in the directions as predicted by my theory, with increased demand
in areas with weak local courts. I also include a plot of the marginal effect of titling intensity on
both measures of demand for judicial services at different levels of institutional strength in Figure
5.5. Similarly as in the case of electoral turnout, the plots show a positive effect in weak institutional
settings that quickly turns negative for areas with strong institutions.21
As the dependent variables for cases presented are log transformations, the coefficients should
be interpreted as a percentage change in the number of cases for each unit of change in the inde-
pendent variable. For a typical municipality in the bottom fifth of the distribution of judicial
institutions, moving from the lowest value of the titling intensity measure to the mean value for
that subset would result in a 33.26 percent increase in cases presented before local courts. However,
among municipalities from the top fifth of the distribution of judicial institutions, a similar move
will result in a -29.57 percent decrease in the number of cases presented.
21Again, results are unaffected by alternate codings which account for outlier municipalities with strong institutions.

































All Cases (log) Civil Cases (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Titling 14.228∗∗ 13.670∗∗ 17.848∗∗∗ 12.975∗∗ 13.857∗∗ 13.281∗∗ 17.727∗∗∗ 12.944∗∗
(5.932) (5.716) (6.776) (6.459) (5.899) (5.657) (6.743) (6.401)
Titling:Jud. Inst. −131.579∗∗∗ −127.583∗∗∗ −156.794∗∗∗ −136.766∗∗∗ −130.516∗∗∗ −126.510∗∗∗ −159.985∗∗∗ −139.172∗∗∗
(48.688) (47.083) (48.598) (47.950) (48.795) (47.040) (48.280) (47.325)
Mun. Income (log) −2.032∗∗ −2.419∗∗ −2.883∗∗∗ −2.144∗∗ −2.556∗∗ −2.905∗∗∗
(1.008) (1.025) (1.098) (1.019) (1.048) (1.091)
Rural −0.009 −0.007 −0.023∗ −0.010 −0.007 −0.023∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013)
Displacement (log) −0.037 −0.024 −0.083 −0.041 −0.028 −0.092∗
(0.045) (0.048) (0.058) (0.046) (0.049) (0.055)
Victims (log) 0.035 0.015 0.081 0.035 0.017 0.092
(0.051) (0.049) (0.075) (0.051) (0.050) (0.071)
GDP per cap. (log) −0.447∗ −0.468∗ −0.436∗ −0.464∗
(0.229) (0.248) (0.225) (0.248)
Armed Actors −0.008 −0.001 −0.011 −0.004
(0.023) (0.029) (0.023) (0.030)
Years 12 12 10 10 12 12 10 10
Municipalities 990 987 986 498 990 987 986 498
Start Year 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000
End Year 2011 2011 2009 2009 2011 2011 2009 2009
Muni FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Titled Only No No No Yes No No No Yes
Observations 11,880 11,820 9,855 4,980 11,880 11,820 9,855 4,980
Adjusted R2 0.880 0.878 0.873 0.813 0.863 0.860 0.854 0.796
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 5.10.: Difference-in-differences analysis of the conditional effects of titling on logged cases (Models 1-4) and logged civil
cases (Models 5-8) presented to local courts (2000-2011).
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These results also suggest that titles are not affecting behavior by simply increasing access to
courts. Rather, title decreases demand for court services in areas of strong rights enforcement. This
decrease could be related to an increase perception of tenure security (i.e., fewer grievances) or a
reduction in conflicts as third parties avoid encroaching on claims protected by stronger legal rights
(see Cooter and Rubinfeld, 1989: 1084-1086). However, similar to the electoral results, predicted
effects are indistinguishable from zero except for very high values of local institutional strength.22
Further research is required to clarify exactly how legal rights affect behavior at higher levels of
enforcement.
Similar to the results of electoral participation, titling increases demand for state protection
in areas where the state is least capable of enforcing rights. It is important to note that such a
result would be inexplicable given a standard understanding of property rights as the equivalent of
property tenure, given that titling in weak enforcement areas should not change expectations that
the state will guarantee those rights. However, this result is consistent with the symbolic effect’s
prediction that rights also provide property owners with an increased sense of political entitlement
and legitimacy in making claims.
5.7. Self-Reported Survey Responses
5.7.1. Political Behavior
The third and final set of outcome measurements is a series of survey questions on political
behavior and attitudes. This additional source of information allows me to test my theory on dif-
ferent forms or political participation and engagement with the state to which electoral and judicial
results do not lend themselves. By examining survey responses on interest in politics, accessing var-
ious state institutions, or participating in contentious protest, I can examine whether the increase in
political entitlement associated with rights-recognition applies more broadly to other forms of par-
ticipation. I also use questions on political attitudes and trust toward state institutions to explore
22These results are also stable for excluding outliers for high institutional strength and recoding this as an ordered
variable.
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All Cases (log) Civil Cases (log)


















Figure 5.5.: Comparison of conditional effects of institutional weakness on the estimated marginal
effects of titling on judicial cases. The black line represents the point estimates of the
marginal effect of treatment for different values of Judicial Institutions. Grey bands are
95% confidence intervals.
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whether the symbolic effect manifests itself primarily by strengthening identities of citizenship, or
by legitimizing perceived grievances and demands for protection from the state. Survey responses
do not necessarily reflect actual behavior, but rather self-reported responses about political actions
and beliefs. Therefore, they may measure trends in rhetorical usage or idealized perceptions as
a result of titling, and when actual costs and benefits are considered behavior may be different.
Therefore, these results should de understood as supplementary support to my main findings above.
In Peru, I draw survey data from the ENAHO (Encuesta Nacional de Hogares), which is an
annual economic and opinion survey that covers a large number of rural districts. The ENAHO
survey has questions on political behavior for 2002-2007 and covers 29,145 observations from 506
rural districts with at least one title granted through the PTRT. For Colombia, I utilize the LAPOP
survey data, which unfortunately does not have as broad a coverage as the ENAHO survey. In order
to ensure a full panel of rural municipalities that are consistent across several years of surveys, I
limited the LAPOP data only to survey years from 2004-2011 and only included respondents living
in rural areas. This produces a final data set of respondents from 33 municipalities that present
variation both in the titling intensity measure and the measure for local institutions necessary to
have common support for my interaction models.23
I employ questions from both surveys on political behavior that measure the willingness or
interest of an individual to engage in politics or make claims against the state. I also limit my
analysis to those questions that present common support for my main variables of interest: land
titling and local enforcement. For Peru, I examine questions on self-reported voting in the last
elections (dichotomous), interest in politics (scale 1-4), whether a respondent seeks information on
politics (scale 1-4), and whether a respondent has used judicial or municipal services in the last 12
months (dichotomous). In Colombia, there is overlap in survey data on questions of voting in the
previous elections and political interest. I also include additional questions on reported willingness
to use local and state institutions to resolve a conflict (scale 1-4) and participating in a protest in the
23Note that as the LAPOP data comes from a limited number of rural districts and I analyze district-level effects,
these results are likely underpowered. Therefore, they should be given less consideration than the ENAHO results.
However, both surveys produce consistent results for behavioral questions, as noted below.
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previous 12 months (dichotomous) as different measures of claim-making and political engagement.

































Vote Pol. Interest Pol. Inform. Jud. Services Mun. Services
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Titling 0.288∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗ 1.003∗∗∗ 1.010∗∗∗ 0.925∗∗ 0.973∗∗ 0.112 0.109 0.110 0.106
(0.099) (0.106) (0.362) (0.342) (0.437) (0.444) (0.073) (0.066) (0.074) (0.066)
Titling:Rondas −0.376∗∗∗ −0.376∗∗∗ −1.082∗∗∗ −1.034∗∗∗ −1.149∗∗ −1.208∗∗ −0.141∗ −0.144∗ −0.142∗ −0.146∗
(0.103) (0.100) (0.377) (0.376) (0.578) (0.585) (0.078) (0.076) (0.079) (0.076)
Age −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.004 −0.003 −0.0002 −0.0003 −0.001 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.001) (0.001)
Gender −0.026∗∗ −0.011 −0.183∗∗∗ −0.164∗∗∗ −0.209∗ −0.138 0.006 0.006 0.001 −0.0001
(0.011) (0.012) (0.004) (0.009) (0.109) (0.106) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010)
Poverty 0.009∗∗ 0.010∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.003 0.002 −0.001
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.042) (0.028) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007)
Own Home 0.042∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗ 0.014 0.019∗∗ 0.020 0.049 −0.003 −0.014 0.0002 −0.014
(0.011) (0.014) (0.009) (0.009) (0.024) (0.041) (0.006) (0.012) (0.009) (0.013)
Ethnic 0.004 0.002 0.065∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.040 0.037 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.011∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.047) (0.051) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Head House 0.068∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗ 0.036∗ 0.058∗∗ 0.083∗∗ 0.003 0.00003 0.001 −0.003
(0.013) (0.010) (0.011) (0.020) (0.026) (0.038) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
Education 0.029∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗ 0.001 0.006 0.0004 0.006
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.100) (0.114) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Years 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5
Districts 1040 510 1066 513 1066 513 788 390 788 390
Start Year 2002 2002 2004 2004 2004 2004 2002 2002 2002 2002
End Year 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2006 2006 2006 2006
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Titled Only No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 25,048 13,316 26,516 14,887 27,862 15,521 36,117 19,648 36,117 19,648
Adjusted R2 0.081 0.080 0.168 0.163 0.170 0.165 0.084 0.084 0.101 0.101
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 5.11.: Difference-in-differences analysis results of district-level effects of titling on behavioral survey responses, condi-
tional on state institutional weakness (Rondas Campesinas presence in 1993).
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Dependent variable:
Vote Political Interest Conflict Resolution Protest
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Titling 25.960∗∗ 93.360 133.337∗∗ 33.486∗∗∗
(11.461) (83.234) (53.534) (2.251)
Titling:Jud. Inst. −3.326∗ −13.601 −16.901∗∗ −2.272
(1.914) (12.198) (6.853) (1.632)
Rural −1.355 −28.150∗∗ 0.205 6.050∗∗
(0.930) (11.110) (4.187) (2.569)
Displacement (log) 0.059 0.142 0.021 0.072
(0.079) (0.600) (0.099) (0.103)
Victims (log) −0.045 −0.203 −0.007 −0.095
(0.086) (0.648) (0.108) (0.137)
GDP per cap. (log) 0.213 0.377 0.445 −0.091
(0.291) (0.480) (0.317) (0.251)
Armed Actors −0.028 −0.073∗∗∗ 0.032 −0.004
(0.023) (0.026) (0.036) (0.016)
Years 6 4 5 5
Municipalities 33 32 33 33
Start Year 2004 2006 2004 2004
End Year 2009 2009 2008 2008
Muni FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,864 1,245 1,442 1,531
Adjusted R2 0.115 0.058 0.034 0.075
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 5.12.: Difference-in-differences analysis of municipal-level titling and the interaction effect
with judicial institutions on behavioral survey responses. All models include individual
covariates for age, gender, trust of others, education, income, and experience with
armed conflict to increase model precision (estimates not shown).
Tables 5.11 and 5.12 present results for survey questions related to political behavior from
the ENAHO annual household survey in Peru, and the LAPOP survey in Colombia, respectively.
All models are fully specified with individual and district-level covariates, district and year fixed
effects, and inverse probability weights based on the number of respondents in a given district. For
table 5.11 (Peru), odd-numbered models include the full dataset and even-numbered models subset
the sample to those districts which benefited from titling during the study period.
The overall results for the behavioral survey questions are consistent with my earlier findings.
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For voting, political interest, and political information in Peru, coefficient estimates are positive for
the titling variable, and negative for the interaction term, showing a positive treatment effect for
areas with weak institutions that trends toward zero when institutions are relatively strong. For
use of judicial and municipal services, the effect is weaker and imprecisely estimated, but in the
predicted direction.24 I include marginal effect plots for the even-numbered models in the Appendix
Section A.2.1. These plots show that the marginal effect of titling on survey results is similar to that
of the electoral results, with positive effects for districts with weak enforcement that trend toward
zero for districts where enforcement is strong.
Colombia survey data show similar results, although the models are much less precise given
the relatively low number of districts in the data set (33) as compared to Peru (over 1,000). Coef-
ficient estimates for titling are positive and relatively large with a negative interaction term in all
models, although the estimates for political interest are imprecisely estimated. The similar results
between reported voting behavior and willingness to use conflict resolution mechanisms and their
corollaries in election and court use data are further support that my models are picking up actual
changes in behavior in Colombia as a result of titling programs. The results for reported participa-
tion in protests also provide interesting evidence that the willingness to engage in politics and make
claims against the state likely extends to more contentious forms of behavior, although further tests
with actual rates of protest are necessary for more definite conclusions.
5.7.2. Political Attitudes
Under my theory, when individuals receive a new right they will positively reevaluate the
legitimacy and fairness of their claim to the underlying interest or entitlement. Their new claim
may also influence the way they perceive the state. Under conditions of strong rights enforcement,
we should expect that the granting of an important right will build trust for the state and increasing
perceptions of state legitimacy. In this sense, after being granted an important right, new rights-
bearers will tend to see the state as more legitimate, provided that this new right is adequately
24The weaker effect for these last two responsiveness may be due to the low overall response rate to these questions
in the survey, which is 0.074 and 0.125 respectively.
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Outcome Strong Enforcement Weak Enforcement
Political Engagement No Effect or (–) Participation (+) Participation
State Trust (+) Trust (–) Trust
Table 5.13.: Diagram comparing the expected predictions for the symbolic effect on political en-
gagement and state trust under conditions of strong and weak enforcement.
protected.
This prediction is supported by both normative and empirical work on the foundations of
state legitimacy. Tyler’s (2006) defines state legitimacy as “the belief that authorities, institutions,
and social arrangements are appropriate, proper, and just” (376). Increases in perceived state
legitimacy will therefore accompany stronger feelings of trust toward the state and state institutions
(Levi, 1997; Tyler, 2006). The recognition of new rights, when they are also adequately enforced,
can build state legitimacy through increases of perceived state responsiveness to material needs
(Tyler, 2006), procedural fairness (Mishler and Rose, 2001; Hough, Jackson, and Bradford, 2013),
or shared normative values (Levi, Sacks, and Tyler, 2009). However, the corollary to this potential
increase in state legitimacy is that the inadequate protection of rights can also undermine state trust
and provoke contentious grievances. When a state grants a new right, but then fails to enforce this
right, the individual will maintain their greater sense of political entitlement, but then negatively
reevaluate the legitimacy of the state. Together, this generates predictions in opposite directions to
those for political participation above, with a negative coefficient estimate for titling and a positive
interaction term (see Table 5.13 below).
I test this final set of variables using the same survey data as above. For Peru, I examine
survey responses on trust for courts and police, the importance of democracy for Peru, and the belief
that in Peru there is equality before the law. All questions capture general trust for the state and
state institutions (as opposed to elected officials) and are measured on a scale of 1 (no trust) to 4
(high trust). I attempt to use similar questions for Colombia, including trust for courts and police,
and whether democracy functions in Colombia. I also include a respondent’s belief of whether their
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vote is effective. All responses are on a similar scale from 1-4 except for whether the vote is effective
which is dichotomous.25
Attitudinal survey responses show some evidence that titling decreases trust in areas of weak
enforcement, but the results are not consistent across all questions or countries. For Peru, Table 5.14
shows models for all four survey questions. All models contain a full battery of covariates, district
and year fixed effects, and inverse-probability weights. Even-numbered models also subset for only
districts that included some titling during the study period. All outcomes show the coefficient
estimates to be in the predicted direction (negative for titling, positive for the interaction effect).
However, they are only statistically significant for trust toward the police. Trust of the judiciary
and the importance of democracy are both imprecisely estimated, and the coefficients for equality
before law are small and indistinguishable from zero.
Results for attitudinal questions in Colombia (Table 5.15) are less supportive of my theory.
Questions on whether democracy functions and votes are effective are in the predicted direction, but
statistically insignificant. Police trust is the only model with significant results, but the coefficients
are in the opposite direction. The Peru results suggest that there is at least some breakdown of
trust after titling in areas of weak enforcement. The negative estimates for titling at low levels
of enforcement for the two questions referring to the state institutions most directly connected to
property rights enforcement (police and courts), is especially indicative that rights-recognition could
produce perceived grievances in these areas. The Colombian results suggest that a grievance may
not always be felt, and that there could be a general level of trust growing as the state extends
recognition of property rights. The difference could be related to the particular experience in
Colombia or individual selection effects of those accessing the titling programs, although the results
for Colombia are inconsistent. In either case, further research is required to reach firmer conclusions.
25See Appendix Section A.2.1 reports full text of the survey questions and responses.
188
Legitimate Grievances: Legal Property Rights and Political Engagement
Dependent variable:
Trust Jud. Trust Pol. Import. Dem. Equality Law
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Titling −0.581∗ −0.514∗ −0.602∗∗∗ −0.508∗∗∗ −0.308 −0.460 −0.113 −0.067
(0.311) (0.287) (0.184) (0.169) (0.473) (0.489) (0.319) (0.350)
Titling:Rondas 0.723∗∗ 0.713∗ 0.795∗∗∗ 0.777∗∗∗ 0.628 0.646 0.116 0.090
(0.363) (0.365) (0.274) (0.278) (0.470) (0.459) (0.319) (0.319)
Age −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.001∗ 0.001 −0.002∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗ −0.001
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.0004)
Gender −0.056∗∗∗ −0.049∗∗ −0.103∗∗∗ −0.093∗∗∗ −0.049∗∗ −0.009 −0.018 −0.001
(0.017) (0.023) (0.011) (0.017) (0.019) (0.028) (0.016) (0.017)
Poverty 0.014 0.009 0.027∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.009∗ −0.013
(0.012) (0.020) (0.007) (0.007) (0.014) (0.014) (0.005) (0.013)
Own Home 0.023∗∗ 0.030 0.039∗∗ 0.047∗∗ 0.013 0.010 0.004 0.033∗
(0.010) (0.020) (0.016) (0.021) (0.016) (0.016) (0.021) (0.019)
Ethnic 0.033∗ 0.042∗ 0.050∗∗ 0.052∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.013 0.020
(0.018) (0.022) (0.021) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.025)
Head House −0.018∗ −0.014 −0.042∗∗∗ −0.049∗∗ 0.016 0.021 −0.020 −0.026∗
(0.010) (0.013) (0.014) (0.021) (0.012) (0.020) (0.013) (0.013)
Education 0.015 0.054∗∗∗ 0.023 0.050∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ −0.044∗ −0.031
(0.009) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.035) (0.046) (0.024) (0.024)
Years 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Districts 1077 517 1079 517 1079 517 1076 517
Start Year 2002 2002 2002 2002 2002 2002 2002 2002
End Year 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Titled Only No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 40,497 22,318 42,710 23,456 37,728 20,840 39,250 21,844
Adjusted R2 0.130 0.117 0.135 0.128 0.130 0.119 0.147 0.139
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 5.14.: Results of district-level effects of titling on responses to political attitude questions for
the ENAHO survey in Peru (trust of the judiciary, trust of the police, importance of
democracy, and belief in equality before law in Peru).
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Dependent variable:
Judicial Trust Police Trust Democracy Functions Vote Effective
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Titling −16.494∗ 31.011∗∗ −3.432 −3.344
(9.217) (12.960) (6.305) (4.423)
Titling:Jud. Inst. 1.927 −3.426∗ 0.633 0.744
(1.385) (1.814) (0.818) (0.657)
Rural 0.382 8.503∗∗ −1.807 −15.738∗∗∗
(8.476) (3.797) (5.836) (2.894)
Displacement (log) 0.305 −0.298 0.073 −0.007
(0.242) (0.244) (0.051) (0.036)
Victims (log) −0.273 0.471∗ −0.039 −0.024
(0.212) (0.281) (0.049) (0.035)
GDP per cap. (log) −0.270 −1.402∗ 0.144 −0.318
(0.363) (0.806) (0.420) (0.384)
Armed Actors 0.017 −0.131 0.053∗ 0.030
(0.065) (0.093) (0.029) (0.026)
Years 6 6 6 5
Municipalities 33 33 33 33
Start Year 2004 2004 2004 2004
End Year 2009 2009 2009 2008
Muni FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,816 1,832 1,717 1,473
Adjusted R2 0.035 0.068 0.047 0.038
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 5.15.: Results for responses to political attitude questions (trust of the judiciary, trust of
police, index of trust of government institutions and belief that democracy function
well) from the LAPOP survey in Colombia (2004-2011). All models include controls
for individual-level covariates (age, gender, education, family income, trust, and vic-
timization; estimates not shown).
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5.8. Causal Assumptions and Robustness Checks
5.8.1. Parallel Trends
While the difference-in-differences estimator and the use of district and year fixed effects can
control for all between-district variation in outcomes, it still requires strong identification assump-
tions that unobserved heterogeneity is similar over time between treatment and control groups; that
is, in the counterfactual of no titling, outcome trends between benefited and non-benefitted districts
(or early and late-titling districts) should be parallel. Therefore, I conduct several checks to test
the parallel trends assumption. I summarize the tests here and include a full set of results in the
Appendix Section A.3.
First, I test whether changes in the dependent variable in the first period of a data set can
predict the exact timing of titling in a district, which could give an indication of possible selection
bias for whether a district is benefited or not (or whether it is titled early or late for the restricted
data set). For these models, I regress the change in each outcome variable during the first period in
each data set (first electoral cycle or first year of data) on the delay in the number of years until the
first titling event in each district.26 As a further test, I follow De Janvry, Gonzalez-Navarro, and
Sadoulet (2014) in regressing the change in the dependent variable from a previous period (electoral
cycle or year) on the main titling intensity variable. This model will test directly whether the trends
in prior years of the dependent variable are predictive of later titling, and therefore be a more direct
check on the parallel trends assumption. Third, I test a simple set of models with lagged values
of electoral and judicial outcomes as predictors of the titling intensity variable. These final two
methods require removing the first year of the data set to generate the initial lagged dependent
variable, but otherwise preserve the remaining panel data.27
All three tests show some support for the parallel trends assumptions. For the first test—
whether changes in the dependent variable predict delay in titling—estimates are small and statis-
26For this test, I considered the first titling event to be the year in which at least half of the titles in the data set for
a given district have been delivered. I only include tests in the appendix for electoral and judicial variables.
27I do not conduct these final two tests on the presidential election data in Peru, as there are only two periods.
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tically indistinguishable from zero for all outcomes except for the president’s vote share in national
elections in Colombia. The second and third tests have similar results, with the exception of turnout
in municipal and presidential elections in Peru and Colombia, and president’s vote share in Colom-
bia. Nonetheless, for all outcomes, estimates lose statistical significance when interacted with local
institutions. In addition, with the exception of turnout in Peru, all effect sizes are quite small.
While there is no outcome measure that consistently fails all three tests, there is some evidence
of a potential failure of the parallel trends assumption for presidential vote share in Colombia and
electoral turnout rates in Peru, and therefore there is a potential source of bias in these estimates.
However, the remaining tests are consistently negative, and while not conclusive, these results are
supportive of my main findings.
5.8.2. Local State Institutions
Finally, I test a series of different proxies for local institutional weakness and alternative
model specifications to further check the robustness of my results. Full results for all tests are
included in the Appendix Section A.4. First, the Rondas Campesinas measure in Peru may be
picking up local levels of social capital instead of state institutional weakness. This is because while
Rondas are a response to a weak state, they also may be more likely to appear in areas with strong
social capital where peasants can effectively organize alternative strategies for protecting property
rights. I therefore test a measure of social capital using membership in other social organizations
in the 1993 rural census as an interaction term. All results are null for the interaction effect, with
the exception of electoral turnout, which has a negative interaction with areas of high social capital
(i.e. high social capital reduces the impact on turnout), demonstrating that social capital is not
driving the results.
Another objection to using the presence of Rondas Campesinas groups is that they may also
pick up some effect from the internal armed conflict in Peru. While the majority of these groups
emerged autochthonously in the Central and Northern Highlands (Starn, 1999), in the Southern
Andes region the government also encouraged the formation of Rondas as a strategy to resist the
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incursion of the Sendero Luminoso (Degregori, 1996a). Even in these areas, many authors noted
that the Rondas groups acted independently from the government and adopted the same community
justice strategies as in other areas.28 However, there could be a lingering effect either related to a
district’s experience with the armed conflict or state attempts to establish greater presence in certain
districts. Therefore, I rerun my main results omitting the districts in the Southern departments
of Huancavelica, Ayacucho, and Apurimac that were part of the Emergency Zone declared in the
early 1980s and the focus of both Sendero’s activities and the state’s military response.29 Results
are both substantively and statistically similar after dropping these districts, suggesting that the
Rondas measure is not picking up the effect of the armed conflict.
For Colombia, I check my results using an alternative measure of local institutions that
captures the general capacity of municipal government, rather than simply judicial institutions.
While interviews with smallholding farmers indicated that many were willing to bring property
disputes before courts if necessary, it was still far more common to use other spaces for dispute
resolution. These include justices of the peace, police inspectors, or municipal ombudspersons
(personer´ıa municipal). A measure of municipal government capacity may be able to capture the
effectiveness of these alternative sources of state protection of rights. I use an index of municipal
government capacity constructed by the National Planning Department in Colombia (Departamento
de Planeacio´n Nacional). This index combines four variables that measure the capacity of local
government: fulfillment of national development goals, efficiency in providing services, fulfilling legal
requirements, and bureaucratic capacity (DNP, 2010). Results are shown in the Appendix and are
similar in direction, magnitude, and statistical significance for all models.
I also test an alternative specification of the Rondas Campesinas and judicial institutions
variables, recoding each as an ordinal variable. This is particularly important for Colombia, where
a small number of outlier districts with very strong judicial institutions (> 0.4) could be driving
results (see rug plot in the marginal effects graphs in Figures 5.4-5.5). I therefore test a recoding of
28Authors who have supported this conclusion include Degregori (1996a: 27), Starn (1996: 241-242), and Watters
(1994: 266).
29These districts are identified by McClintock (1984: 52).
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both the judicial index and the Rondas Campesinas as ordinal variables (from 0 to 4). In addition,
I test subsets of the Colombia data which drop outliers districts. Again, results are consistent with
my main models. Finally, as INCODER and PTRT titling specifically targeted rural areas, I check a
subset of data that only includes rural municipalities (those above the mean value for the proportion
of rural population). These subsets also do not change the substantive or statistical interpretations
of my results.
5.9. Conclusions
The above results provide strong initial support for my theory on the symbolic effect of
rights. In previous chapters, I demonstrate that legal property rights are highly symbolic for peasant
farmers as they provide meaning for identities as landowners, symbolic connections with the state,
and legitimate claim-making. These discussions also demonstrated how rights’ symbolic meaning is
present even in areas of weak state institutions and where legal titles are of relatively little material
value. The statistical analyses here show evidence that the importance of titles is not only rhetorical
embellishment in the discourse of peasant farmers, but can actually influence political behavior of
new rights-bearers.
My theory predicts that granting a formal right to an individual will incentivize them to
make more claims toward the state and engage more in politics in general. However, this effect
will manifests itself only where rights remain vulnerable, such as in areas of weak enforcement of
property rights. Studying land titling programs offers a unique opportunity to test this theory at a
moment when formal, legal rights change but the underlying distribution of assets remains stable.
I can thus distinguish the “symbolic” effect from other possible effects of rights recognition, such as
those due to changes in land tenure or control over physical property. Using a variety of different
outcomes to measure political behavior and claim-making toward the state, I find consistent evidence
for a positive effect on electoral participation, demand for courts, and survey responses on political
participation. Furthermore, while there does seem to be an electoral benefit for national incumbent
politicians as a result of titling, this effect is also limited to areas with weak property enforcement,
194
Legitimate Grievances: Legal Property Rights and Political Engagement
indicating that it is likely not the result of the material benefits gained from titling.
I offer two explanations on how rights-recognition can generate a symbolic effect to empower
political engagement in rights-bearers. First, new legal rights can create grievances by legitimating
claims toward the state. Second, they can also provide a broader political entitlement by strengthen-
ing the identity of the rights-bearer as a citizen and political agent. While my design and limitations
in available data do not allow for a full comparison of these two possible mechanisms, there is some
evidence that both may be at play. The symbolic effect seems strongest for participation in local
elections, which are most likely related to concerns for protecting property rights. However, there is
some evidence of an impact on participation in national elections in Colombia, and several survey
responses indicates that titling may spark more interest in politics in general. However, there is
also an indication that titling may erode trust for the state in areas of weak enforcement, at least
in the case of Peru, which indicates the emergence of newly perceived grievances. This opens up
multiple potential avenues for new research to build on and re-confirm these initial results.
The final chapter in this study examines the implications of my theory for both policy-makers
and social scientists studying the impact of legal property rights. I discuss the policy-making impli-
cations through the use of an illustrative example: the land restitution process in Colombia though
the 2011 Victims’ Law. Through this abbreviated case study, I examine how the symbolic effect
of rights recognition could complicate efforts to rebuild communities and trust in state institutions
in war-torn areas—particularly if they are not accompanied with broader state-building policies.
Finally, I conclude with a discussion on how my theory applies to several important debates on poli-
tics, including the role of legal property rights in clientelistic regimes or unconsolidated democracies,







Throughout this study, I have offered theoretical arguments and empirical evidence support-
ing the claim that legal rights empower political engagement through a symbolic effect. This idea
originated from my experience working with smallholder communities in the Northwestern region of
the Colombian department of Choco´. From 2008-2010 I had the opportunity to work with several
communities of displaced peasant farmers near the frontier border with Panama. These villages had
endured several years of violent human rights abuses and displacement in the late 1990s and early
2000s as a result of territorial battles between rebel, paramilitary, and Colombian state forces.1
After the final wave of violence dissipated in 2003, several farmers returned to find that the bucolic
scenery of their fomer homesteads had been fundamentally altered. During their absence, entire vil-
lages had been razed and local elites had established new plantations where displaced villagers had
previously farmed or raised cattle. The new land holders had used unscrupulous means to gain both
physical and legal control over the dispossessed land. Some conserved the veneer of legality, using
falsified documents and sales under duress, while others resorted directly to violent usurpation.2
Despite years of hardships, several families insisted on returning and recovering their former
homes. Following the footsteps of peasants from earlier times in Colombia’s history, they organized
occupations to reclaim control over their former property. Such strategies were dangerous and
often risked violent confrontations with armed actors who were likely also those responsible for the
displacement. Therefore, families adopted a coordinated strategy of collectively occupying one farm
where they could better guarantee their safety. Legal property rights played a curiously central role
in discussions regarding exactly which farm to occupy. Families prioritized farms where the former
owner had a full legal title, even if the erstwhile owner had lost the document during the violence.
Nearly everyone agreed that these families had a stronger claim to their farm, even though legal
titles and state institutions had failed (and continued to fail) in recognizing or guaranteeing these
1For a full account of the recent history of these communities, see CIJP (2005).
2Specific incidences such as these were not uncommon in the armed conflict (Herna´ndez, 2011; Berry, 2014), but





The strong meaning that these families ascribed to legal property rights—even in extreme
situations displacement and institutional breakdown—highlights the importance of understanding
how legal rights shape political behavior even in the absence of the state. In many rural areas
throughout the developing world, thousands of smallholding farmers have tenuous legal claims to
land they have peacefully occupied and managed for years, if not generations. As the state continues
to expand its reach into these areas and formally recognizes the rights to these individuals, they
will not only be confronted with new possibilities and hopes to enjoy the benefits of the state
services, but also the ongoing challenges and frustrations of effectively accessing these. In post-
conflict and transitional settings in particular, the reparation and recognition of rights for former
victims is particularly significant for fulfilling goals of repairing past harms and rebuilding trust in
the state (De Greiff, 2012). Understanding how the impact of legal rights extends beyond material
compensation is central for explaining how and when these policies will legally or politically empower
victims or foment trust in state institutions.
In this final chapter, I discuss the implications of the symbolic effect of rights for social science
literature and policy-making debates. I begin with an examination of transitional justice efforts in
Colombia—a context in which the symbolic recognition of rights for victims of armed conflict is
central. I discuss limits of the power of rights-recognition in motivating individuals to engage with
the state. Do rights empower claim-making even in extreme situations where state institutions and
trust breakdown, such as periods of violent conflict or contentious politics? I then examine other
types of fundamental rights, aside from property rights, for which my theory could apply, and how
my theory can contribute to debates on social movements, contentious politics, and the impact of
rights-recognition. Finally, I discuss how the symbolic effect of rights can deepen our understanding




6.2. Colombia’s Land Restitution Process
In 2011, Colombia passed the Victims’ Law (Law 1448 of 2011), perhaps its most ambitious
piece of legislation pertaining to transitional justice. One of the laws’ central policies is a land
restitution process that provides victims of armed conflict with an accelerated judicial procedure to
recover abandoned or dispossessed land. As a result of this process, victims can petition to receive a
legal right to any land affected by the armed conflict, regardless of whether the land was previously
held with a full, legal title.
My theory on the symbolic effect of rights is particularly relevant for understanding the
potential impact of Colombia’s land restitution policy for two reasons. First, the symbolic act of
recognizing rights of victims, particularly property rights, is central to the goals and activities of
land restitution. Second, those eligible for land restitution are largely smallholding peasant farmers
that live in areas with limited access to the state and which had been previously affected by armed
conflict. Therefore, the intended beneficiaries and regions of intervention are precisely where my
theory indicates that rights will produce their greatest symbolic impact on behavior.
The recognition of victims’ rights is a cornerstone of transitional justice. While there is much
debate on what transitional justice consists of and the extent of its goals, most definitions agree that
it includes a “full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come
to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and
achieve reconciliation” (UNSC, 2004: 4). Reparations for victims in particular play a key role in
debates on transitional justice (Arthur, 2009; De Greiff, 2012), with many advocating for a greater
recognition of victims, respect for their agency, and space for victims’ voices in the transitional
justice process (e.g. Sriram et al., 2012; McEvoy and McConnachie, 2013).
De Greiff (2012) has argued that the recognition of victims as rights-bearers and citizens is
central to the mediate goals of reconciliation and building civic trust. Specifically, he notes that:
Ultimately, what is critical for a transition, and what transitional justice measures ar-
guably aim to do, is to provide to victims a sense of recognition not only as victims but
as (equal) rights-bearers and, ultimately, as citizens. Particularly where marginalization
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has made it possible or easier to mistreat others (in various ways, including the failure to
recognize individuals as anything other than parts of an undifferentiated mass), acknowl-
edging the capacity to suffer is important but not enough. What is indispensable, and
what arguably transitional justice measures have sought to accomplish, is to recognize
that the other is the bearer of rights—and therefore to engage in modes of redress that
can not only assuage suffering but also restore the rights that were so brutally violated
and affirm victims’ standing as full citizens. (42–43)
De Greiff’s arguments coincide with other normative debates on the importance of recognition
over material redistribution (Honneth, 2003), and the reestablishment of identities of citizenship
and equality before law in transitions (O’donnell and Schmitter, 1986: ch. 5). The role of rights
in defining political identities as citizens of my own theory also echoes these considerations (see
Chapter 2).
The recognition of victims as rights-bearers and citizens is also a central goal of the Victims’
Law itself. Article 1 states that the law aims to “make possible the effective enjoyment of [victims’]
rights to the truth, justice, and reparations with guarantees of no repetition, in order to recognize
their condition as victims and dignify this through the materialization of their constitutional rights.”
Many have noted that this law is one of the most ambitious transitional justice policies attempted
to date, not only because of its intended reach and scope (Sikkink et al., 2014), but also because it
was initiated before the formal cessation of hostilities (Iba´n˜ez and Mun˜oz, 2010).3
To accomplish these lofty goals, the Victims’ Law contemplates two central policies and
establishes an extensive administrative bureaucracy to execute each. First, the law creates an easily
accessed administrative benefit that is open to a broad category of victims of conflict since 1985.
These benefits are available regardless of the identity of the victimizer (guerrilla, paramilitary,
state, etc.) and, unlike the previous Law of Justice and Peace process, are not tied to prosecutions
(Summers, 2012).
The second policy is the land restitution process itself. Land restitution is accessible to
all victims of displacement in areas where conditions of return and safety have been established.
3At the writing of this study, the peace negotiation process has been concluded with the former forces of the FARC
rebel group. However, the ELN is still operative and many areas of the countryside still suffer from endemic
violence from other illegal armed actors.
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Beneficiaries apply through a mixture of an administrative and judicial process, first through the
Land Restitution Unit (URT; Unidad de Restitucio´n de Tierras) and then before specialized resti-
tution courts. The judicial hearing is an accelerated proceeding lasting from six to eight months
and which features a burden shifting regime where any current occupants of dispossessed land must
prove good-faith occupation.4 At the conclusion of the process, the beneficiary receives a judicial
sentence that supersedes any competing property claims to restituted land.
The final sentence can also order state benefits such as housing subsidies and agricultural
credits for development projects. Restitution judges have been active in leveraging sentences to
order national and local state institutions to coordinate broader development and infrastructure
projects, such as schools, rural electrification, and roads to facilitate the return of displaced fam-
ilies (Bolivar Jaime, Botero Giraldo, and Gutie´rrez Baquero, 2016). A recent study by the URT
has shown that in 2014, the majority of these orders (77%) involved national agencies, while the
remainder were directed at municipal or departmental authorities (URT, 2015: 119).
The land restitution policy is ambitious because the potential demand for land restitution
is enormous. Government statistics from the Registry of Victims (Registro U´nico de Vı´ctimas)
show at least 3.6 million displaced persons from the armed conflict since 1985. The size of territory
that has been abandoned or dispossessed is equally great. An analysis of data from the Registry of
Abandoned Lands and Territories (Registro U´nico de Predios y Territorios Abandonados) estimated
that between 1995-2010 as many as 256,480 families had abandoned over 6.5 million hectares of land
in all of Colombia. Figure 6.1 shows the geographic distribution of forced displacement in Colombia
as recorded by official statistics from 1985-2017. Unlike in other cases of internal displacement, in
Colombia many displaced families did not gather in large camps, but rather moved individually
to major cities, regional urban areas, or safer parts of the countryside (Rodr´ıguez-Garavito and
Franco, 2010: 70). Therefore, it is likely that not all of the potential demand will materialize itself
into actual requests for land restitution.
Nonetheless, the existing demand for restitution is considerable. As of June 2017, there
4Under normal controversies involving conflicting land claims, it would fall on the plaintiff to prove a legal right.
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Figure 6.1.: Geographic distribution in Colombia of Left: displaced persons (1995-2015) andRight:











Figure 6.2.: Time series of the number of requests for land restitution received and the number of
cases presented to restitution courts (cutoff June 2017).
have been 106,830 applications for land restitution in the entire country. Figure 6.1 shows a map
displaying the total number of requests by districts. Of these, the URT has processed 13,919 cases
which have been presented before land restitution courts.5 I compare the number of requests and
cases presented over time since the initiation of the restitution process in Figure 6.2. As can be seen,
there is much remaining demand for land restitution that the URT has yet to address, although
the rate of new requests being presented has quickly dropped off since the initial two years of the
restitution.6
5Official data on the current number of sentences is not presently available. However as of 2015 there were only
1,348 out of 11,267 cases which had resulted in final sentences.
6In addition, many of these requests pertain to land in areas where the government has determined that their are
not sufficient conditions of security to guarantee safe return. The URT is not authorized to process cases in those
areas until security conditions have improved (URT, 2015).
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It is likely that the majority of restitutions will be similar to land formalizations in practice,
as restitution will mostly benefit peasant smallholders who lack a formal title and who have already
returned to their land. According to the National Commission of Reparations and Reconciliation,
as many as 61% of potential beneficiaries of restitution never had a formal title, but rather occupied
state bald´ıo lands with informal or no documentation (CNRR, 2009: 58). Much of the displacement
in Colombia occurred in remote rural areas—precisely the same areas of the agricultural frontier
where peasant farmers possessed land informally and which were far from the reach of central state
institutions (Iba´n˜ez and Mun˜oz, 2010: 279). Many of these regions experienced punctual moments
of violence which caused mass displacements, but after which families soon returned and control over
rural land was never disputed (see e.g., the case of Tablo´n de Go´mez below). While still presenting
legal and bureaucratic challenges, resolving these cases is relatively straightforward and is handled
by administrative restitution magistrates.
When third-parties oppose the process, however, the judicial proceeding becomes contentious
and can quickly become more complex. The main concern with the designers of the restitution
process was over how to protect the rights of victims in precisely these cases. Many feared that
the victimizers—illegal armed groups, former paramilitary or guerrilla soldiers, or their associates—
would still be in possession of land, much like in the case of Northwestern Choco´ villages that I
mention in the introduction to this chapter (Lo´pez, 2010; Herna´ndez, 2011; Berry, 2014). These
cases would present special legal as well as security challenges for the victims involved, and the
restitution process was structured specifically to deal with these cases (see URT, 2015).
However, with the exception of a few emblematic cases that presented these characteris-
tics and which were specifically target by the URT,7 the majority of cases in which a third-party
presents an opposition have been by individuals who are also themselves victims of the armed con-
flict. That is, rather than illegal armed actors, most cases with opposition thus far have involved
smallholding farmers who were displaced from other rural areas and occupied abandoned farmsteads
(Bolivar Jaime and Va´squez Cruz, 2017). However, only a small minority of the total cases (9.3%
7Interviews CE-10-14; CE-1-14; CE-3-17
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according to official statistics from the URT) have third-party opposition. Therefore, the majority
of the cases that the URT will address before the close of the restitution process in 2021 will likely
be without direct opposition and take place in districts where families have already returned and
occupied land, thus making the process more akin to traditional rural titling.
What will be the ultimate result of this process? Even if the Colombia government success-
fully meets the demand for material reparations, will the symbolic recognition of victims in the
process be sufficient to rebuild communities and trust in institutions as De Greiff and other authors
argue is necessary? Thus far, much of the evidence and debate over the land restitution has cen-
tered on procedural aspects and easily quantifiable measures such as the number of cases processed
(Sa´nchez Leo´n, 2017: 233). Of the commentators in favor of land restitution, two principal positions
have emerged. One advocates for greater celerity and coverage of the process (Futuros, 2015), while
the other promotes a more wholistic approach that can be transformative in nature, and which
does not simply restitute past damages but actively promotes rural development (Sa´nchez Leo´n,
2017; Restrepo and Morales, 2014; Bolivar Jaime, Botero Giraldo, and Gutie´rrez Baquero, 2016;
Uprimny-Yepes and Sa´nchez, 2010). While both sides have highlighted important distributional
concerns in the restitution process, thus far the debate has left aside the deeper question of what
the ultimate impact of land restitution has been for the reconstruction of the countryside.
Starting from the perspective of the symbolic effect of rights-recognition, however, we can
better examine the possibilities of land restitution to fulfill the goals of recognition and civic trust in
the transitional justice process. I argue that by examining both the material and symbolic impact
of the restitution process, we can gain a more complete understanding of how restitution impacts
the lives of beneficiaries and rural communities. Specifically, we can determine if the recognition
of victims as rights-bearers and citizens through the restitution process empowers beneficiaries
politically. However, my theory also suggests that if new rights are not also adequately protected,




6.3. Restitution in Tablón de Gómez
As an example of how my theoretical framework can be applied to studying the impact of
Colombia’s land restitution process, I present a brief case study of two villages currently benefiting
from land restitution, El Recuerdo and Pitalito Alto. Both villages lie in the municipality of Tablo´n
de Go´mez in the Northeast corner of Narin˜o, Colombia. Information for this case study comes from
official documents of the URT and direct interviews with smallholding peasants who reside in both
villages and with URT officials in Narin˜o and Bogota´. These interviews follow similar methodology
for respondent selection, interview structure, and analysis as those presented in Chapter 4.
During the 1990s, Tablo´n de Go´mez was under the de facto control of the Southern Block
of the FARC rebel group. Although the guerrillas restricted transportation and access to the
municipality, there were relatively few acts of violence or military operations during that time and
the local government offices still operated as normally in the municipal seat. Between 2002-2003,
Colombian armed forces staged a series of operations in the area to regain control, culminating in
a successful attack on FARC forces in the municipality in April 2003. The confrontation lasted two
weeks, but the violence caused a massive displacement of many families from the villages surrounding
the main town toward other municipalities. After the operations concluded, state forces cleared the
municipality of remaining FARC guerrillas and reestablished full state control.
I selected the municipality of Tablo´n de Go´mez an an emblematic case study that provides a
best case scenario for restitution to have a positive impact. The district has not suffered from armed
attacks since military operation ceased in 2003, most families have returned to their homes over 10
years ago, and land benefiting from restitution is not under dispute with third-parties. Local state
institutions are also relatively robust compared with neighboring districts. In addition, the URT has
undergone extensive outreach there to build local consensus and to emphasize the rights-recognition
aspect of restitution.
My interviews reveal that beneficiaries of restitution in Tablo´n de Go´mez are responding
positively to the restitution process. Many expressed feeling trepidation at the start of the process,
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out of fear of reprisals from armed actors.8 However, all respondents said these fears soon waned after
restitution was underway. A significant factor contributing to the positive response was likely the
access to material benefits as a result of the restitution process. All beneficiaries of land restitution
received development assistance as part of their final sentence, which could include subsidies for
housing, subsidies and credit for agricultural production projects, and other development assistance.
In addition, all residents in the villages (whether they participated in restitution or not) were also
eligible for similar aid and welfare packages as part of Victims’ Law. When describing the restitution
process, all village residents understood it equally as a titling program that restored their land rights
and as a benefits program. Many mentioned titling and benefits in the same breath: “The restitution
was where they told us ‘this land is yours,’ and they are going to give you a project so you can live,
so you can get ahead.”9
Overall, however, beneficiaries interpreted the program as a recognition of their rights. This
recognition was not only in the form of rights to their land, but also to the access to state subsidies
and services as a right itself, and not just as assistance or aid. First, many noted the importance
of the titles given out through restitution and how it could offer greater security against future
violence.10 Most beneficiaries insisted in the importance of restitution titles even though they had
also undergone titling previously through the INCODER program for the same property.11 One
woman felt particularly empowered by the effort of the URT to recognize titles for couples in the
name of both the man and the woman:
Before only the men had access to land, women couldn’t get any. It was just cook and
take care of the husband. They didn’t give titles to women. Now the advantage of the
Land Restitution Unit is that they think that women also have the right to a land title,
not just the men, because us women also do part of the farm work.12
8E.g. interviews C5-1A-CG, C5-2-CG, C4-1-JM, C4-4-JM
9Interview C5-5-JM “La restitucio´n de tierras, que fue donde ya nos dijeron si, este predio es suyo, y se le va a dar
un proyecto para que viva, para que salga adelante.”
10E.g. Interviews 5-2-CG, C4-2-NR
11E.g. Interviews C4-3-NR, C4-2-NR, 5-2-CG, 5-3-CG
12Interview C4-2-NR “Antes como las tierras solo las acced´ıan los hombres no ma´s, a una mujer no le daban. Que uno
era solamente era, dizque era cocinar y llevarle al esposo. Un t´ıtulo, a las mujer no lo daban. Ahora es tambie´n la
ventaja de la unidad de restitucio´n de tierras que ellos piensan que pues, vieron de que las mujeres tambie´n tienen
derecho de tener un t´ıtulo de propiedad, no solamente los hombres porque nosotras tambie´n hacemos parte de los
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Second, when describing the process, participants articulated their entitlement to benefits of the
restitution process as a right with a corresponding obligation of the state to comply.13 Many
respondents described the restitution process as a recognition of rights: “And the government has
to comply with everything it says there, no? Well, it’s because of the sentence, they have to comply
because there it says everything you have a right to, like housing, projects, things like that. So they
have to follow through with all of that.”14 This emphasis on rights was also likely strengthened
by the form in which restitution came: a judicial sentence. As one beneficiary noted: “We were so
delighted, we looked over the sentence, and there were many orders for productive projects. . . It
said ‘the Agricultural Housing Bank is ordered.” And another ordered SENA to provide trainings!
All of these orders you have as long as they give you a sentence. Now the judge ordered it and if
they don’t comply, well, I’ll go over and demand it!”15 This response was also in contrast to other
villages that had not undergone restitution, and where peasant farmers did not refer to access to
state benefits in the form of a right, but simply as state aid or a welfare benefit.
From the above description I draw two primary conclusions about the potential symbolic
impact of rights-recognition under Colombia’s Victims’ Law. First, as demonstrated by the changing
perspective and sense of empowerment in many beneficiaries’ responses, land restitution has the
potential to be a transformative process that not only provides material benefits, but also important
symbolic recognition. This recognition could be vital for connecting reparations efforts with broader
transitional justice goals and to ensure that victims truly feel empowered and not simply “bought-
off” through reparations schemes (De Greiff, 2012: 36). Second, the wholistic approach undertaken
by the URT in this case and advocated by many proponents of land restitution in Colombia is likely
necessary to fulfill these goals. This strategy is necessarily more difficult and time consuming, as
trabajos del campo.”
13E.g. interviews C5-5-JM, C5-4-CG, C4-6A-NR
14Interview C4-3-NR “Y el gobierno tiene que cumplir con todo lo que dice ahi, ¿no? Entonces, eso es por la sentencia
ellos tiene que cumplirle a uno. Por que ahi dice a todo lo que uno tiene derecho. Que a la vivienda, a los proyectos,
todo eso. Entonces ellos le cumplen por todo eso.”
15Interview C4-6A-NR “Entonces ah´ı nosotros pues ya nos fuimos muy contentos, ya miramos la sentencia, ya hab´ıa
muchas o´rdenes en proyecto productivo. Dec´ıa:“se ordena al banco Agrario vivienda.” Otro que va ordenando al
Sena capacitaciones. Todas las o´rdenes uno tiene que siempre, y cuando te lo entregan una sentencia. Pues que si
ya ordeno´ el juez y si no me cumplen pues alla´ le reclamo.”
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it requires simultaneously recognizing rights and reconstructing state institutions in former conflict
zones, and therefore may limit the ultimate geographical reach of the restitution process. However,
without these institution-building efforts, the empowerment of the restitution process can easily
convert rights into grievances and erode trust, thereby hampering the broader goals of transitional
justice.
6.4. Other Fundamental Rights
In the remainder of this chapter, I discuss several key implications and take-aways of my the-
ory for other areas of social science research. First, I discuss how to apply my theory to other kinds
of fundamental rights. Although my focus here has been on legal property rights, the underlying
driver of the symbolic effect is the recognition of an importance right by the state. Therefore, the
impact of rights should not be restricted only to property rights, but should extend to any right
which holds sufficient political or moral weight as a claim. These would include fundamental, con-
stitutional, or human rights that conforms to Dworkin’s (1977) definition of a right in the “strong
sense”—that is, as a moral claim to a benefit or entitlement that requires special consideration by
the state (194). I briefly outline how my theory can apply to three specific rights: voting rights,
free speech rights, and collective property rights.
In the case of voting rights, the symbolic effect would likely have a direct impact on the
political identity of a rights-bearer as a citizen. Unlike the case with property rights, it is more
difficult to distinguish conceptually between the symbolic and material effects for suffrage rights.16
The material effect would result from any change in expectation that an individual can participate
in or affect the outcome of a given election. Given the relatively sparse material benefits expected
from casting a vote or influencing election results (Aldrich, 1993), the material effect should be
inconsequential for most cases. However, material benefits could be an important consideration in
clientelistic electoral regimes in which votes are more closely tied with individually targeted benefits.
What symbolic impact would granting recognition of suffrage have on an individual? The




main effect will be to strengthen perceptions of who is a legitimate participant in the national
political process. It could result in a change in self-identity as someone whose opinions should be
taken into account, and may result in a higher likelihood of publicly voicing those opinions. It
could also increase the willingness for an individual to demand that current political representatives
take her preferences into account when deciding policy, and that her voice should be taken into
consideration even outside of electoral cycles.
For the right to free speech, the material effect is the change in expectation that an individual
will successfully be able to publicly communicate a political opinion. This could result from a change
in expectation that the state will not prevent the of speech or subsequently penalize that act. It
could also result from the expectation that the state will guarantee a proper forum for engaging in
an act of free speech in which third-parties will not interfere. In contrast, the symbolic effect would
legitimize an individual’s right to publicly share and express their political views. This could change
an individual’s perception of self-efficacy in expressing their viewpoint or increase their belief in the
value of participating in politics more generally.
Measuring the symbolic effect of the recognition of suffrage rights or free speech rights on
political participation would be difficult, considering that such rights are, by definition, a necessary
requirement for voting or expressing a public opinion. However, there could be broader, horizontal
impacts on political behavior and engagement before other state institutions that would be inter-
esting avenues of research to explore. In addition, examining the impact of recognizing voting or
free speech rights which are not effectively guaranteed in practice could also be a fruitful avenue of
inquiry.
Finally, the symbolic impact of collective property rights could provide new insight for both
political economy theory and current policy-making goals related to the recognition of ethnic group
rights, mitigation of climate change, and conservation of forests. This study has focused exclusively
on individual property rights, only examining a case of collective titling as a contrast to state
protection of individual rights (see Chapter 4). However, collective property rights themselves
could have an important impact on the political behavior. Political economy literature has long
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recognized the importance of collective ownership arrangements and local institutions in managing
common pool resources and resolving collective action problems (Ostrom, 1990; Agrawal, 2007;
De Janvry, Sadoulet, and Wolford, 2001). Collective titling for ethnic groups has also become an
increasingly common policy choice for improving forest management (Larson, Barry, and Dahal,
2010; Velez, 2011), and struggles for collective rights have driven much political mobilization in
Latin America (Arce, 2014; Saffon Sanin, 2015).
The majority of the work on the impact of collective titles on local resource management
has focused on ways in which collective property rights mimic the material benefits of individual
property rights, for example by increasing clarity of property claims or strengthening tenure secu-
rity (e.g. Mendelsohn, 1994; Barbier and Burgess, 2001). However, more recent literature has noted
the potential for collective property rights to also strengthen community-level government (Pen˜a
et al., 2017; Blackman et al., 2017) or foster cooperation norms (Braaten, 2014). Could collective
property rights also have an important symbolic effect on the members of a collective? Collective
property rights likely function as an important political symbol for peasant or indigenous commu-
nities, instilling local government with legitimacy and defining important goals (such as territorial
protection) that community members will have a moral commitment to promote. Understanding
how and under what conditions collective property rights mobilize individuals politically can shed
light on how they improve local governance within indigenous and forest communities. New interest
in titling collective territories, such as the push to title new indigenous communities in the Peruvian
Amazon under the third wave of the PTRT project, can also be new opportunities for empirically
testing these effects.
6.5. Contentious Politics and Rights-Based Frames
This study can also contribute to expanding our understanding of the power of conceptual
frames for social movements and cycles of contentious politics. Scholars of social movements in
general (Snow et al., 1986; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001) and rights movements in particular
(Scheingold, 2010; Epp, 1998), have long recognized the importance of conceptual frames in mobi-
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lizing supporters and allies. However most studies either start from the assumption that certain
frames are rhetorically powerful, such as fundamental or human rights, or deny that such motiva-
tions alone cannot adequately explain outcomes. Fewer scholars have attempted to study the actual
impacts of conceptual frames and frame choice on political behavior (e.g Simmons, 2016; Beckwith,
2014). My theory provides a structure for explaining why a powerful frame—fundamental rights—
can mobilize individuals even in the absence of a strong expectation of material benefits. This is
particularly significant given the resilience social movements often need to persist in the face of
repeated set-backs (Beckwith, 2014). In addition, I also lay out an empirical strategy for statisti-
cally testing the impact of conceptual frames on actual behavior. This is a major step forward, as
the vast majority of studies on frames in social movement literature have relied almost exclusively
on in-depth, qualitative case studies, which are rich sources of data for theory construction, but of
limited use for hypothesis testing.
In turn, this could help resolve entrenched debates within the literature on the ultimate
impact of frame-choice on social movement outcomes. Can rights better mobilize support than other
conceptual frames? Many scholars have expressed concern that rights-based frames, while powerful
rhetorically, can interfere with movement goals because they privilege legal professionals and legal
strategies (Rosenberg, 2008), reduce room for democratic debate (Glendon, 2008), or potentially
cause backlashes and counter-movements (Klarman, 1994; Greenhouse and Siegel, 2010). Other
critics have argued that liberal rights can engender complacency with the current political status
quo, as they “construct an illusory politics of equality, liberty, and community in the domain of the
state,” (Brown, 1995: 114) and thus weaken support for radical change among marginalized groups.
By carefully selecting cases where important rights change (such as titling programs), scholars
of social movements can measure the changes in activating a rights-based framework, potentially
shedding light on these debates. In addition, this strategy can also explain when and where certain
entitlements will spark mobilization, such as social security versus health care in the United State
(Romer, 1996; Levitsky, 2008). It can also help inform debates on the impact of enumerated rights
that are not directly justiciable or enforced by courts, such as social, economic, and cultural rights,
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that some commentators argue are therefore not “rights” per se (Roth, 2004).
Similarly, my work can help explain how international human rights—powerful symbols with
weak enforcement mechanism—can produce policy change. Scholars have long debated whether
human rights affect state behavior (Simmons and Hopkins, 2005; Von Stein, 2005), or are epiphe-
nomenal and subsidiary to considerations of power and material interest (Goldsmith and Posner,
2005). Empirically measuring the impact of human rights is notoriously difficult to test directly, but
examining programs that expand recognitions of rights on a gradual basis could be a way to test
some of the micro-foundations of theory on how human rights law influences states. Specifically,
several scholars have argued that human rights law affects state behavior by socializing state offi-
cials (Goodman and Jinks, 2004) or providing motivational frames for social mobilization (Simmons,
2009). My theory and empirical strategy can directly test these hypotheses and also help explain
how rights-based frames can mobilize supporters even where chances of changing policy are low.
If rights frames can legitimize grievances and promote engagement with the state, can they
also increase demand for broader political change? This question is central to debates regarding the
potential for new rights-consciousness to emerge in China or other authoritarian contexts. Several
authors have argued that the existence of new formal rights can spark claim-making, potentially
leading to new demands on the state for greater participation or liberalizing reforms (Pils, 2005;
O’Brien and Li, 2006). Others have argued that this will lead only to “rules-consciousness” (Perry,
2009), which will funnel claim-making through official channels and reduce contentious mobilization
(Lorentzen and Scoggins, 2015). My theory supports arguments that rights can spark new grievances
and claim-making toward the state, but that this is likely dependent upon the capacity of the state
to guarantee those rights in practice, and thus where capacity is strong, calls for broader political
change may not materialize.
Finally, this work can also help resolve whether legal property rights can reduce conflict
related to disputes over land. Under a rational-choice framework, greater clarity over property
rights should reduce conflict as parties are better able to bargain, assuming that there are few or no
transaction costs (see Coase, 1960). However, under normal circumstances with costly information,
213
Conclusion
weak credibility, or the inability to bargain before encroaching on property rights, greater clarity
and enforceability of rights will also increase the probability of a successful claim. This would
create a positive incentive for property owners to take conflicts to court (increasing conflict) but
also for potential encroachers to exercise greater caution (thereby reducing conflict) (Priest and
Klein, 1984). However, as I have shown in Chapter 5, titling can increase perceived grievances,
leading to greater claim-making under certain conditions.17 This could potentially lead to greater
conflict, particularly if stronger legal rights trigger deeply-held moral convictions, which have been
associated with a refusal to bargain and barriers to conflict resolution (Skitka, Bauman, and Sargis,
2005). Given the potential for rights frameworks to facilitate contentious mobilization, could titling
programs and stronger legal property rights exacerbate conflicts in areas with competing claims over
land? In rural areas of many Latin American countries, conflict over land control and resources
extractive industries have frequently sparked political resistance and mobilization (Bebbington,
2012; Arce, 2014). Understanding how legal rights affect the potential for contentious protest can
help explain when and where such events occur.
6.6. Voting Behavior
Finally, this study proposes a new perspective for understanding claim-making as an impor-
tant driver of political engagement, and in particular electoral participation. This relationship has
been clear in the contentious politics literature, as noted above, but this connection has not yet
received due consideration in the literature on electoral turnout. Rights-recognition, just as in the
case of mobilizing contentious protests, can also be a powerful frame for mobilizing voters for reasons
that go beyond mere economic interest. This has important implications for our understanding not
only of why voters turnout for elections, but also for explaining how voters form preferences and
the impact of property rights on clientelism.
A robust theoretical and empirical body of literature on democratic accountability has de-
bated whether voters sanction politicians for poor performance at the polls (Duch and Stevenson,
17The limited empirical work on this question thus far have produced conflicting results (Albertus, Brambor, and
Ceneviva, 2016; Fetzer and Marden, 2017)
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2008; Anderson, 2007). Evidence suggests that multiple factors, such as international markets (Al-
can˜iz and Hellwig, 2011) or informational costs (Ferraz and Finan, 2008; Arias et al., 2018), can
influence voters’ interpretation of a politician’s performance and prevent them from exerting demo-
cratic control. However can a strong conceptual frame have impact on voter preferences as much
as poor economic performance? Political psychology literature has shown that strong moral convic-
tions (which are activated when fundamental rights are violated, for example) are highly predictive
of voter choice (Morgan, Skitka, and Wisneski, 2010; Skitka and Bauman, 2008). If conceptual
frames such as rights guide an individual’s understanding of justified claims, grievances, and when
it is appropriate to make demands on the state, they will also influence individual decision-making
at the polls. In this sense, the breaking of a commitment by denying a right may be a powerful
factor that at times drives certain voters to punish an incumbent or favor a challenger.
In regards to clientelism, many authors have posited that weak property rights protections,
in particular for the poor, can facilitate machine politics and engender relationships of dependency
between the electorate and the political elite (Kitschelt, Wilkinson et al., 2007; Magaloni, 2006).
This dynamic is most patent regarding property rights over land, and particularly in Latin America,
promises of land reform or redistribution have consistently followed openings of the electorate to
the rural poor (Lapp, 2004). However, many land reforms have only been partial, and resulted in
incomplete property rights that then leave poor communities vulnerable to political manipulation
(Albertus, 2015: 99).
Can land titling and rights-recognition erode clientelistic structures? Some empirical work
has suggested that this may be the case in Mexico from the breakup of communal ejidos (Dower and
Pfutze, 2015; Larreguy, Marshall, and Trucco, 2015). However, my results suggest that this is not
always the case. Specifically for areas where titling does not increase property tenure, new rights
recognition may have little effect on support for clientelistic parties. My theory also implies that
voters will adjust their behavior simply from the recognition of rights, and that this can potentially
mobilize political support for incumbents. If, as Albertus (2015) suggests, the transfer of de facto
property tenure without de jure rights can increase dependency on politicians (Albertus, 2015), can
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the reverse also be true? A deeper look at how legal rights, perceived grievances, and clientelistic
structures interact will provide greater insight into how clientelism may persist even under contexts
of institutional reform.
6.7. Concluding Remarks
I have made two claims throughout this study. First, I argue that legal rights, and in
particular fundamental rights such as the right to property, have an important symbolic effect that
can empower political engagement with the state even in the absence of material benefits. This
symbolic effect derives from the meaning with which rights are imbued. Specifically, they define
morally just and appropriate claims that can be made toward the state, and legitimate actors to make
these privileged claims. Second, I argue that this symbolic effect is strongest in areas where rights
are most vulnerable. Where entitlements are ill-protected, legal rights will legitimize grievances and
empower individuals to demand protection from the state. This effect is not dependent upon the
expectation that the state will adequately protect rights, but that the state ought to protect these
entitlements.
Drawing from several sources of data, including time series of titling and political engagement,
interviews with peasant farmers, and historical information, I have provided an initial validation
of my theory in two separate contexts and across a range of measurements. Both historically and
today, legal property rights are significant for peasant farmers in both Peru and Colombia, even when
titles should not otherwise affect rational expectations of material benefits. I have found consistent
evidence that the recognition of legal property rights for peasant farmers tends to increase political
engagement with the state. However, it does so only in areas where rights are relatively weak due
to lack of state capacity to enforce them. I have also shown some evidence of eroding trust in the
state in areas of weak state institutions, suggesting that the rights are most effective at mobilizing
engagement when they shape perceptions on legitimate grievances.
While this body of evidence provides initial support for my theory, no single study can
conclusive prove the mechanisms behind complex political phenomena, and further research should
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push past the limitations of my empirical analysis. First, further studies should improve on my initial
attempts to show causal identification of the impact of legal property right. The randomization
of legal property rights in the field is difficult and implies important ethical concerns (Ali et al.,
2014; Goldstein et al., 2015), however lab-in-the-field type experiments where researchers randomize
symbolic political entitlements to small benefits could provide additional means of testing my theory.
Another limitation of my study is the reliance on district-level data on political engagement and
titling. Future studies can use more refined data that can estimate the individual-level effects of
titling on behavior.
Theoretically, my description of the symbolic effect of rights should be seen as a starting
point for understanding how legal rights can influence political behavior; additional theorizing and
questioning of how the symbolic and material benefits of rights interact is needed to further flesh
out this explanation. One important questions left by my analysis is why legal rights do not exercise
such a strong effect where tenure security is high and rights are adequately protected. I explain
this as a “dampening” effect on political engagement due to a feeling that one’s interests are more
secure. However, is there still a latent potential for political engagement that is not yet activated
for these individuals? New research that can exploit an exogenous source of variation on perceived
threats towards entitlements can help resolve this question. For areas that have experienced rural
titling, large development projects such as mines and dams often are a source of conflict and could
provide a useful mechanism to test these effects. Similarly, new research should explore how changes
in enforcement can alter the symbolic effect of rights. If newly granted rights create legitimate
grievances in areas of weak state enforcement, will changes in enforcement affect levels of political
engagement for individuals who have long held secure rights?
Finally, while I examine changes in legal rights for individuals who already possess material
assets, what effect do legal rights have for individuals who do not yet enjoy any material benefits
guaranteed by the right? This is often the case for politicians who make promises of future material
benefits prior to an election or as a strategy to mobilize support. If an electoral promise is made in
the form of a legal right, is this likely to generate more mobilization and support?
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I began this study by asking why peasant farmers in remote areas of Colombia and Peru
placed so much faith in legal titles. For many rural villages, state institutions charged with enforcing
property rights are either distant, ineffective, or both, and farmers had managed internal disputes
reasonably well with informal documentation in the past. Were peasant farmers simply acting
irrationally to an overinflated expectation of what a written, legal document con provide? To
answer this inquiry, it was necessary to start from the perspective that legal rights represent not
only a material benefit that can proxy for economic value or tenure security, but also as a political
symbol that defines appropriate behavior and provides meanings to identities of citizens as political
actors.
My focus on the non-material effects of legal rights differentiates my theory from prior studies
of property rights. Most political economy scholars start from the understanding of a property right
as synonymous with property tenure—that is, the expectation of extracting value from property
(Barzel, 1997). Instead, I focus on the “right” itself as a moral claim to protection and special
consideration by the state. This shift in perspective is not to deride earlier literature on property
rights or contradict the important insights and evidence amassed regarding the impact of economic
property rights on behavior. My argument instead is that this perspective is incomplete and in need
a broader theory that can also explain how legal rights can influence behavior and convey meaning
even when they do not otherwise change material benefits.
This argument highlights a cross-cutting theme of this entire study: that institutions such
as legal property rights are significant not only because they inform rational expectations, but also
because they themselves provide meaning to political behavior and identities. In this sense, the idea
of the right is just as powerful for explaining behavior as the material goods it protects. Scholars
should continue pursuing this perspective to explore the varied ways institutions mold political life.
My hope is that this study motivates other scholars to refine, correct, and further verify my work in
the goal of understanding why rights continue to be such a powerful and influential idea in politics.
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4.5.3.1. Titles in land conflicts
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5.7. Hiring migrant labor
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7.1. Taxes and titling
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8.2. State Protects Rights
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• Tables A.1 and A.2 provides summary statistics for the survey data sets using the LAPOP
(Colombia) and ENAHO (Peru) surveys, respectively.
• Figures A.1 and A.2 are histograms showing the distribution of titling over the data sets for
Colombia and Peru, respectively.
• Figures A.3 and A.4 show scatter plots of the institutional weakness measure and titling





















































































































































Table A.1.: Summary statistics for Colombia LAPOP survey data set, segregated by municipalities
with tiling (titling intensity ≥ 0.01) and those without titling during the period of 2004-















Figure A.1.: Histogram of the titling intensity measure across the Colombia data set.
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Table A.2.: Summary statistics for Peru ENAHO survey data set, segregated by districts with tiling
(titling intensity ≥ 0.01) and those without titling during the period of 2002-2007. Mean




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































• Table A.3 provides full text and responses of ENAHO survey questions on political behavior.
• Table A.4 provides full text and responses of LAPOP survey questions on political behavior.
• Figure A.5 shows marginal effect plots for the effect of titling under different values of the
institutional strength variable for ENAHO survey data (Peru).
• Figure A.6 shows marginal effect plots for the effect of titling under different values of the
institutional strength variable for LAPOP survey data (Colombia).
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Appendix
Dep. Variable Survey Question Responses
Behavioral
Vote Did you vote in the previous elections? Dichotomous
Ha votado Ud. en las u´ltimas elecciones?
Political Interest Are you interested in politics? Interested; Indifferent; uninterested
¿A Ud. la pol´ıtica: Le interesa; Le es indiferente; Le
desagrada
Political Inform. How often do you inform yourself on current politics Never; Only if I am interested in a
in the country? certain issue; Occasionally;
Frequently
Con que frecuencia usted se informa sobre la actualidad Nunca; So´lo cuando me interesa
pol´ıtica en el pa´ıs? algu´n tema; De vez en cuando;
Frecuentemente
Jud. Service In the last 12 months, have you or a member of Dichotomous
your household used any of the following services:
Proceedings before the Judiciary?
En los u´ltimos 12 meses, Ud. o algu´n miembro del
hogar ha hecho uso de los servicios, tales como:
Tra´mites en el poder judicial
Muni. Service In the last 12 months, have you or a member of Dichotomous
your household used any of the following services:
Proceedings in the Municipal Government?
En los u´ltimos 12 meses, Ud. o algu´n miembro del
hogar ha hecho uso de los servicios, tales como:
Tra´mites en la Municipalidad
Attitudinal
Trust in Do you have trust in institutions such as the Judiciary? Not at all; A little; Somewhat; A lot
the Judiciary Tiene Ud. confianza en las instituciones tales como Nada; Poco; Suficiente; Bastante
El Poder Judicial?
Trust in Police Do you have trust in institutions such as the National Police? Not at all; A little; Somewhat; A lot
Tiene Ud. confianza en las instituciones tales como Nada; Poco; Suficiente; Bastante
La Polic´ıa Nacional?
Importance In your opinion, the importance of having democracy Not at all; A little; Somewhat; A lot
of Democracy in a government is:
En su opinio´n la importancia que tiene la democracia Nada; Poco; Suficiente; Bastante
en un gobierno es:
Equality in Law According to you, in Peru is there respect for Equality Not at all; A little; Somewhat; A lot
before the Law?
Segu´n Ud. en el Peru´ hay respeto por: La igualdad Nada; Poco; Suficiente; Bastante
frente a la ley?




Dep. Variable Survey Question Responses
Behavioral
Vote Did you vote in the previous presidential elections of [year]? Dichotomous
¿Voto´ usted en las u´ltimas elecciones presidenciales de [an˜o]
Political Interest How much interest do you have in politics? Not at all; A little; Somewhat;
A lot
¿Que´ tanto intere´s tiene usted en la pol´ıtica? mucho, algo, poco o nada
Conflict Resolution Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las Dichotomous
comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver
por s´ı mismas, y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a
algu´n funcionario u oficina del gobierno. ¿Para poder
resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido usted
ayuda o cooperacio´n ... ¿A algu´n concejal de su
municipio? ¿A algu´n Conciliador o Juez de paz?
¿A la Polic´ıa?
Protest ¿En los u´ltimos doce meses, ha participado en una sometimes, almost never, never
manifestacio´n o protesta pu´blica?
¿Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca?
algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca
Attitudinal
Trust in How much confidence do you have in the justice system? Not at all; A little; Somewhat;
A lot
the Judiciary ¿Hasta que´ punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia? Nada; Poco; Suficiente; Bastante
Trust in Police How much confidence do you have in the police? Not at all; A little; Somewhat;
A lot
¿Hasta que´ punto tiene confianza en la Polic´ıa? Nada; Poco; Suficiente; Bastante
Democracy In general, would you say that you are ... with the way Very unsatisfied; Unsatisfied;
Functions in work democracy works in Colombia? Satisfied; Very satisfied
En general, ¿dir´ıa que esta´ ... con la forma en que la Muy satisfecho; Satisfecho;
democracia funciona en Colombia? Insatisfecho; Muy insatisfecho
Vote Effective Do you believe that the vote can improve things in the Dichotomous
future or do you believe that no matter how you vote,
things will not improve?
¿Cree que el voto puede mejorar las cosas en el futuro
o cree que como quiera que vote, las cosas no van
a mejorar?
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Figure A.5.: Comparison of conditional effects of institutional weakness (Rondas Campesinas pres-
ence in 1993) on the estimated marginal effects of PTRT titling program for behav-
ioral survey responses. Left: Questions on voting, using judicial services, and using
municipal government services. Right: Questions on political interest and political
information. Black line represents point estimates of the marginal effect of treatment
for different values of Rondas and rug plots show common support for different values
of the interaction term. Grey bands are 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure A.6.: Comparison of conditional effects of institutional weakness (judicial institutions) on the
estimated marginal effects of titling program for behavioral survey responses. Left:
Questions on political interest and willingness to use state conflict resolution services.
Right: Questions on voting and participation in protests. Black line represents point
estimates of the marginal effect of treatment for different values of judicial institutions
and rug plots show common support for different values of the interaction term. Grey
bands are 95% confidence intervals.
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A.3. Parallel Trends Analysis
• Table A.5 shows the parallel trends test of regressing the timing of titling on the change in
election outcomes for the first period (electoral cycle).
• Table A.6 shows additional parallel trends test for municipal elections in Peru, using the lagged
values and changes in value of the dependent variable from prior time periods (electoral cycle).
• Tables A.7, A.8, and A.9 show parallel trends test for Colombia regressing the timing of titling
on the change in outcome variables (municipal election, presidential election, and judicial cases,
respectively) for the first period of the data set (electoral cycle or year).
• Tables A.10, A.11, and A.12 show additional parallel trends test for municipal elections,
presidential elections, and judicial cases in Colombia, using the lagged values and changes in




Delay Until Titling (Years)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Change Turnout (Muni) 0.432 0.345
(0.979) (1.093)
Change Turnout (Muni):Rondas 1.932
(3.594)




Depart. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No No No
Observations 1,604 1,529 1,502 1,443
Adjusted R2 0.084 0.080 0.077 0.073
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table A.5.: Robustness check for parallel trends assumption in Peru. Models regress delay in titling
program (in years) on the change in municipal turnout (Models 1-2) and Fujimori party
vote share (Models 3-4) from first period in the data set (electoral cycle). All models
include department fixed effects. Null results indicate that electoral outcomes do not





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
















Years 4 4 2 2 4 4 2 2
Districts 1638 1543 1624 1545 1638 1543 1610 1535
Start Year 1998 1998 1995 1995 1998 1998 1995 1995
End Year 2010 2010 1998 1998 2010 2010 1998 1998
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,493 6,156 3,126 2,988 6,485 6,149 3,109 2,975
Adjusted R2 0.579 0.581 −0.024 −0.026 0.580 0.582 −0.021 −0.024
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table A.6.: Additional robustness check for parallel trends assumption in Peru. Models regress
titling on lagged outcome variables (Models 1-2; 5-6) and the change in outcome vari-
ables (Models 3-4; 7-8) for municipal elections in Peru. Outcome variables tested include
turnout (Models 1-4) and Fujimori party vote share (Models 5-8). All models include





Delay Until Titling (Years)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Change Turnout −2.782 −1.247
(3.200) (4.080)
Change Turnout:Jud. Inst. −39.726
(56.865)
Change Pres. Party −0.637 −0.428
(0.752) (1.053)
Change Pres. Party:Jud. Inst. −6.365
(11.169)
Rural 0.962 1.478 1.466 2.144∗
(1.213) (1.233) (1.064) (1.093)
Mun. Income (log) −0.123 0.028 0.013 0.090
(0.252) (0.254) (0.260) (0.268)
Displacement (log) 2.029∗∗∗ 2.490∗∗∗ −0.243 0.033
(0.723) (0.755) (0.824) (0.847)
Victims (log) −1.607∗∗ −2.051∗∗∗ 0.506 0.143
(0.753) (0.791) (0.842) (0.868)
GDP per cap. (log) 0.168 0.233
(0.412) (0.427)
Armed Actors 0.172 −0.003
(0.278) (0.284)
Muni FE No No No No
Year FE No No No No
Observations 401 378 490 457
Adjusted R2 0.155 0.161 0.111 0.125
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table A.7.: Robustness check for parallel trends assumption in Colombia for municipal electoral
outcomes. Models regress delay in titling program (in years) on the change in municipal
turnout (Models 1-2) and President’s party vote share (Models 3-4) from first period
in the data set (electoral cycle). All models include department fixed effects. Null





Delay Until Titling (Years)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Change Turnout 2.138 −0.545
(2.186) (3.355)
Change Turnout:Jud. Inst. 30.616
(40.676)
Change Incumbent 5.579∗∗∗ 4.465∗∗
(1.676) (2.218)
Change Incumbent:Jud. Inst. 29.381
(23.104)
Rural 1.034 1.475 0.509 0.946
(0.973) (1.004) (0.872) (0.879)
Mun. Income (log) −0.138 −0.160 −0.152 −0.132
(0.156) (0.170) (0.160) (0.161)
Displacement (log) −0.377 −0.182 −0.004 0.138
(0.843) (0.855) (0.699) (0.706)
Victims (log) 0.948 0.724 0.356 0.161
(0.883) (0.905) (0.713) (0.723)
GDP per cap. (log) 0.165 0.211
(0.327) (0.340)
Armed Actors −0.058 −0.058
(0.241) (0.246)
Muni FE No No No No
Year FE No No No No
Observations 495 463 501 466
Adjusted R2 0.135 0.137 0.139 0.159
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table A.8.: Robustness check for parallel trends assumption in Colombia for presidential electoral
outcomes. Models regress delay in titling program (in years) on the change in municipal
turnout (Models 1-2) and incumbent’s party vote share (Models 3-4) from first period
in the data set (electoral cycle). All models include department fixed effects. Null





Delay Until Titling (Years)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Change All Cases 0.0001 −0.001
(0.0002) (0.001)
Change All Cases:Jud. Inst. 0.020∗
(0.011)
Change Civil Cases −0.0004 −0.002
(0.0005) (0.001)
Change Civil Cases:Jud. Inst. 0.032
(0.025)
Rural 1.575 2.185∗∗ 1.721∗ 2.337∗∗
(0.963) (0.977) (0.932) (0.949)
Mun. Income (log) −0.083 −0.087 −0.088 −0.084
(0.079) (0.080) (0.079) (0.080)
Displacement (log) −0.255 −0.382 −0.247 −0.382
(0.451) (0.512) (0.451) (0.513)
Victims (log) 0.778 0.929∗ 0.773 0.927∗
(0.488) (0.551) (0.488) (0.552)
GDP per cap. (log) −0.001 0.086 −0.006 0.063
(0.347) (0.353) (0.347) (0.354)
Armed Actors −0.035 −0.051 −0.032 −0.024
(0.217) (0.218) (0.217) (0.219)
Muni FE No No No No
Year FE No No No No
Observations 501 466 501 466
Adjusted R2 0.133 0.156 0.134 0.153
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table A.9.: Robustness check for parallel trends assumption in Colombia for judicial cases presented.
Models regress delay in titling program (in years) on the change in all new cases pre-
sented (Models 1-2) and new civil cases presented (Models 3-4) from first period in the
data set (year). All models include department fixed effects. Null results indicate that









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Turnout (t-1) 0.012∗∗ 0.011
(0.005) (0.007)
Turnout (t-1):Jud. Inst 0.026
(0.128)
Pres. Party (t-1) −0.002 −0.003∗
(0.001) (0.002)
Pres. Party (t-1):Jud. Inst 0.013
(0.012)
Change Turnout −0.006∗∗ −0.009∗
(0.002) (0.006)
Change Turnout:Jud. Inst 0.096
(0.140)
Change Pres. Party 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Change Pres. Party:Jud. Inst −0.004
(0.006)
Rural −0.048∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗ −0.049 −0.046 −0.051∗∗ −0.051∗∗ −0.049 −0.046
(0.019) (0.019) (0.036) (0.036) (0.020) (0.020) (0.036) (0.036)
Mun. Income (log) 0.001 0.001 −0.001 −0.001 0.001 0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Displacement (log) 0.001 0.001 0.0003 −0.00003 0.001 0.001 0.0003 −0.0001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Victims (log) −0.001 −0.001 −0.0005 0.00001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.0004 0.00004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Years 4 4 2 2 4 4 2 2
Municipalities 544 499 544 499 544 499 541 497
Start Year 2003 2003 2011 2011 2003 2003 2011 2011
End Year 2015 2015 2015 2015 2015 2015 2015 2015
Muni FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,986 1,822 1,076 987 1,949 1,787 1,072 984
Adjusted R2 0.976 0.970 0.993 0.991 0.976 0.969 0.993 0.991
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table A.10.: Additional robustness check for parallel trends assumption for municipal electoral outcomes in Colombia. Models
regress titling on lagged outcome variables (Models 1-2; 5-6) and the change in outcome variables (Models 3-4; 7-
8) for municipal elections in Colombia. Outcome variables tested include turnout (Models 1-4) and President’s
party vote share (Models 5-8). All models include municipality and year fixed effects. Null results indicate









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Turnout (t-1) 0.007∗ 0.007
(0.004) (0.007)
Turnout (t-1):Jud. Inst 0.022
(0.149)
Incumbent (t-1) 0.006∗ 0.003
(0.003) (0.004)
Incumbent (t-1):Jud. Inst 0.032
(0.042)
Change Turnout −0.005 −0.006∗
(0.004) (0.003)
Change Turnout:Jud. Inst 0.011
(0.067)
Change Incumbent 0.002∗∗ 0.002
(0.001) (0.002)
Change Incumbent:Jud. Inst −0.003
(0.017)
Rural −0.050∗∗∗ −0.051∗∗∗ −0.085∗∗ −0.079∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗ −0.051∗∗∗ −0.085∗∗ −0.079∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.034) (0.035) (0.018) (0.017) (0.035) (0.036)
Mun. Income (log) 0.0003 0.0003 −0.001 −0.001 0.0003 0.0003 −0.001 −0.001
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.001)
Displacement (log) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.0002 0.001 0.001 0.0001 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Victims (log) −0.001 −0.001 0.00004 0.001 −0.001 −0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Years 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2
Municipalities 540 496 540 496 540 496 540 496
Start Year 2006 2006 2010 2010 2006 2006 2010 2010
End Year 2014 2014 2014 2014 2014 2014 2014 2014
Muni FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,610 1,481 1,079 991 1,610 1,481 1,079 991
Adjusted R2 0.987 0.983 0.993 0.992 0.987 0.983 0.993 0.992
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table A.11.: Additional robustness check for parallel trends assumption for presidential electoral outcomes in Colombia.
Models regress titling on lagged outcome variables (Models 1-2; 5-6) and the change in outcome variables
(Models 3-4; 7-8) for municipal elections in Colombia. Outcome variables tested include turnout (Models 1-4)
and incumbent’s party vote share (Models 5-8). All models include municipality and year fixed effects. Null









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All Cases (t-1) 0.00002 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001)
All Cases (t-1):Jud. Inst −0.001
(0.001)
Civil Cases (t-1) 0.00001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Civil Cases (t-1):Jud. Inst −0.001
(0.001)
Change All Cases −0.00000 −0.00000
(0.000) (0.00000)
Change All Cases:Jud. Inst −0.00000
(0.00000)
Change Civil Cases −0.000 −0.000
(0.00000) (0.00000)
Change Civil Cases:Jud. Inst −0.00000
(0.00000)
Rural −0.015∗∗ −0.016∗∗ −0.015∗∗ −0.016∗∗ −0.015∗∗ −0.016∗∗ −0.015∗∗ −0.016∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Mun. Income (log) 0.00004 0.0001 0.00004 0.0001 0.00004 0.0001 0.00004 0.0001
(0.00004) (0.0001) (0.00004) (0.0001) (0.00004) (0.0001) (0.00004) (0.0001)
Displacement (log) −0.0001 −0.0003 −0.0001 −0.0003 −0.0001 −0.0003 −0.0001 −0.0003
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Victims (log) 0.0002 0.0004∗∗ 0.0002 0.0004∗∗ 0.0002 0.0004∗∗ 0.0002 0.0004∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Years 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
Municipalities 1101 987 1101 987 1101 987 1101 987
Start Year 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001
End Year 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011
Muni FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,066 10,838 12,066 10,838 12,066 10,838 12,066 10,838
Adjusted R2 0.993 0.992 0.993 0.992 0.993 0.992 0.993 0.992
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table A.12.: Additional robustness check for parallel trends assumption for new judicial cases in Colombia. Models regress
titling on lagged outcome variables (Models 1-2; 5-6) and the change in outcome variables (Models 3-4; 7-8) for
judicial cases. Outcome variables tested include all new cases presented (Models 1-4) and civil cases presented




A.4. Alternative Model Specifications
A.4.1. Rural Districts
• Tables A.13, A.14, and A.15 present results for alternative regression models on electoral
(municipal and presidential) and judicial outcomes for Colombia, using subsets of the data
with only rural districts.
• Tables A.16 and A.17 present results for alternative regression models on electoral outcomes




Turnout Inc. Vote Share Pres. Party Vote Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Titling 0.848∗∗∗ 0.585 −1.155 −1.370 0.766 −0.285
(0.327) (0.367) (2.160) (2.267) (1.030) (1.014)
Titling:Jud. Inst. −5.772∗ −5.277 −2.520 −6.479 −0.713 4.518
(3.177) (3.379) (18.218) (16.145) (9.360) (9.224)
Rural −0.247 1.025∗∗∗ 0.271
(0.183) (0.378) (0.740)
Mun. Income (log) −0.002 0.001 −0.005
(0.001) (0.008) (0.010)
Displacement (log) −0.006 0.062∗∗ 0.103∗∗
(0.007) (0.030) (0.050)
Victims (log) −0.0001 −0.065∗ −0.106∗∗
(0.009) (0.036) (0.041)
Years 5 5 5 5 3 3
Municipalities 591 334 524 289 554 309
Start Year 2000 2000 2000 2000 2007 2007
End Year 2015 2015 2015 2015 2015 2015
Muni FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,547 1,403 1,315 710 1,580 866
Adjusted R2 0.771 0.766 0.179 0.236 0.272 0.290
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table A.13.: Alternative models for municipal election results in Colombia restricting the data to
a subset of only rural municipalities. Rural municipality defined as those with as
proportion of rural residents over the mean for the dataset (0.58). All models include
municipal and year fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the municipal and
year level. Odd numbered models include controls for time-variant measures of the
proportion of rural population, logged municipal income, logged displaced persons,




Turnout Inc. Vote Share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Titling 13.535∗∗∗ 7.478∗∗ 37.839∗∗ 35.378∗∗
(2.836) (3.125) (15.480) (15.807)
Titling:Jud. Inst. −88.849∗∗ −75.153 −296.900∗∗ −271.364∗∗
(41.397) (49.335) (136.281) (127.918)
Rural 0.409 −4.484
(1.687) (3.545)
Mun. Income (log) −0.017 0.242
(0.022) (0.245)
Displacement (log) 0.037 1.018
(0.095) (0.794)
Victims (log) −0.120 −0.834
(0.109) (0.699)
Years 4 4 3 3
Municipalities 586 325 558 308
Start Year 2002 2002 2006 2006
End Year 2014 2014 2014 2014
Muni FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,174 1,193 1,604 877
Adjusted R2 0.728 0.718 0.220 0.236
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table A.14.: Alternative models for presidential election results in Colombia restricting the data
to a subset of only rural municipalities. Rural municipality defined as those with
as proportion of rural residents over the mean for the dataset (0.58). All models
include municipal and year fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the municipal
and year level. Odd numbered models include controls for time-variant measures of
the proportion of rural population, logged municipal income, logged displaced persons,




All Cases (log) Civil Cases (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Titling 11.380∗∗ 9.368 11.162∗∗ 9.207
(5.016) (5.924) (5.029) (5.870)
Titling:Jud. Inst. −105.627∗∗ −124.770∗∗∗ −105.597∗∗ −126.440∗∗∗
(42.249) (40.525) (42.451) (39.518)
Rural −4.320∗ −4.256∗
(2.416) (2.353)
Mun. Income (log) −0.011 −0.012
(0.012) (0.012)
Displacement (log) −0.042 −0.047
(0.067) (0.068)
Victims (log) 0.042 0.050
(0.075) (0.075)
GDP per cap. (log) −0.707∗∗ −0.709∗∗
(0.315) (0.315)
Armed Actors 0.017 0.010
(0.032) (0.033)
Years 12 10 12 10
Municipalities 600 337 600 337
Start Year 2000 2000 2000 2000
End Year 2011 2009 2011 2009
Muni FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,731 3,136 6,731 3,136
Adjusted R2 0.812 0.785 0.804 0.775
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table A.15.: Alternative models for new judicial cases presented in Colombia restricting the data
to a subset of only rural municipalities. Rural municipality defined as those with
as proportion of rural residents over the mean for the dataset (0.58). All models
include municipal and year fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the municipal
and year level. Odd numbered models include controls for time-variant measures of
the proportion of rural population, logged municipal income, logged displaced persons,








Turnout Incumbent Fujimorista Official Turnout (Pres.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Titling 0.101∗∗ 0.071∗ −0.023 −0.033 1.408∗∗∗ 2.225∗∗∗ 0.015 0.055 0.002 −0.023
(0.040) (0.042) (0.033) (0.034) (0.398) (0.630) (0.077) (0.079) (0.029) (0.029)
Tit.:Rondas −0.106∗∗ −0.089∗∗ 0.029 0.056 −1.294∗∗∗ −2.801∗∗∗ 0.042 0.019 −0.015 0.013
(0.042) (0.045) (0.036) (0.039) (0.476) (1.033) (0.084) (0.090) (0.031) (0.034)
Years 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 3
Districts 1543 897 1543 897 1545 897 1543 897 1731 953
Start Year 1995 1995 1995 1995 1993 1993 2002 2002 2001 2001
End Year 2010 2010 2010 2010 1998 1998 2010 2010 2011 2011
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Titled Only No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 7,698 4,474 7,708 4,481 4,528 2,629 4,629 2,691 5,004 2,803
Adjusted R2 0.673 0.696 0.140 0.167 0.479 0.515 0.218 0.228 0.752 0.755
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table A.16.: Alternative models for municipal election results in Peru restricting the data to a subset of only rural munici-
palities (odd numbered models). Rural municipality defined as those with as proportion of rural residents over
the mean for the dataset (0.49). All models include district and year fixed effects and cluster standard errors
at the district and year level. Even numbered models use a subset of municipalities that receive some titling








Vote Pol. Int Pol. Inform. Jud. Services Mun. Services
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Titling 0.281∗∗∗ 1.003∗∗∗ 0.987∗∗∗ 0.112 0.109
(0.096) (0.362) (0.344) (0.073) (0.070)
Titling:Rondas −0.400∗∗∗ −1.082∗∗∗ −1.112∗∗ −0.141∗ −0.173∗∗
(0.125) (0.377) (0.469) (0.078) (0.078)
Age −0.003∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.005 −0.0002 −0.001
(0.001) (0.0003) (0.003) (0.0002) (0.001)
Gender −0.040∗∗ −0.183∗∗∗ −0.262∗∗ 0.006 0.012
(0.019) (0.004) (0.119) (0.004) (0.008)
Poverty 0.011∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ −0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.041) (0.001) (0.006)
Own Home 0.052∗∗∗ 0.014 0.011 −0.003 0.008
(0.013) (0.009) (0.022) (0.006) (0.011)
Ethnic −0.009∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.018 0.003 0.0001
(0.005) (0.008) (0.065) (0.003) (0.005)
Head House 0.063∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗ 0.040∗ 0.003 0.005
(0.017) (0.011) (0.023) (0.005) (0.009)
Education 0.025∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.002
(0.014) (0.007) (0.082) (0.010) (0.009)
Years 4 4 4 5 5
Districts 638 1066 653 788 491
Start Year 2002 2004 2004 2002 2002
End Year 2007 2007 2007 2006 2006
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Titled Only Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 15,625 26,516 16,683 36,117 22,919
Adjusted R2 0.082 0.168 0.165 0.084 0.097
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table A.17.: Alternative models for behavioral survey responses to the EHANO survey in Peru, restricting the data to a
subset of only rural municipalities. Rural municipality defined as those with as proportion of rural residents
over the mean for the dataset (0.49). All models include district and year fixed effects and cluster standard
errors at the district and year level.
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A.4.2. Ordinal Interaction Term and Dropping Outlier Municipalities (Colombia)
• Tables A.18, A.19, and A.20 show results for alternativeAlternative regression models dropping
outlier municipalities with strong institutions (> 0.4).
• Figures A.7 and A.8 show marginal effect plots for models dropping outlier municipalities with
strong institutions (> 0.4).
• Tables A.21, A.22, and A.23, present results for an alternative coding of the judicial institu-
tional interaction term (Colombia) as an ordinal variable.
• Tables A.24 and A.25 present results for an alternative coding of Rondas Campesinas as an
ordinal variable (Peru).
• Table A.26 shows results for regression models on electoral and survey data in Peru, using an




Turnout Inc. Vote Share Pres. Party Vote Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Titling 1.137∗∗∗ 0.858∗∗ −1.173 −1.139 1.328∗ 0.965
(0.333) (0.334) (1.554) (1.885) (0.799) (0.853)
Titling:Jud. Inst. −8.062∗∗ −7.145∗∗ −6.309 −7.696 −2.576 −2.015
(3.567) (3.609) (10.437) (12.857) (8.704) (8.990)
Rural −0.143∗ 0.182 0.680
(0.080) (0.314) (0.415)
Mun. Income (log) −0.002 0.002 0.003
(0.001) (0.006) (0.010)
Displacement (log) −0.010 0.042 0.048
(0.007) (0.027) (0.041)
Victims (log) 0.006 −0.041 −0.056
(0.008) (0.035) (0.047)
Years 5 5 5 5 3 3
Municipalities 980 498 881 444 980 498
Start Year 2000 2000 2000 2000 2007 2007
End Year 2015 2015 2015 2015 2015 2015
Muni FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,581 2,314 2,302 1,156 2,935 1,481
Adjusted R2 0.769 0.750 0.221 0.274 0.222 0.240
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table A.18.: Alternative models for municipal election results in Colombia dropping dropping outlier
municipalities with strong institutions (> 0.4). All models include municipal and
year fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the municipal and year level. Odd
numbered models include controls for time-variant measures of the proportion of rural





Turnout Inc. Vote Share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Titling 0.851∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗ 3.531∗∗∗ 3.345∗∗∗
(0.178) (0.141) (1.061) (1.197)
Titling:Jud. Inst. −3.521∗∗∗ −2.530∗ −17.820∗∗ −15.506∗∗
(1.296) (1.354) (7.100) (6.621)
Rural 0.060 −0.016 0.823 −0.0005
(0.068) (0.093) (0.584) (0.430)
Mun. Income (log) 0.0002 −0.002 0.042 0.049
(0.001) (0.002) (0.026) (0.042)
Displacement (log) −0.012∗ −0.008 0.017 0.163
(0.007) (0.011) (0.042) (0.129)
Victims (log) 0.003 −0.001 0.002 −0.133
(0.007) (0.013) (0.049) (0.111)
Years 4 4 3 3
Municipalities 980 495 980 495
Start Year 2002 2002 2006 2006
End Year 2014 2014 2014 2014
Muni FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,905 1,973 2,938 1,484
Adjusted R2 0.767 0.727 0.277 0.263
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table A.19.: Alternative models for presidential election results in Colombia dropping dropping
outlier municipalities with strong institutions (> 0.4). All models include municipal
and year fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the municipal and year level. Odd
numbered models include controls for time-variant measures of the proportion of rural





All Cases (log) Civil Cases (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Titling 5.712∗∗ 5.223∗ 5.549∗∗ 5.210∗∗
(2.473) (2.681) (2.459) (2.657)
Titling:Jud. Inst. −34.364∗∗∗ −33.911∗∗∗ −34.036∗∗∗ −34.515∗∗∗
(13.137) (12.087) (13.156) (11.932)
Rural −2.637∗∗ −2.658∗∗
(1.074) (1.068)
Mun. Income (log) −0.024∗ −0.023∗
(0.014) (0.013)
Displacement (log) −0.084 −0.093∗
(0.057) (0.054)
Victims (log) 0.081 0.092
(0.074) (0.070)
GDP per cap. (log) −0.461∗ −0.456∗
(0.250) (0.249)
Armed Actors 0.0001 −0.004
(0.029) (0.030)
Years 12 10 12 10
Municipalities 983 497 983 497
Start Year 2000 2000 2000 2000
End Year 2011 2009 2011 2009
Muni FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,796 4,970 11,796 4,970
Adjusted R2 0.880 0.814 0.864 0.797
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table A.20.: Alternative models for new judicial cases presented in Colombia dropping dropping
outlier municipalities with strong institutions (> 0.4). All models include municipal
and year fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the municipal and year level. Odd
numbered models include controls for time-variant measures of the proportion of rural
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Figure A.7.: Comparison of conditional effects of institutional weakness on the estimated marginal
effects of titling on electoral outcomes, dropping one municipality with high institu-
tional index measure (Gamarra, Cesar Department, index = 0.602). The black line
represents the point estimates of the marginal effect of treatment for different values
of Judicial Institutions. Grey bands are 95% confidence intervals.
273
Appendix
All Cases (log) Civil Cases (log)



















Figure A.8.: Comparison of conditional effects of institutional weakness on the estimated marginal
effects of titling on judicial cases, dropping one municipality with high institutional
index measure (Gamarra, Cesar Department, index = 0.602). The black line represents
the point estimates of the marginal effect of treatment for different values of Judicial




Turnout Inc. Vote Share Pres. Party Vote Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Titling 1.393∗∗∗ 1.101∗∗∗ −0.802 −0.837 1.481∗ 1.033
(0.373) (0.364) (1.960) (2.349) (0.900) (0.956)
Titling:Jud. Inst. (Ord.) −0.419∗∗∗ −0.377∗∗ −0.433 −0.443 −0.150 −0.102
(0.151) (0.150) (0.639) (0.731) (0.362) (0.376)
Rural −0.140∗ 0.192 0.676
(0.080) (0.314) (0.412)
Mun. Income (log) −0.002 0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.006) (0.010)
Displacement (log) −0.010 0.042 0.044
(0.007) (0.027) (0.039)
Victims (log) 0.005 −0.041 −0.052
(0.008) (0.035) (0.046)
Years 5 5 5 5 3 3
Municipalities 987 499 888 445 987 499
Start Year 2000 2000 2000 2000 2007 2007
End Year 2015 2015 2015 2015 2015 2015
Muni FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,616 2,319 2,320 1,158 2,956 1,484
Adjusted R2 0.771 0.751 0.217 0.274 0.221 0.240
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table A.21.: Results for municipal election results in Colombia with an alternative specification of
the judicial institutions interaction term as an ordinal variable. All models include
municipal and year fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the municipal and year
level. Even numbered models are subsetted for only municipalities that received some




Turnout Incumbent Vote Share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Titling 2.138∗∗∗ 1.314∗∗∗ 10.052∗∗∗ 9.780∗∗∗
(0.486) (0.410) (2.961) (3.343)
Titling:Jud. Inst. (Ord.) −0.557∗∗∗ −0.442∗∗ −3.316∗∗∗ −3.145∗∗
(0.191) (0.214) (1.261) (1.287)
Rural −0.012 0.057
(0.093) (0.433)
Mun. Income (log) −0.002 0.049
(0.002) (0.042)
Displacement (log) −0.007 0.164
(0.011) (0.130)
Victims (log) −0.001 −0.135
(0.013) (0.112)
Years 4 4 3 3
Municipalities 990 496 990 496
Start Year 2002 2002 2006 2006
End Year 2014 2014 2014 2014
Muni FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,945 1,977 2,968 1,487
Adjusted R2 0.760 0.727 0.265 0.269
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table A.22.: Results for presidential election results in Colombia with an alternative specification
of the judicial institutions interaction term as an ordinal variable. All models include
municipal and year fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the municipal and year
level. Even numbered models are subsetted for only municipalities that received some




All Cases (log) Civil Cases (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Titling 16.240∗∗ 15.268∗ 15.798∗∗ 15.321∗
(7.216) (8.318) (7.174) (8.216)
Titling:Jud. Inst. (Ord.) −5.907∗∗ −6.249∗∗ −5.836∗∗ −6.378∗∗
(2.421) (2.875) (2.417) (2.829)
Rural −2.870∗∗∗ −2.891∗∗∗
(1.086) (1.078)
Mun. Income (log) −0.023∗ −0.023∗
(0.014) (0.013)
Displacement (log) −0.084 −0.093∗
(0.057) (0.054)
Victims (log) 0.082 0.093
(0.074) (0.070)
GDP per cap. (log) −0.462∗ −0.458∗
(0.248) (0.248)
Armed Actors −0.001 −0.004
(0.029) (0.030)
Years 12 10 12 10
Municipalities 990 498 990 498
Start Year 2000 2000 2000 2000
End Year 2011 2009 2011 2009
Muni FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,880 4,980 11,880 4,980
Adjusted R2 0.880 0.813 0.863 0.796
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table A.23.: Results for new judicial cases presented in Colombia with an alternative specification
of the judicial institutions interaction term as an ordinal variable. All models include
municipal and year fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the municipal and year
level. Even numbered models are subsetted for only municipalities that received some








Turnout Incumbent Fujimorista Official Turnout (Pres.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Titling 0.030∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.004 0.011 0.588∗∗∗ 0.601∗∗∗ 0.057 0.057 −0.009 −0.007
(0.016) (0.017) (0.020) (0.022) (0.152) (0.153) (0.042) (0.042) (0.017) (0.018)
Tit.:Rondas −0.009∗ −0.009∗ −0.001 −0.0003 −0.148∗∗ −0.143∗∗ −0.002 −0.002 −0.001 −0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.073) (0.071) (0.014) (0.014) (0.006) (0.006)
Years 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 3
Districts 1543 642 1543 642 1545 643 1543 1543 1731 749
Start Year 1995 1995 1995 1995 1993 1993 2002 2002 2001 2001
End Year 2010 2010 2010 2010 1998 1998 2010 2010 2011 2011
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Titled Only No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 7,698 3,204 7,708 3,208 4,528 1,899 4,629 4,629 5,004 2,140
Adjusted R2 0.672 0.686 0.140 0.141 0.479 0.476 0.218 0.218 0.752 0.751
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table A.24.: Alternative models for municipal election results in Peru using an ordinal measure of Rondas Campesinas to
capture local institutional strength (0 to 4). All models include district and year fixed effects and cluster
standard errors at the district and year level. Even numbered models use a subset of municipalities that receive








Vote Pol. Interest Pol. Inform. Jud. Services Mun. Services
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
treat 0.125∗∗ 0.523∗∗ 0.392 0.066∗∗ 0.045
(0.049) (0.241) (0.288) (0.028) (0.039)
age −0.003∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.004 −0.0002 −0.001
(0.001) (0.0003) (0.003) (0.0002) (0.001)
female −0.026∗∗ −0.183∗∗∗ −0.209∗ 0.006 0.001
(0.011) (0.004) (0.109) (0.004) (0.007)
pobreza 0.009∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.004) (0.005) (0.042) (0.001) (0.004)
own.home 0.042∗∗∗ 0.014 0.020 −0.003 0.0002
(0.011) (0.009) (0.024) (0.006) (0.009)
group 0.004 0.065∗∗∗ 0.040 0.003 0.003
(0.005) (0.008) (0.047) (0.003) (0.003)
head 0.068∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗ 0.058∗∗ 0.003 0.001
(0.013) (0.011) (0.026) (0.005) (0.007)
educ2 0.029∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗ 0.001 0.0004
(0.009) (0.007) (0.100) (0.010) (0.010)
treat:rondas o −0.062∗∗∗ −0.179∗∗∗ −0.182 −0.028∗∗ −0.022
(0.016) (0.066) (0.131) (0.011) (0.016)
Years 4 4 4 5 5
Districts 1040 1066 1066 788 788
Start Year 2002 2004 2004 2002 2002
End Year 2007 2007 2007 2006 2006
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 25,048 26,516 27,862 36,117 36,117
Adjusted R2 0.081 0.168 0.170 0.084 0.101
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table A.25.: Alternative models for behavioral survey questions in Peru using an ordinal measure of Rondas Campesinas
to capture local institutional strength (0 to 4). All models include district and year fixed effects and cluster








Turnout Incumbent Fujimorista Official Turnout (Pres.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Titling 0.061∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ −0.014 −0.012 1.339∗∗∗ 1.328∗∗∗ −0.037 −0.037 −0.013 −0.015
(0.028) (0.028) (0.038) (0.038) (0.289) (0.284) (0.083) (0.083) (0.028) (0.028)
Tit.:Rondas −0.056∗ −0.057∗ 0.023 0.028 −1.199∗∗∗ −1.183∗∗∗ 0.093 0.093 0.001 0.006
(0.031) (0.031) (0.041) (0.041) (0.379) (0.373) (0.089) (0.089) (0.031) (0.030)
Years 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 3
Districts 1337 595 1337 595 1339 596 1337 1337 1506 692
Start Year 1995 1995 1995 1995 1993 1993 2002 2002 2001 2001
End Year 2010 2010 2010 2010 1998 1998 2010 2010 2011 2011
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Titled Only No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 6,672 2,970 6,681 2,974 3,955 1,761 4,011 4,011 4,348 1,979
Adjusted R2 0.671 0.693 0.139 0.143 0.473 0.472 0.222 0.222 0.754 0.755
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table A.26.: Alternative models for municipal election results in Peru using a subset of the data that excludes districts




A.4.3. Alternative Institutional Weakness Measures
• Tables A.27 and A.28 show results for a re-analysis of electoral outcomes and behavioral survey
responses for Peru using a measure of social capital as an interaction term.
• Tables A.29, A.30, and A.31, show results for a re-analysis of electoral outcomes (municipal
and presidential), judicial outcomes, and behavioral survey responses for Colombia using a








Turnout Incumbent Fujimorista Official
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Titling 0.027∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.003 0.011 0.215 0.227 0.030 −0.007
(0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.142) (0.143) (0.025) (0.027)
Titling:Social Cap. −0.071∗∗∗ −0.063∗∗∗ −0.002 −0.002 −0.043 0.033 0.075 0.073
(0.018) (0.018) (0.029) (0.030) (0.802) (0.790) (0.056) (0.058)
Years 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3
Districts 1543 642 1543 642 1545 643 1543 642
Start Year 1995 1995 1995 1995 1993 1993 2002 2002
End Year 2010 2010 2010 2010 1998 1998 2010 2010
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Titled Only No Yes No No No No No No
Observations 7,698 3,204 7,708 3,208 4,528 1,899 4,629 1,926
Adjusted R2 0.673 0.688 0.140 0.141 0.479 0.475 0.219 0.214
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table A.27.: Results of a re-analysis of district-level effects of titling on municipal election outcomes in Peru, conditional on
levels of social capital (participation in community associations) from the 1993 agriculture census. All models








Vote Pol. Int Pol. Inform. Jud. Services Mun. Services
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Titling −0.067 −0.067 0.055 0.099 −0.442 −0.438 −0.033 −0.038 −0.024 −0.032
(0.055) (0.065) (0.154) (0.133) (0.306) (0.335) (0.022) (0.030) (0.027) (0.036)
Titling:Social Cap. 0.101 0.097 −0.137 −0.111 1.370 1.373 0.081 0.079 0.028 0.024
(0.096) (0.094) (0.206) (0.215) (1.064) (1.036) (0.088) (0.086) (0.097) (0.096)
Age −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.004 −0.003 −0.0002 −0.0003 −0.001 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.001) (0.001)
Gender −0.026∗∗ −0.012 −0.183∗∗∗ −0.164∗∗∗ −0.209∗ −0.138 0.006 0.005 0.001 −0.0001
(0.011) (0.012) (0.004) (0.010) (0.108) (0.104) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010)
Poverty 0.009∗∗ 0.010∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.003 0.002 −0.001
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.042) (0.028) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007)
Own Home 0.042∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗ 0.013 0.019∗∗ 0.020 0.048 −0.003 −0.014 0.0002 −0.014
(0.011) (0.014) (0.009) (0.009) (0.025) (0.042) (0.006) (0.012) (0.009) (0.013)
Ethnic 0.004 0.002 0.065∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.040 0.037 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.011∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.046) (0.050) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Head House 0.068∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗ 0.036∗ 0.058∗∗ 0.083∗∗ 0.003 −0.00003 0.001 −0.003
(0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.020) (0.027) (0.039) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
Education 0.029∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗ 0.001 0.006 0.0005 0.006
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.101) (0.116) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Years 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5
Districts 1040 510 1066 513 1066 513 788 390 788 390
Start Year 2002 2002 2004 2004 2004 2004 2002 2002 2002 2002
End Year 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2006 2006 2006 2006
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Titled Only No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 25,048 13,316 26,516 14,887 27,862 15,521 36,117 19,648 36,117 19,648
Adjusted R2 0.080 0.079 0.167 0.162 0.170 0.165 0.084 0.084 0.101 0.101
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table A.28.: Results of a re-analysis of district-level effects of titling on behavioral survey questions in Peru, conditional on
levels of social capital (participation in community associations) from the 1993 agriculture census. All models
include individual-level (age, gender, poverty-level, home ownership, ethnicity, and education) and district-level









Turnout Inc. Vote Share Pres. Party Vote Share Turnout (Pres.) Inc. (Pres.) Vote Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Titling 2.640∗∗ 2.231∗∗ −1.989 0.208 0.424 0.900 1.403 0.644 21.444∗∗∗ 17.401∗∗
(1.033) (0.954) (5.549) (5.408) (3.331) (3.278) (1.942) (1.741) (7.995) (7.503)
Titling:Muni. Inst. −3.627∗∗ −3.303∗∗ 0.739 −2.935 0.875 −0.147 −0.738 −0.558 −30.726∗∗ −24.075∗∗
(1.548) (1.456) (8.721) (8.129) (5.675) (5.503) (3.494) (3.045) (12.765) (11.958)
Mun. Income (log) −0.149∗∗ 0.187 0.588 0.035 0.045
(0.068) (0.281) (0.453) (0.099) (0.463)
Rural −0.002∗ 0.001 0.003 −0.0005 0.037
(0.001) (0.005) (0.010) (0.002) (0.034)
Displacement (log) −0.009 0.046∗∗ 0.037 −0.005 0.144
(0.006) (0.023) (0.047) (0.011) (0.112)
Victims (log) 0.004 −0.043 −0.045 −0.002 −0.121
(0.007) (0.029) (0.053) (0.013) (0.094)
Years 5 5 5 5 3 3 4 4 3 3
Municipalities 1100 544 981 483 1100 544 1100 540 1100 540
Start Year 2000 2000 2000 2000 2007 2007 2002 2002 2006 2006
End Year 2015 2015 2015 2015 2015 2015 2014 2014 2014 2014
Muni FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,132 2,528 2,574 1,259 3,291 1,618 4,376 2,150 3,295 1,619
Adjusted R2 0.776 0.764 0.241 0.298 0.216 0.243 0.755 0.724 0.259 0.256
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table A.29.: Results for a re-analysis of the effects of titling on electoral outcomes conditional on a measure of local municipal
capacity in Colombia. All models include municipal and year fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the
municipal and year level. Even numbered models are subsetted for only municipalities that received some titling




All Cases (log) Civil Cases (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Titling 48.768∗∗ 44.983 49.348∗∗ 46.616∗
(21.951) (28.083) (21.959) (27.854)
Titling:Muni. Inst. −78.446∗∗ −75.838∗ −79.820∗∗ −78.868∗
(32.492) (41.803) (32.564) (41.484)
Rural −2.940∗∗∗ −2.965∗∗∗
(1.132) (1.121)
Mun. Income (log) −0.018 −0.018
(0.014) (0.014)
Displacement (log) −0.085 −0.093∗
(0.059) (0.056)
Victims (log) 0.087 0.096
(0.075) (0.072)
GDP per cap. (log) −0.536∗∗ −0.530∗∗
(0.248) (0.247)
Armed Actors −0.013 −0.018
(0.032) (0.032)
Years 12 10 12 10
Municipalities 1100 543 1100 543
Start Year 2000 2000 2000 2000
End Year 2011 2009 2011 2009
Muni FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 13,200 5,430 13,200 5,430
Adjusted R2 0.881 0.814 0.865 0.799
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table A.30.: Results for a re-analysis of the effects of titling on new judicial cases presented con-
ditional on a measure of local municipal capacity in Colombia. All models include
municipal and year fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the municipal and year
level. Even numbered models are subsetted for only municipalities that received some








Vote Political Interest Conflict Resolution Protest
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Titling −2.848 35.494∗∗ 43.263 105.876 283.182∗∗∗ 297.763∗∗∗ 70.858∗∗∗ 96.448∗∗∗
(12.771) (17.827) (38.679) (151.346) (77.103) (92.561) (17.925) (29.968)
Titling:Muni. Inst. 6.405 −60.717∗ −65.415 −210.653 −442.210∗∗∗ −451.488∗∗∗ −104.282∗∗∗ −123.651∗∗∗
(22.801) (33.620) (63.452) (281.374) (119.002) (144.813) (24.177) (36.810)
Rural −1.215 −27.979∗∗∗ 2.278 8.340∗∗∗
(0.901) (7.257) (4.399) (2.483)
Displacement (log) 0.045 0.125 0.036 −0.019
(0.032) (0.586) (0.059) (0.050)
Victims (log) −0.017 −0.125 −0.008 0.030
(0.038) (0.633) (0.057) (0.062)
GDP per cap. (log) 0.169 0.523 0.178 −0.288
(0.287) (0.590) (0.314) (0.203)
Armed Actors −0.032 −0.075∗∗∗ 0.027 −0.006
(0.022) (0.022) (0.042) (0.016)
Years 8 6 6 4 5 5 5 5
Municipalities 35 35 34 34 35 35 35 35
Start Year 2004 2004 2006 2006 2004 2004 2004 2004
End Year 2011 2009 2011 2009 2008 2008 2008 2008
Muni FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,092 1,989 2,341 1,324 1,772 1,535 1,909 1,636
Adjusted R2 0.026 0.110 0.016 0.056 0.037 0.034 0.034 0.073
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table A.31.: Results for a re-analysis of the effects of titling on behavioral survey questions conditional on a measure of local
municipal capacity in Colombia. All models include municipal and year fixed effects and cluster standard errors
at the municipal and year level.
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